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Copyright, broadly defined, is a legal form of proprietary ownership of authored works, 
including literary, pictorial, musical, and selected other intellectual kinds. Ideally, one 
who is familiar with the law should know whether something they have created is 
protected by copyright (and to what extent), and whether some action they take will 
infringe a copyright. Unfortunately, this is often not the case. Rather, established 
copyright law gives rise to a host of problems, including legal decisions and established 
doctrines that are alternatively arbitrary, counterintuitive, and contradictory.  
My central argument is that these problems arise from a failure in copyright law 
to recognize the nature of its objects, authored works, and that a coherent and stable 
approach to copyright must be built upon such an understanding. To this end, I outline an 
ontology of authored works suitable for grounding both the legal and ethical domains of 
copyright. 
Centrally, I contend, a reasonable understanding of copyright depends on grasping 
four composite dimensions of authored works: their atomic dimension—the parts of 
which they are composed, and the selection and arrangement of these parts; their causal 
dimension—their contexts of creation and instantiation, and the weak and strong 
historical links that connect a given work to others; their abstract dimension—that all 
such works are best understood as type/token entities capable of multiple instantiation; 
and their categorial dimension—that multiple works belonging to mutually-exclusive 
categories can be embodied in the same physical object. On an understanding of these 
factors, I establish conditions for the copyrightability of authored works, for the 
infringement of these copyrights, and for the creation of “derivative works.”  
Finally, I consider the right of copyright. First showing how the strongest 
contenders for grounding this right—the Lockean and Constitutional approaches—fail to 
align with our understanding of authored works, I sketch an alternative approach—one 
based on the author’s creativity as realized in the authored work—building on the 
ontological account outlined above, and for establishing the extent of this right, including 
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In 2003, a photograph by Richard Prince, “Untitled (Cowboy),” sold at 
Christie’s Auction House for $332,300. Some might be surprised that a 
photograph could garner such a princely sum, but—in this case at least—
none more so than Jim Krantz. Krantz might be allowed a certain unique 
incredulity, for Prince’s photograph was a photograph of another 
photograph, this one taken by Krantz himself while on commercial 
assignment for Marlboro. Indeed, Prince has based entire gallery shows on 
photographs of Krantz’s commercial work.  
* * * 
In 2007, the Fraser Gallery in Bethesda, Maryland, displayed a series of 
photographs taken by local artist Doug Sanford. The photographs depicted 
e-mailed letters sent to him throughout the previous year by an ex-
girlfriend, stating variously: “I don’t love you anymore,” “I hope you 
suffer horribly,” and the like. Sanford had not received permission from 
the letter writer, and she entreated both Sanford and the gallery to remove 
the works from display. Sanford argued that his work had transformed the 
e-mails into something new: “The words are the subject. I’ve never said 
the words are mine. … If I were selling her words and calling them mine, 
there would be a copyright issue.”1 
* * * 
                                               
1 Quoted in Jessica Gould, “Mad About You: An artist’s photos of an ex’s angry e-mails prompt even more 
anger.” Washington City Paper (Washington, DC), 2 February 2007. 
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In 2008, J.K. Rowling, author of the popular Harry Potter novel series, 
filed suit against Steven Vander Ark for his role in contributing to a 
proposed unauthorized publication, Harry Potter Lexicon. Ark edits a 
website containing a database of original essays and encyclopedic material 
based on the Potter series. Rowling claims she intends to publish her own 
Harry Potter encyclopedia, and that the Harry Potter Lexicon illegally 
infringes her part in the copyright to materials in the Harry Potter series. 
 
Ideally, one who is familiar with the details of the law should know whether something 
they have created is protected by copyright (and to what extent), and whether some action 
they take will infringe a copyright. Unfortunately, however, this is often not the case. 
Although intellectual property in general, and copyright in particular, has in recent years 
become a popular topic in the media, and is regularly debated in legal literature, 
discussion of the matter in the domain of philosophy remains surprisingly minimal. 
However, addressing both the ethical and legal issues arising in cases such as those 
above, as well as determining if any wrongdoing has occurred, depends on the sorts of 
rights that creators can claim over their works—and, as I argue in the chapters that 
follow, these rights in turn ultimately depend on the nature of the works themselves. 
Providing an understanding of this nature, and showing how it impacts one’s rights and 
the rights of others, will be the central project of this dissertation.  
In Chapter One, I provide a brief historical account of American copyright law, 
and an outline of the central concepts employed in the law to determine when a work may 
be copyrighted, and when that copyright has been infringed. However, as an examination 
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of these concepts and their application in real-world cases will show, the conceptual 
framework of copyright law leads to results that are alternatively arbitrary, counter-
intuitive, and, taken as a whole, often self-contradictory. The root cause of these 
collective problems, I argue, is metaphysical in nature. In particular, I contend that while 
American copyright law assumes some metaphysical basis to its objects, it fails to 
provide a suitable ontological basis necessary for its administration. Partly, this seems the 
result of judges being left to their own devices to determine the nature of the objects of 
copyright, and partly it seems the result of concepts ingrained in the law that are 
themselves metaphysically confused. 
As such, the central project of my dissertation is to provide a comprehensive, 
coherent, and consistent ontological groundwork for determining the copyrightability of 
authored works—the objects of copyright—and the infringement of these copyrights. 
However, doing so first requires setting out in some detail the factors that serve to gird 
this account. 
 In Chapters Two through Four, I build the foundations to my ontological account, 
outlining the atomic, causal, abstract, and categorial dimensions of authored works. 
Beginning with the atomic dimension, in Chapter Two, I provide an outline of the various 
properties and entities of which authored works are composed, and a guide to thinking 
about “atomic similarity” between distinct works. As well, I establish the author’s act of 
creation as the selection and arrangement of these properties and entities to constitute the 
new work. 
In Chapter Three, I turn my attention to the causal dimension of authored works, 
and in particular to their unique contexts of creation, and to the causal chains by which 
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they are linked. Building on the work of Jerrold Levinson, I argue that a work’s context 
of creation (determined by when, where, and by whom it was created) can be 
distinguished from any particular instance’s context of instantiation (determined by 
when, where, and by whom it was instantiated), such that works are uniquely identifiable 
by the former and particular instances of those works by the latter. Having thus provided 
a means for distinguishing works, I outline two causal means by which works are 
connected: weak historical links—weak asymmetric dependency relations such that the 
properties of some given work depend counterfactually upon properties held in common 
by a body of pre-existing works; and strong historical links—strong asymmetric 
dependency relations such that the properties of some given work depend 
counterfactually upon properties of some particular pre-existing work. 
In Chapter Four, I discuss the abstract dimension of authored works, in particular 
the view that authored works are best understood as type/token entities—that is, as 
created abstract objects capable of multiple instantiation and to be distinguished from the 
physical objects in which they are instantiated. I defend this view against proposals that 
works are best understood as universals and particulars (both Platonic and Aristotelian), 
as kinds and instances (vide Nicholas Wolterstorff), and as action types and action tokens 
(alternatively proposed by Gregory Currie and David Davies). Further, I consider in this 
chapter a line of argumentation begun by Nelson Goodman and further advanced by 
Jerrold Levinson that some categories of works are not capable of multiple 
instantiation—are essentially singular in nature—and thus fail to qualify as entities of a 
type/token sort. Finally, I investigate the complex ontological issues raised by notations 
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and templates, and translations and adaptations, each best understood as drawing on the 
type/token ontology. 
In Chapter Five, I discuss the categorial dimension of authored works. In 
particular, following Kendall Walton, I contend that many of the properties a work 
possesses depend on that work’s being viewed in the correct category, although the field 
of authored works contains a variety of “utilitarian” kinds that outstretch the categories of 
art works, and so complicate matters. In particular, I argue, a given object can embody 
multiple authored works belonging to mutually-exclusive categories of works. Finally, I 
return to the argument that some categories of works are essentially singular in nature, 
and consider a variation on this argument proposed by Mark Sagoff. 
In Chapter Six, I set out my central argument, building on the ontological factors 
outlined in the foregoing chapters. In particular, I argue that the copyrightability of 
authored works depends on such a work being of a new type—and that this in turn 
requires that either the new work possess atomic properties that differ from those of any 
pre-existing work, or that the work fail to possess strong historical links to any pre-
existing work. I further argue that infringing the copyright of some pre-existing work 
requires that the new work be atomically similar to some pre-existing work, and that the 
properties held in common between the two works be connected by strong historical 
links. 
On this account, I seek in Chapter Seven to ground the claims of copyright-
holders to own their works. Thus concerned with the right of copyright, I first seek to 
show how the strongest contenders for grounding such a right—the Lockean and 
Constitutional approaches—fail to align with our understanding of authored works, and 
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second to sketch an alternative approach to grounding this right—a right based on the 
author’s creativity as realized in the authored work. It is on an understanding of authored 
works and how they come about, I argue, that the copyright-holder gains his right to 
determine under what conditions a work may be instantiated, whether in whole or in part. 
Finally in this chapter, I investigate the extent of copyright, including the limits and 
duration of this right, and claims that users of copyrighted works—that is, members of 
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The Objects and Concepts of Copyright Law 
 
What you are reading right now is protected by copyright. At least, most of it is. That is 
to say, the words aren’t protected, nor are the ideas they express, but somehow it is. And 
because it is protected by copyright, you are legally forbidden to copy it (though you’re 
perfectly free to write the same words in the same order on your own). Moreover, you are 
forbidden to make an audio recording of it, or to adapt it into a play or a movie (however 
unlikely that may be). Had I only spoken the words, however, and not written them 
down, you would be free to copy them at will. Such is the domain of copyright law.  
 
A Brief Introduction to Copyright 
Although once merely the purview of novelists and mapmakers, today copyright affects 
nearly everyone. If, in the last 30 years, you have written, drawn, or constructed anything 
with even a modicum of creativity, chances are, that thing is protected by copyright. 
What exactly that “thing” is, however, and what your protection over it amounts to, are 
complex, non-trivial, and deeply philosophical issues. Problematically, copyright law has 
focused primarily on issues of the rights of copyright, and not the nature of its objects, or 
else has estimated the latter in its attempts to explicate the former, and it is from here that 
the problems of copyright arise. 
Copyright, broadly defined, is a legal form of proprietary ownership of authored 
works, including literary, pictorial, musical, dramatic, and selected other intellectual 
kinds. Copyright ownership is essentially a cluster of rights centered around such 
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authored works, allowing the owner to reproduce, distribute, display, and create 
derivative works based upon the original. 
Modern copyright law, generally, stems from Great Britain’s Statute of Anne 
(1709), a law that repealed a 150-year-old general monopoly enjoyed by Britain’s 
printing guild, the Stationer’s Company. Members of the Company purchased 
manuscripts from authors and thereafter held a perpetual monopoly on printing the work. 
The new Statute removed the monopoly from the printers, and placed it instead in the 
hands of the authors themselves (though for a limited duration). So enacted, the Statute 
would serve not only as the basis for future copyright law in Britain, but also as the 
inspiration for copyright law elsewhere in the world. 
Copyright in the United States is formally based on Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 
of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 Using language largely 
adapted from the Statute of Anne, Congress originally enacted this power in the 
Copyright Act of 1790. Brief in its detail,2 and initially protecting only maps, charts, and 
books (paintings, drawings, and music would be added later), the complexity of cases 
would quickly outstrip the brevity of the Act. The law was revised in the Copyright Act 
of 1909, and again in the Copyright Act of 1976, with the latter Act serving as the 
primary grounding for current copyright law in the U.S. (entered into the U.S. Code as 
                                               
1 This sentence in the Constitution (known as the “Intellectual Property Clause”) also forms the basis for 
patent law, with copyright factoring over “Science” (employing an archaic definition of the term),  
“Authors”, and “Writings”, and patent dealing with “the useful Arts”, “Inventors”, and “Discoveries”. 
2 See Columbian Central (Boston), 17 July 1790. 
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Title 17). The law has continued to develop, both with revisions that bring the Act in line 
with international treaties, and with court decisions that interpret the Act.3 
 
Untangling the Concepts of Copyright 
In general, copyright law is meant to establish, first, when a work may obtain a valid 
copyright, and, second, when another work infringes upon that copyright. My central 
argument in this dissertation will be that, although interpretation and application of 
copyright law is an active and lively enterprise, its legal and ethical implications rest 
ultimately on questions of a metaphysical nature. That is, what rights one has or does not 
have with regard to the objects of copyright will depend largely on the nature of those 
objects. Although the Constitution specifically mentions “authors” and their “writings”, 
the evolution of the Copyright Act has expanded the objects of copyright law to include 
not only additional categories of art and artist, but also such items as computer programs, 
boat hulls, and other articles of industrial design. As well, the nature of copyright law 
excludes a variety of traditional artworks, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Given 
this unusual domain of copyright, I shall use the term “authored works” to refer to its 
objects, generally.  
Distinguished from plagiarism (an act of presenting another’s ideas as one’s own), 
copyright infringement involves the unauthorized appropriation of the expression of 
                                               
3 Although most countries have their own copyright laws, this dissertation will focus specifically on U.S. 
copyright law. Primarily, this is for obvious practical reasons: analyzing the copyright law of countless 
nations is a gargantuan task. As well, a variety of international treaties over copyright and intellectually 
property, generally, have worked to establish at least some international standards. As such, while U.S. 
copyright law is by no means universal, many of its central elements are mirrored in the laws of other 
countries. Some essential points of difference, however, will be discussed in relevant chapters to come. 
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another’s ideas.4 This expression may take the form of a literary, musical, pictorial, 
audio-visual, or other work, and it is the work itself that is protected, not the idea that it 
embodies. This distinction between the idea and its expression is just one of the central 
concepts employed by the law to establish when a work may be copyrighted, and when 
that copyright has been infringed. In the following sections, I will outline these central 
concepts, some derived directly from the Constitution, some set in the Copyright Act and 
its legislative history, and others stemming from an assortment of court decisions. As 
these decisions illustrate, however, enactment of copyright law has led to problematic 
conclusions that are variously counterintuitive, arbitrary, and contradictory. This is, I 
argue, the result of ambiguity with regard to the objects of copyright. While legal and 
philosophical discussion on copyright tends to revolve around its ethical and 
constitutional entailments, such debate regularly fails to investigate the root of the 
problem: the nature of the kinds of things being protected. 
In untangling the central concepts of copyright in this chapter, I will show that not 
only are the problems that arise from them essentially metaphysical in nature, so too are 
the concepts themselves. Overall, the essential metaphysical nature of these concepts 
points to a foundational problem: while copyright law assumes some metaphysical basis 
of its objects, it provides no actual such basis upon which its concepts are built. As such, 
the problems that arise in copyright law are not only endemic, but also foundational and 
systemic in nature. 
                                               
4 Certainly, plagiarism may take the form of copying another’s words verbatim, but this is simply a 
specialized case of plagiarism, one which ventures also into the domain of copyright infringement. 
Plagiarism is an ethical, but not a legal, issue in the United States. While laws are perhaps designed to 
reflect and enforce our ethical intuitions, not all of our ethical intuitions are reflected in the law. 
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i. Originality 
The objects of copyright are sketched out in §102 of the 1976 Copyright Act: 
 
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.5 
 
This passage contains two central concepts in copyright theory: that of an ‘original work 
of authorship’, and that of being ‘fixed in a tangible medium of expression’. The first of 
these concepts will be the subject of this section; the second will be taken up in the 
following section. 
 “Originality” is not defined in §101 of the 1976 Act (which sets out other critical 
definitions for terms in use throughout the Act), though legislative history and court 
findings set the bar for what constitutes originality quite low. The 1976 Senate House 
Report that forms the legislative history of the Act notes, “The phrase ‘original works of 
authorship,’ which is purposely left undefined, was intended to incorporate without 
change the standard of originality established by the courts under the [1909 Copyright 
Act]. This standard does not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, 
and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them.”6 
This is to say, under the 1976 Act, a work need not be novel: it need not (a) express 
                                               
5 Copyright Act of 1976, §102, reproduced in Cohen et al. (2006b) Copyright in a Global Information 
Economy 2006 Statutory Supplement, 10. 
6 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976) , reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665-66. 
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unique ideas, nor (b) express ideas in a unique manner. Moreover, it need not possess any 
discernible aesthetic merit.7 Even so, novelty and aesthetic merit aside, court cases have 
continued to test the bar for what constitutes originality under these broad conditions. 
In the case of Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger (1959), known as the “Hand of God 
case,” the plaintiff laboriously reproduced the Carnegie Institute’s bronze casting of 
Auguste Rodin’s Hand of God on a smaller scale. The defendant marketed similar 
reproductions, and the plaintiff filed suit. The defendant claimed to have copied the 
casting possessed by the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and argued that the plaintiff’s 
reproduction was not original, and therefore not protected by copyright. Based on this 
case, the court introduced a new test for originality, under which a work is “original” if it 
is created by the reproducer’s “own skill, labor, and judgment without directly copying or 
evasively imitating the work of another.” It contended that the plaintiff’s reproduction 
satisfied this condition.8 
 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. (1991), Rural, a 
publisher of local residential telephone directories, filed suit against Feist, a publisher of 
area-wide telephone directories, on the basis that Feist had incorporated a large number 
of listings from Rural’s directory into Feist’s more encompassing directory. Feist did not 
contest that it had copied Rural’s listings, but rather that the listings were not protected by 
copyright. The court agreed: “[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The 
distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a 
                                               
7 The exclusion of artistic merit as a basis for copyrightability was established in the finding of Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co. 188 U.S. 239 (1903), in which Justice Holmes states, “It would be a 
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth 
of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” 
8 Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (SDNY 1959). Certainly, given this interpretation, it 
seems reasonable to say that the defendant had not copied the plaintiff’s work. It is unclear in the decision, 
however, why either the defendant’s or the plaintiff’s works should qualify as “original”, given that each 
copied from Rodin’s work. 
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particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.”9 As 
such, the basis for originality is set in the creative act of the author—merely that “the 
work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), 
and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”10 Rural had not created 
the facts that it published, certainly, so the question was whether it had created anything 
else in the publication. Perhaps, it was thought, what Rural had created was a unique 
organization of the facts (which would qualify the directory as a compilation, and 
therefore copyrightable in the same way that an anthology is copyrightable separately 
from its component articles11). If this were the case, while Feist would be free to copy the 
facts themselves, it would not be free to copy their particular organization and selection, 
as had been done. However, the court found that Rural’s laborious contribution of 
selecting certain facts to publish, and of organizing the listings alphabetically, failed to 
meet the low bar of originality: 
 
Rural’s selection of listings could not be more obvious: It publishes the 
most basic information—name, town, and telephone number—about each 
person who applies to it for telephone service. This is “selection” of a sort, 
but it lacks the modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere 
selection into copyrightable expression. Rural expended sufficient effort to 
                                               
9 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). The conceptual issue of 
“facts” will be further explored in §iv, below. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Particular rules govern the copyrightability of compilations under §103 of the 1976 Act. 
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make the white pages directory useful, but insufficient creativity to make 
it original.12 
 
We are left asking, what would be sufficiently creative to constitute originality? What is 
this modicum of necessary creativity? Unfortunately, even when dealing with virtually 
identical cases, the courts have come to contradictory conclusions regarding originality, 
as shown in the following two examples. 
In Boosey v. Empire Music Co. (1915), plaintiffs argued that a musical 
composition, “I Hear You Calling Me,” was infringed by the defendant’s composition, 
“Tennessee, I Hear You Calling Me.” In particular, it was argued the refrain, “I hear you 
calling me”—both the words, and the accompanying six notes—were identical in each 
song, and that this musical phrase was the prominent aspect of the plaintiff’s piece. The 
court found that “the use of this similar phraseology and the similar bars of music” was 
sufficient to warrant the charge of copyright infringement.13 
 Similarly, in 1983, Les Baxter sued composer John T. Williams, arguing that 
Williams’ theme to the film E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial lifted a series of six notes from 
Baxter’s song “Joy”. After a series of appeals, however, a jury found that, though 
Williams was so familiar with “Joy” that he had performed it in concert, and though the 
same series of notes appeared in each work, a series of six notes is not original material 
protected by copyright. 
Although the Boosey and Baxter cases involved more than the copying of two 
series of six notes, what is at issue here is the findings by the courts about the series of 
                                               
12 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
13 Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 F. 646 (SDNY 1915) 
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notes in each case.14 One case presumes that a short musical passage has been created by 
the artist, and the other argues that such a passage cannot be. Surely, both results cannot 
be true.15 What, we must ask, is thus the minimum of creativity—in music, in literature, 
in the visual arts? 
  
ii. “Fixed” Tangible Form 
Prior to the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act, works were protected by a dual 
system of copyright protection. At the federal level, works were protected by the 1909 
Copyright Act, but this Act required that a work be published in order to secure federal 
copyright protection. Unpublished authored works, meanwhile, were protected under 
state common law copyright (laws set by the courts, rather than by statute, and differing 
by state as precedents differed). The act of publication eliminated protection for that work 
under common law, and opened the door for federal protection. Securing federal 
protection, however, required submitting to a host of formalities, most centrally including 
affixing proper copyright notice to the work. Failure to affix copyright notice meant the 
work failed to qualify for federal protection, and since the publication of the work 
eliminated common law protection, the work fell into the public domain.16  
                                               
14 In Boosey v. Empire Music Co., the case involves the copying of both the music and the accompanying 
words. The final outcome of the Baxter and Williams case depended further on whether the jury found 
“Theme to E.T.” to be “strikingly similar” to “Joy”. This matter is essentially an issue of the weight of 
evidence of infringement. The concept of “substantial similarity” is discussed later in this chapter. 
15 The Boosey and Baxter cases are not isolated incidents. See Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959, 960 (2d 
Cir. 1923) (implication that copying six bars of music is not actionable); Northern Music Corp. v. King 
Record Distributing Co., 105 F. Supp. 393 (SDNY 1952) (similarity of four bars actionable); Gingg v. 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 56 F. Supp. 701 (SD Cal. 1944) (similarity in two to four bars not 
actionable); Robertson v. Batten, Bardon, Durstine & Obcorn, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795 (SD Cal. 1956) 
(similarity in two to four bars actionable). 
16 The original term of copyright protection under the 1909 Act lasted 28 years from the date of publication. 
Copyright holders had to submit to further formalities upon the expiration of this term to gain a further 28-
year term. Again, failure to properly submit to these formalities resulted in the work’s falling into the 
public domain. 
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 Perhaps more problematic than the practical issues involved in securing federal 
copyright protection under the 1909 Act was the conceptual issue of exactly what 
qualified as “publication” of a work. The 1909 Act did not expressly define 
“publication”, though §26 notes that “‘the date of publication’ shall […] be held to be the 
earliest date when copies of the first authorized edition were placed on sale, sold, or 
publicly distributed by the proprietor of the copyright or under his authority.”17 Although 
this stipulation seemed to easily encompass such cases as books, periodicals, maps, and 
motion pictures, other categories of works proved more problematic. Notoriously, the 
public performance of a spoken drama did not constitute publication.18 And precisely 
what would qualify as the “publication” of a statue, painting, or other singular work 
remained an open question. Finally, in the decades following the institution of the 1909 
Act, the advent of new media, in particular radio and television, continued to test the 
boundaries of what qualified as publication. Would the broadcasting of a speech, 
dramatization, or musical performance (whether live or previously recorded) over 
television or radio constitute “publication”? Further, if a Broadway play ran for years, 
with the script of the play eventually being published in book form, would the play itself 
be protected under federal or state protection? 
 The creation of the 1976 Act was implemented, in part, to resolve these issues, as 
well as to eliminate the dual system of copyright protection. Under the new Act, federal 
copyright protection began not with the publication of the work, but with its fixation in a 
tangible form. This requirement is laid out in §101 of the 1976 Act: 
 
                                               
17 Copyright Act of 1909, §26, available at http://www.kasunic.com/1909_act.htm 
18 See Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912) 
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A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the 
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are 
being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the 
work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.19 
 
On its face, this new requirement seemed to solve many of the questions left open by the 
1909 Act20: public performance of a dramatic work still did not qualify for copyright 
protection, though the script from which the director and actors worked did, even without 
publication, so the dramatic work was indeed protected; statues, paintings, and other 
singular works (“published” or not) qualified for copyright protection from the moment 
they were created; and while the broadcast of a live performance by television or radio 
did not itself qualify the performance for copyright protection, a simultaneous recording 
of the performance did. 
 These effective improvements notwithstanding, the new requirement of “fixation” 
breeds its own sorts of conceptual problems. What qualifies as “sufficiently” permanent 
or stable? What are the bounds of “transitory” duration? Is this a reasonable basis on 
which to ground protection? Certainly, a work’s being “fixed” has practical 
repercussions: if it is not fixed, establishing that infringement has occurred will be 
                                               
19 Copyright Act of 1976, §101, reproduced in Cohen et al. (2006b), 6. 
20 Note, however, that the institution of the 1976 Act could not entirely solve the problems left behind by 
the 1909 Act, as works created before the effective date of the 1976 Act continue to be governed by the 
former rules. 
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difficult at best, for it will not be possible to compare the original work and the infringing 
one. However, consider the following scenario: 
 
Murphy, a horn player, performs an improvised composition in a jazz 
club. Taffy is in the audience, and makes an audio recording of the 
performance, unbeknownst to Murphy. Because the jazz composition is 
improvised, Murphy did not “fix” the work, either as a score or as a 
recording (what copyright law calls a “phonorecord”). However, because 
Taffy did record the performance, on the principle of fixation, Taffy owns 
the copyright on the recording. And, as such, any later performance of the 
composition (even by Murphy) may arguably constitute infringement of 
Taffy’s copyright. 
 
Certainly, this is a less-than-satisfying conclusion. Intuitively, Murphy created the work, 
and without a contract or some other basis to the contrary, it seems unreasonable that 
Taffy should manage to secure the copyright on the composition.21 Similar problems 
promise to arise for improvised speeches, stand-up comedy routines, and other such 
“unfixed” works. 
In this case, Murphy might consider two possible routes to circumventing this 
conclusion. First, Murphy might argue that, as the artist, he had not authorized Taffy to 
make the recording and, as such, given the specification in §101 that a fixation must be 
made “under the authority of the author,” the recording would not qualify for copyright 
                                               
21 Similarly, we might consider a gifted audience member who, instead of recording the composition by 
audio-visual means, simply made a written score of the composition as Murphy improvised it on stage. 
Virtually identical issues will arise. 
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protection. However, while Murphy is intuitively the author of the composition, 
legislative history would seem to establish Taffy as the author of the recording. In the 
1976 Senate House Report, discussing the broadcast of football games, it is argued that 
“there is little doubt that what the cameramen and the director are doing constitutes 
‘authorship.’”22 Certainly, Taffy is performing a similar action to that of the cameramen 
and director of the football game broadcast. And, like the actions of the football players 
captured by the cameramen, Murphy’s improvised composition (in and of itself) fails to 
qualify for copyright protection. 
Second, Murphy might appeal to a 1994 amendment to the 1976 Act enacted by 
Congress to implement the World Trade Organization’s TRIPs (Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement, intended to establish minimum intellectual 
property standards to WTO member-nations. Added as §1101 to the 1976 Act, the 
amendment is meant to protect live musical performances, specifying that anyone who 
(without consent of the performers) fixes the sounds and/or images of the live 
performance shall be subject to the same remedies and “to the same extent as an infringer 
of copyright.”23 However, while this rule appears as a part of the Copyright Act, it neither 
(a) establishes any copyright ownership on the part of Murphy, nor (b) blocks any 
copyright ownership on the part of Taffy. It simply specifies that Taffy shall be punished 
for his bootlegging activity to the same extent as an infringer of copyright. Further note 
that §1101 specifically applies to musical performances, and not to improvised speeches, 
stand-up comedy acts, or other such performances.  
                                               
22 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665-66. 
23 Copyright Act of 1976, §1101, reproduced in Cohen et al. (2006b), 182. 
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If a musician’s own recording of his work is copyrightable by the musician, it 
seems deeply counterintuitive to withhold copyright protection on the basis that he 
improvised the work. Likewise, while a comedian can copyright a book of jokes, it seems 
counterintuitive that he should not be able to copyright precisely the same jokes if they 
are delivered in a live performance without being written down. Under the rules of the 
1976 Act, Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous “I Have a Dream” speech would only be 
copyrightable because he had first written it down. If the same words had come to King 
only as he spoke them, under the Act, he would not hold a copyright (though the various 
news organizations who filmed the speech might).24 In effect, King would have no legal 
claim to own the speech, nor the jazz musician his music, nor the comedian his jokes. 
Here, we must ask, is there some essential difference between the instantiation of 
a work in “fixed” and “unfixed” forms? And, if so, should this difference be taken to 
indicate that these are, indeed, instantiations of different works? If not, on what 
reasonable basis do we offer copyright protection to one, and not to the other? 
 
iii. Substantial Similarity and Derivative Works 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, copyright is essentially a cluster of exclusive rights 
held by the copyright owner. Copyright ownership allows the owner to reproduce, 
distribute, display, and create derivative works based upon the original.25 The vast 
majority of cases of purported copyright infringement fall into two categories: (1) the 
unauthorized reproduction of whole copyrighted works (or parts thereof), and (2) the 
                                               
24 In fact, King’s estate successfully defended the copyright of his speech against claims by CBS that the 
speech was not copyrightable. As the speech was delivered prior to the effective date of the 1976 Act, 
however, the argument by CBS was made on the basis that the speech was not published. Estate of Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc. 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999)  
25 These rights are more fully detailed in §106 of the 1976 Act, reproduced in Cohen et al. (2006b), 17-18. 
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unauthorized appropriation of elements of a copyrighted work into a new work.26 Cases 
of the first type tend to include the copying of musical recordings (whether a single song 
or an entire album), movies, books (or chapters therein), articles, and the like. Such cases 
tend to be relatively straightforward.27 Conversely, cases of the second type tend to be 
much more problematic, as they tend to turn on less obvious issues of appropriation. This 
second type can be further broken down into (i) cases of “derivative works”, and (ii) 
cases of what I will call “elemental” appropriation. To better clarify this distinction, 
consider the definition of a “derivative work” as outlined in §101 of the 1976 Act: 
 
A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, 
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, 
represent an original work or authorship, is a “derivative work”.28 
 
This category of work encompasses a wide berth of cases, including the adaptation of 
works from one medium to another (what I will call “transmediations”), and new works 
based on previously-existing works of the same medium (including translations, revised 
editions, “cover songs”, and the like). This said, it should be obvious that an artist can 
                                               
26 At times, determining whether a purported case of infringement falls into (1) or (2) is less than simple, 
particularly in cases dealing with copying across media. 
27 Though many such cases turn on the issue of “Fair Use”. This doctrine of copyright law will be further 
discussed in Chapter Seven. 
28 Copyright Act of 1976, §101, reproduced in Cohen et al. (2006b), 5. 
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appropriate elements of a previously-existing work without going so far as to “adapt” or 
“revise” that work. The artist might take a phrase of music, a character from a novel or 
film, a visual element of a painting, and so on. Unlike the appropriation of book chapters 
or songs from albums (which might arguably be considered parts of a larger work), 
however, “elemental” appropriation involves inserting those elements appropriated into a 
new work. This was the sort of appropriation being considered in the Feist, Boosey, and 
Baxter cases outlined above. 
 Historically, establishing infringement in cases of purported derivative works and 
cases of elemental appropriation tends to turn on the issue of “substantial similarity” 
between one work and another. However, as Justice Torruela notes in the decision on 
Concrete Machinery Co., Ltd v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc. (1988), “Substantial 
similarity is an elusive concept, not subject to precise definition.”29 Courts have 
employed a variety of tests for substantial similarity. Two of the most common are the 
“extrinsic test” or “pattern test” and the “intrinsic test” or “ordinary observer test”. The 
“extrinsic test” or “pattern test” is generally employed to compare narrative works, and 
focuses on individual features of each work to find specific similarities in plot, theme, 
dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters and sequence of events.30 The “intrinsic test” or 
“ordinary observer test” asks whether an “ordinary, reasonable observer would find a 
substantial similarity of expression” of the ideas shared between the two works. It asks if 
there is substantial similarity in “the total concept and feel of the works.”31 
                                               
29 Concrete Machinery Co., Ltd v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988) 
30 See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir.); Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451 (SDNY 1965). 
31 See Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984); Pasillas v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 
440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991); MicroStar v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998); Smith v. 
Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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A simple case should illustrate the problems inherent in deciding a case of 
copyright infringement on tests for substantial similarity. Both Piet Mondrian and Theo 
van Doesburg were non-representational Dutch painters, each contributing to the neo-
plasticist and De Stijl art movements in the early part of the 20th Century. They knew 
each other well, belonging at one point to the same artists’ colony. Certainly, their works 
heavily influenced each other. Indeed, each artist’s paintings tend to depict complex 
interlocking patterns of squares and rectangles, sometimes in color and sometimes in 
black and white. Given the standard tests for substantial similarity, and given nearly any 
two paintings, either Mondrian or van Doesburg could be found guilty of copyright 
infringement, depending on which work was painted first. Certainly the works of 
Mondrian and van Doesburg are “substantially similar” but it seems deeply problematic 
to argue that either artist was doing anything wrong in being influenced—even heavily 
influenced—by the other. 
The case of Gross v. Seligman (1914) centers on the purported copyright 
infringement of a nude photograph taken by the defendant. After taking the original 
photograph, the defendant sold its copyright to the plaintiff. Two years later, however, 
the defendant reproduced the photograph, and the plaintiff subsequently filed suit. 
However, rather than reproducing the original from its negative (which, as the 
photographer of the original, one presumes he could easily have done), photographing the 
photograph, or using another means to directly copy the original, the defendant 
laboriously recreated and re-photographed the scene depicted in the original, including 
using the same model. Although differences between the original and the recreation are 
clear—the model had visibly aged, struck a different facial expression, and now held a 
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rose—the court found that “the identities are much greater than the differences” and that 
the recreation therefore infringed on the original’s copyright.32 
 Although the justification for the decision in Gross v. Seligman seems clear, the 
matter is more complicated. Justice Lacombe writes in the Gross decision: 
 
If, by chance, the pose, background, light, and shade, etc., of this new 
picture were strikingly similar, and if, by reason of the circumstance that 
the same young woman was the prominent feature in both compositions, it 
might be very difficult to distinguish the new picture from the old one, the 
new would still not be an infringement of the old because it is in no true 
sense a copy of the old.33 
 
That is, had the new photograph simply, coincidentally, represented a strikingly similar 
scene (or even the same scene) from the same angle, it would not thus constitute 
infringement of the original. Infringement does not occur if a new work represents the 
same scene as another; it occurs only if the new work copies the previously-existing work 
in its representation. This principle is affirmed in the following case. 
 In Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts (1951), the defendant intentionally 
attempted to paint reproductions of mezzotint prints produced by the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff’s prints are, themselves, reproductions of the images of “Old Masters” paintings, 
produced using engraved copper plates. On the basis that the plaintiff’s prints merely 
reproduced works already in the public domain, the defendant contended that the plaintiff 
                                               
32 Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914) 
33 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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could therefore not hold any copyright in their prints for the defendant to infringe. The 
court concluded that, due to the creativity involved in recreating the Old Masters 
paintings in the mezzotint process, the mezzotints were original enough to qualify for 
copyright protection. That said, had the defendant copied the public domain work 
directly, rather than copying the mezzotint prints, it would not have infringed the 
plaintiff’s copyright. The court argued: 
 
The “author” is entitled to a copyright if he independently contrived a 
work completely identical with what went before; similarly, although he 
obtains a valid copyright, he has no right to prevent another from 
publishing a work identical with his, if not copied from his.34 
 
On this argument, similarity alone is not enough of a basis on which to establish 
copyright infringement. Copyright infringement is generally further established on the 
basis of another connection between works. 
In the much-cited decision in Litchfield v. Spielberg (1984), Justice Wright 
argues, “To prove copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show (1) ownership of the 
copyright; (2) access to the copyrighted work; and (3) substantial similarity between the 
copyrighted work and the defendant’s work.”35 Certainly, it seems difficult to argue that 
one artist has infringed another if the first artist has never seen (or heard, or read) the 
work that he is charged with infringing. However, even where “substantial similarity” is 
admitted, is familiarity with the copyrighted work enough to ground a conclusion of 
                                               
34 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) 
35 Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984) 
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copyright infringement? Consider again the case of Mondrian and van Doesburg, outlined 
above. Similar cases can be found throughout the history of art: artists are influenced by 
both their predecessors and their contemporaries. Where clusters of these influences 
occur, we get artistic movements. Works do not exist each in a vacuum—each is 
connected to others through historic webs of influence. So on what grounds does one 
draw the line between infringement and mere influence? Is there some reasonable 
difference to be found between copying a work and being influenced by it? 
 
iv. Facts 
Just as ideas are not protected by copyright, nor are facts. However, the basis for the non-
copyrightability of facts is not due to any similarity between facts and ideas—quite the 
opposite. The non-copyrightability of facts seems to follow directly from the originality 
requirement, outlined above. Ideas are created, and are thus original to their creators. 
Conversely, facts are discovered, and so are not original to their discoverers. Justice 
O’Scannlain makes this point in the decision on CDN Inc. v. Kapes (1999): “Subject 
matter created by and original to the author merits copyright protection. Items not 
original to the author, i.e., not the product of his creativity, are facts and not 
copyrightable.”36 Certainly, a distinction in kind can be drawn between facts and ideas—
one is created, the other discovered – but the bottom line is the same: neither may receive 
copyright protection. However, it must be asked, given that neither facts nor ideas are 
protected by copyright, what difference does this distinction between the two make, so 
far as copyright protection is concerned?  
                                               
36 CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999). O’Scannlain is being notably imprecise (and 
potentially misleading) in this assessment, of course: “subject matter” only merits copyright protection if 
“subject matter” is taken to refer to the expression of the idea, and not the idea itself. 
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 One might reasonably ask, if neither facts nor ideas are protected by copyright, 
but the expression of ideas is so protected, what can be said of the expression of facts? 
This issue was at the heart of the decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co. (1991), outlined above. As was decided in this case, if the expression of facts 
itself contains no originality, then just as the facts are not copyrightable, neither is the 
expression. Consider, however, another case. In 1962, author A.A. Hoehling published 
Who Destroyed the Hindenburg?, an exhaustively researched account of the colossal 
dirigible constructed in Germany under Hitler’s rule. Based on investigative reports, 
previously-published books and articles, and interviews with survivors of the Hindenburg 
disaster and others, Hoehling developed the theory that the explosion of the zeppelin over 
the Lakehurst, New Jersey Naval Air Station in 1936 was the result of sabotage at the 
hands of Eric Spehl, a rigger on the Hindenburg. Hoehling presented this theory in his 
novelized account as fact. 
 In 1972, Michael MacDonald Mooney published another book, The Hindenburg, 
a more “literary” approach to the Hindenburg affair, including the sabotage theory. 
Mooney’s book developed symbolic themes around the tragedy, contrasting the beauty of 
the month of May with the cold technology of the Hindenburg. Mooney acknowledged 
consulting Hoehling’s book, but states he first discovered the theory of “Spehl-as-
saboteur” in another book, Dale Titler’s Wings of Mystery (also published in 1962). After 
Mooney had finished an outline of his book, his publisher negotiated an agreement with 
Universal City Studios, who commissioned a screenplay by Nelson Gidding, a 
fictionalized account of the Hindenburg disaster, turning on sabotage by a rigger named 
“Boerth.” The story in Gidding’s screenplay, and the resulting film, The Hindenburg 
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(1975), largely match the theory laid out by Mooney and Hoehling, though Gidding 
infused his screenplay with a variety of additional subplots, and the fictional character 
Boerth differs substantially from accounts of the real rigger, Spehl. Hoehling, however, 
filed suit against Universal and Mooney for copyright infringement. 
 The court found that, though verbatim reproduction of even a nonfiction work 
(which Hoehling purported to be writing) is actionable as copyright infringement, 
“Hoehling’s allegations of copying […] encompass material that is non-copyrightable as 
a matter of law.”37 That is, Hoehling had employed sufficient creativity in expressing his 
account for the expression to qualify for copyright protection, and had Gidding 
appropriated Hoehling’s word-for-word account, he would have committed copyright 
infringement. However, employing the purported facts alone that Hoehling laid out in 
Who Destroyed the Hindenburg? is not actionable. 
 It is generally agreed among historians that the Hindenburg disaster was not the 
result of sabotage, but rather was an accident. Much of the result in the Hoehling case 
rests on his account as fact, and not as fiction. Had Hoehling written Who Destroyed the 
Hindenburg? as fiction, a very different court case might have resulted. One might ask, 
then, if Hoehling had presented his account as fiction, as Gidding did in his screenplay, 
would he have had a better case in arguing for copyright infringement? This issue will be 
further explored below in connection with the idea/expression dichotomy. 
 
v. The Public Domain 
The term “public domain” refers to the arena of works, types of works, and elements of 
works that do not qualify for copyright protection. Some works were once protected by 
                                               
37 A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) 
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copyright, but the duration of their protection has run out, and so the works have fallen 
into the public domain.38 Similarly, works published prior to the effective date of the 
1976 Copyright Act, but without proper notice, likewise fell into the public domain as a 
matter of law. The more interesting set of unprotected entities, however, are those that by 
their very nature fail to qualify for protection, and it is these entities that shall be the 
focus of this section. 
The Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) is published by the Federal Register, 
and lists the codification of the general and permanent rules of the executive departments 
and agencies of the Federal Government. Included in the C.F.R. is a list of materials not 
subject to copyright and for which registration will not be given. The majority of types 
included in this list are intuitively excluded based on the rules set forth in the 1976 Act 
and the various cases discussed throughout this chapter. The exclusion of other types, 
however, is not so obviously derivable from the Copyright Act. Among these are: 
 
Words and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar 
symbols or designs; mere variations of typographic ornamentation, 
lettering or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or contents.39 
 
Each of these types of entities is, as such, in the “public domain” and receives no 
protection under copyright law. In the cases of words, short phrases, typographic 
variations, and the like, the basis for exclusion from copyright protection seems to be 
                                               
38 The duration of copyright on a work created after the effective date of the 1976 Act is the life of its 
author plus 70 years. However, the duration of copyright on a work created prior to this date and/or as a 
work-for-hire is a much more complex matter.  
39 37 C.F.R. §202.1 
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that, like facts, these entities are not so much created as discovered. A similar argument is 
made regarding short “phrases” of musical notes in the Boosey and Baxter cases 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Certainly, the vast majority of literary works are 
composed entirely of pre-existing words, and in many cases common phrases. Similarly, 
musical works are composed of pre-existing notes, chords, and harmonies, and rare is the 
musician today who would lay claim to creating any of these composite elements. The 
scale of notes is, after all, mathematically derived, with individual notes representing 
standardized frequencies of vibration. As such, the intuitive argument behind excluding 
individual words and musical notes (and short phrases of either) from protection is that 
they are so commonplace that no one today can lay claim to having created them. They 
are part of the “public domain”, and all are free to use them as they see fit.  
The argument for the familiarity of words and short phrases has been further 
expanded to include “scenes à faire” or commonplace scenes in literary and dramatic 
works, and here the inherent problem with the argument may be made more clear. In the 
Hoehling case, discussed in detail above, the plaintiff argued that the defendants had 
reproduced particular scenes, and doing so constituted copyright infringement. The court, 
however, dismissed this argument:  
 
[A]ll three works [Hoehling’s, Mooney’s, and Gidding’s] contain a scene 
in a German beer hall, in which the airship’s crew engages in revelry prior 
to the voyage. […] These elements, however, are merely scenes à faire, 
that is, “incidents, characters or setting which are as a practical matter 
indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic.” […] 
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Because it is virtually impossible to write about a particular historical era 
or fictional theme without employing certain “stock” or standard literary 
devices, we have held that scenes à faire are not copyrightable as a matter 
of law.40 
 
There are two possible arguments here by which such scenes à faire may be excluded 
from copyright protection. First, like words and musical notes, such scenes are common 
because they have been used so often in storytelling that none today may lay claim to 
having created them: they are “standard” scenes or “stock” devices. That is, stories 
including scenes of German beer-hall revelry have been around at least as long as 
German beer halls, and no one today can reasonably argue that they created that type of 
scene. Second, as with words and musical notes, scenes à faire are common because they 
are “indispensable” elements of storytelling, and certain kinds of stories simply cannot be 
made without them. That is, one cannot tell a story that takes place in 1930s Germany 
without a scene of revelry in a beer hall. 
 This second argument is clearly flawed. Certainly, all manner of stories take place 
in 1930s Germany and yet fail to include a scene of beer-hall revelry. The first argument, 
however, seems more viable. Scenes of beer-hall revelry are, indeed, much older than any 
of Hoehling’s, Mooney’s, and Gidding’s stories. None of them are going to lay claim to 
having created that particular kind of scene. Rather, each is likely drawing on scenes 
developed throughout literary history. Indeed, even Beowulf, which is at least 1000 years 
                                               
40 A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980). 
A different take on scenes à faire is made in the case of Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits (2003), that “[C]ourts will 
not protect a copyrighted work from infringement if the expression embodied in the work necessarily flows 
from a commonplace idea.” As all ideas are essentially in the “public domain”, however, this basis for 
withholding protection from scenes à faire appears flawed on its face. 
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old, contains a scene of German beer-hall revelry. As such, even if Gidding and Mooney 
did rely on Hoehling’s story to create their scenes of beer-hall revelry, Hoehling himself 
relied on a long history of such scenes—stretching back to Beowulf and probably 
beyond—to create his own, and one cannot claim copyright on what did not originate 
with oneself. The same would seem to be true of words, musical notes, and (at least) 
short phrases of each. 
 Two further problems, however, threaten this argument. First, however long the 
histories of particular scenes, words, and musical notes, each such history has a 
beginning: someone did create these entities. And just as a new type of scene, it seems, 
cannot constitute a scene à faire, and so should qualify for copyright protection, the same 
should hold true for new words and phrases (and perhaps new musical notes). Certainly, 
new words and musical notes are not plucked from the Platonic Forms (though one might 
argue that the ideas that they express are). As such, while one might argue that a given 
author “discovered” such an entity in the work of another, such entities certainly owe 
their origin not to discovery, but to creation. Second, given that such entities as words, 
notes, and scenes are created and not discovered, it seems at least possible that one might 
create a given scene without reference to other scenes, however similar in kind. In cases 
of such commonplace literary scenes as those of beer-hall revelry, this might require a 
particularly insulated author, utterly unfamiliar with much of literature. However, had 
one done so, it seems patently wrong to say the scene did not originate with him, and if 
another were to reproduce the scene of this author, it seems, this second individual has 
infringed upon the work of the first. After all, as established above, that a work is 
indistinguishable from a previously-existing work does not qualify, alone, as grounds for 
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copyright infringement. Rather, some further connection needs to be established between 
the new work and the old one. 
 
vi. Utility and Conceptual Separability 
Copyright is only one of several domains of intellectual property law, including 
trademark, trade secret, and (as particularly relevant to this discussion) patent law. The 
domain of patent law is that of useful articles, and is based on the same “Intellectual 
Property Clause” in the U.S. Constitution as copyright law. Despite their common origin, 
however, patent and copyright law have developed along different lines and, as a result, 
patent law has not only more stringent requirements for protection, but also a more 
limited duration of protection for the patent holder.41 As copyright protection is easier to 
obtain and lasts substantially longer than patent protection, designers of industrial 
products have sought not only patents for their creations, but also copyrights. To 
effectively distinguish these respective arenas of protection, copyright, while protecting 
the creator’s expression, specifically does not protect useful articles qua useful articles.  
 Under the 1976 Act, “useful articles” are defined as follows: 
 
A “useful article” is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is 
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey 
information. An article that is normally a part of a useful article is 
considered a “useful article”.42 
 
                                               
41 Patents require not only originality, but also novelty. The duration of patent protection is 20 years from 
date of filing, versus copyright’s 70 years from the death of the author. 
42 Copyright Act of 1976, §101, reproduced in Cohen et al. (2006b), 8. 
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In the same section of the 1976 Act, under the definition of “pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works”, the extent of copyright protection for the expression embodied in 
useful articles is further explored: 
 
Such [pictorial, graphic, and sculptural] works shall include works of 
artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or 
utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined 
in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work 
only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and 
are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspect of the 
article.43 
 
Following the language of this section, if one cannot conceive of the artistic or aesthetic 
elements of a useful article as being “capable of existing independently of […] the 
utilitarian aspect of the article” (that is, being removed from the article and standing on 
their own), then the aesthetic and utilitarian aspects of article are not conceptually 
separable. This language presents difficulties for such intuitively copyrightable designs as 
those of clock faces and book covers, however. As such, the courts have relied as much 
(if not more) on testing “conceptual separability” outlined in the 1976 Senate House 
Report: 
 
                                               
43 Ibid, 7. 
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Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies’ dress, food processor, 
television set, or any other industrial product contains some element that, 
physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the 
utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted 
under the bill.44 
 
Although the House Report is meant to better clarify the test for separability, borderline 
cases have led to problematic and questionable results. Consider the following two cases, 
each dealing the copyrightability of lamp designs. 
In the case of Mazer v. Stein (1954), the respondents, Stein et al., manufactured a 
series of statuettes from original molds depicting both male and female dancers, intended 
to serve as the bases for electric lamps. The statuettes, without any lamp components 
added, were submitted and registered as copyrighted works with the Copyright Office. 
Thereafter, the respondents sold the statuettes around the United States, both as lamp 
bases and as individual statuettes (though primarily the former). Petitioners, Mazer et al, 
copied the statuettes and likewise sold them as lamps, contending that the statuettes, as 
intended to serve as lamp bases, were not the proper subject matter of copyright. As 
Justice Reed notes, “The case requires an answer, not as to a manufacturer's right to 
register a lamp base but as to an artist's right to copyright a work of art intended to be 
reproduced for lamp bases.”45 The court ultimately sided with the respondents, and 
upheld the copyright of the bases, arguing that “[t]he successive acts, the legislative 
history of the 1909 Act and the practice of the Copyright Office unite to show that ‘works 
                                               
44 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667-68. 
45 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) 
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of art’ and ‘reproductions of works of art’ are terms that were intended by Congress to 
include the authority to copyright these statuettes.”46 Although Mazer v. Stein was 
decided on the basis of the 1909 Act, it has been argued that the decision rests on 
principles that are in line with the 1976 Act. 
 The case of Esquire Inc. v. Ringer (1978) likewise dealt with the copyrightability 
of lamp designs, but here the lamp designs were of a different sort. First, Esquire 
designed and manufactured streetlamps, not interior ones. And second, the lamps were of 
a contemporary and decorative design, employing smooth, stylistic lines and rounded 
housings for the lights themselves. Unlike those in the Mazer case, there was nothing 
representational to the Esquire designs, and no clearly physically separable bases. After a 
series of failed attempts, Esquire eventually secured copyright for its designs, with the 
registration compelled by Mazer v. Stein. Ringer, however, sought to appeal Esquire’s 
copyright, and, ultimately, the court found that, because Esquire had sought copyright 
protection on each lamp’s entire design, and not on some physically separable element 
thereof (as was the case with Mazer), the designs did not qualify for copyright 
protection.47 
In the case of Mazer v. Stein, it is, perhaps, relatively easy to see how one of the 
lamp bases, on its own, might be considered a sculptured work of art. Though kitschy, the 
depiction of the figures is realistic, and almost classical in configuration. Absent the 
external wiring, fittings, bulb, and shade, it is rather easy to imagine placing one of the 
figures on a mantle. (Similar reasons would later be used to affirm the copyrightability of 
                                               
46 Ibid. 
47 Esquire Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
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belt-buckle designs,48 and to deny the copyrightability of sculptured human torsos 
intended for displaying clothing in retail stores.49) Unlike the Mazer statuettes, the 
Esquire designs are clearly and obviously lamp designs. In a later, similar decision, a 
stylistic bicycle rack design (the “RIBBON Rack”) by Brandir International, Inc. was 
denied copyright on the basis that, though aesthetically appealing, it was essentially the 
product of industrial design. Here, the court employed a test for conceptual separability 
developed by Robert Denicola (the “Denicola Test”):  
 
If design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional 
considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be 
conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements.50 
 
The court argued that the aesthetic and functional aspects of the RIBBON Rack had 
indeed merged, and as such the design was not protected by copyright. Another test for 
conceptual separability suggested by Justice Newman, in his dissent of Carol Barnhart 
Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp. (1985) may have yielded similar results: 
 
For the design features to be “conceptually separate” from the utilitarian 
aspects of the useful article that embodies the design, the article must 
stimulate in the mind of the beholder a concept that is separate from the 
concept evoked by its utilitarian function.51 
                                               
48 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) 
49 Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) 
50 Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) 
51 Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985), J. Newman, dissenting. 
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Although both the Denicola Test and Newman’s “eye of the beholder” test attempt to 
interpret the notion of “conceptual separability” introduced in the 1976 Act and House 
Report, neither truly captures the notion.  
 To begin, a positive result in a test for physical separability (as is essentially 
employed in the Mazer case) is surely sufficient for conceptual separability. That is, if 
one can physically separate an item’s aesthetic elements from its utilitarian ones, then one 
can certainly conceptually do so. However, surely physical separability is not necessary 
for conceptual separability. The problem that has arisen for conceptual separability in 
both the Denicola Test and the “eye of the beholder” test results from attempting to 
conceive of the aesthetic elements of an article without likewise conceiving of the 
utilitarian elements. To imagine, say, a bicycle’s particular structural design without at 
the same time imagining a bicycle is perhaps an impossible task. However, the reverse 
does not seem to be true. Certainly, one can imagine all variety of industrial designs that 
equally fulfill the utilitarian requirements of a bicycle (that is, at an approximation, being 
a seated, single-operator, human-propelled vehicle of personal conveyance) without 
imagining the particular bicycle design under consideration. That is, the utilitarian 
aspects of being-a-bicycle might be embodied in all variety of industrial designs, and 
need not be embodied in any one particular design. As such, it seems, if one can imagine 
those utilitarian aspects embodied in a design other than the one under consideration, then 
one has sufficiently conceptually separated the aesthetic aspects from the utilitarian ones. 
Rather than conceiving of the aesthetic elements of an article without likewise conceiving 
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of the utilitarian elements, one has instead conceived of the utilitarian elements without 
likewise conceiving of the particular aesthetic ones.  
 With this conclusion in mind, the test for conceptual separability runs into one 
immediate problem: absolutely everything will pass it. That is, with any set of functional 
considerations, there seems to be an infinite number of ways in which those utilitarian 
needs might be embodied. Any functional artifact requires some choice in construction, 
aesthetic or otherwise. Whether building a car, or a house, or a sprinkler system, there is 
always some choice as to how the artifact should be designed. And this being the case, it 
is always possible to conceive of the utility embodied in another form.  
 Were this not enough, further problems arise for the distinction between “useful” 
articles and aesthetic ones. First, the 1976 Act, by elimination, defines “non-useful” 
articles as those whose function is “merely to portray the appearance of the article or to 
convey information”. But does this adequately capture the function of authored works? 
The types of art works in the category of “authored works” variously inspire, amuse, 
entertain, and sometimes provoke. Alternatively, several theorists have argued that the 
function of art is to bring about the “aesthetic experience”,52 to produce “aesthetic 
contemplation”,53 or to yield “aesthetic satisfaction”.54 It seems at least unobvious that 
these various functions fall within the bounds of “[portraying] the appearance of the 
article or [conveying] information.” If these are “useful” functions, then copyright seems 
to cover only those aspects of the work that do not serve these functions (which would 
                                               
52 See Beardsley, Monroe C. (1958). “The Relation of Design to Subject” and “The Instrumentalist Theory” 
in Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.; 
Schlesinger, George (1979). “Aesthetic Experience and the Definition of Art” in The British Journal of 
Aesthetics (19:2). 
53 See Tolhurst, William (1984). “Toward An Aesthetic Account of the Nature of Art” in The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism (42:3); Wolterstorff, Nicholas (1980). Works and Worlds of Art.  
54 See Hanfling, Oswald (1995). “Art, Artifact and Function” in Philosophical Investigations (18:1). 
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leave very little to copyright). Alternatively, if these are not “useful” functions, it remains 
to be explained why this should be the case. 
 The next problem arising from the distinction between “useful” articles and 
aesthetic ones is that the function of articles can change. Reasonably speaking, for 
instance, the function of a urinal is to be a receptacle for liquid human waste. Surely, 
however, this is not the function of Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain (nor is it, presumably, 
even a secondary function of the work). Do we want to say that as a urinal, the object is 
uncopyrightable, but inverted and entitled by Duchamp, it is? If copyright law wants to 
maintain the distinction for “useful” articles, it will need to tell a story here. 
 
vii. Idea, Expression, and Merger 
The inclusion of copyright law under the category heading of “intellectual property” is 
something of a misnomer. As touched on earlier in this chapter, copyright protection may 
be afforded to the expression embodied in a work of art, but not to the ideas expressed 
therein. According to §102(b) of the 1976 Act: 
 
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.55 
 
                                               
55 Copyright Act of 1976, §102, reproduced in Cohen et al. (2006b), 10. This article in the Act further 
distinguishes the realm of copyright from that of patent law, and cements the non-copyrightability of facts 
(encompassed under the category of “discovery”). 
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By no means an idiosyncrasy of U.S. Copyright Law, the idea/expression dichotomy is 
likewise maintained in the international TRIPs Agreement and World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, each of which extends copyright 
protection “to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or 
mathematical concepts as such.”56  
 Cases illustrating the distinction between idea and expression are not hard to 
imagine. The simple idea that love conquers all, for example, is variously expressed in 
the film Sleepless in Seattle, Sarah McLachlan’s song “Sweet Surrender”, and countless 
other works in various media. Although each work expresses the same idea, each does so 
in original and entirely dissimilar ways. Despite the effectively countless number of such 
examples, however, legal history has served to erode the conceptual line between ideas 
and expressions.  
In Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Company (1967), plaintiff Morrisey sought to 
defend its copyright in a set of rules for a promotional contest. Procter & Gamble had, in 
the rules for a similar promotional contest, allegedly reproduced nearly word-for-word 
Morrisey’s materials, with only minor variations. Like facts, discussed earlier, the 
procedure that makes up the promotional contest is likely not protected by copyright, 
being essentially ideational. Its expression, however, at least potentially is. In the case of 
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Company, however, the court established a class of 
exceptions. The procedural rules of Morrissey’s and Procter & Gamble’s contests were, 
for all intents and purposes, the same, and, as Justice Aldrich argues in the court decision, 
there are only very few ways in which this idea might be expressed. As such, affording 
                                               
56 TRIPs Agreement, Article 9, reproduced in Cohen et al. (2006b), 265; WIPO Copyright Treaty, Article 2, 
reproduced in Cohen et al. (2006b), 282. 
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copyright protection to Morrissey’s rules would essentially result in protection for the 
idea that they expressed. Because Procter & Gamble (or anyone else) could not express 
the same idea without utilizing essentially the same expression, protection for the 
expression would give Morrissey an effective monopoly over the idea itself, a result that 
copyright law has been specifically designed to avoid. As Aldrich states, “We cannot 
recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.”57 The 
finding of this case formalized the basis for a foundational principle in copyright law: 
 
The merger principle […] is a variation of the idea/expression dichotomy[. 
W]hen the idea and the expression of the idea coincide, then the 
expression will not be protected in order to prevent creation of a monopoly 
on the underlying ‘art.’ [A]n expression will be found to be merged into 
the idea when ‘there are no or few other ways of expressing a particular 
idea.’58 
 
However, while the merger principle exposes (and patches over) a conceptual hole in the 
dichotomy of idea and expression, the merger principle is not without conceptual holes of 
its own. 
 First, consider a case that predates not only the 1976 Act, but also its 1909 
precursor.59 In 1859, Charles Selden registered the copyright on his book, Selden’s 
Condensed Ledger, or Book-keeping Simplified, in which he explains a new and unique 
                                               
57 Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Company, United State Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 1967. 379 F.2d 
675. 
58 Educational Testing Services v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533 (ed Cir. 1986) 
59 Prior to the 1909 Act, the Copyright Act of 1790 held sway. Full text available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/history/1790act.pdf 
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accounting system that he has developed, and includes a series of blank ledgers 
developed to implement this system. In 1860 and 1861, Selden filed copyrights on 
several other books that improved upon his system. Selden filed suit against the 
defendant, Baker, for infringement. Baker had created slightly altered ledgers, including a 
different arrangement of columns and different headings, and used them in his business. 
The court found for Baker in the case, arguing: 
 
The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to 
communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But this 
object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without 
incurring the guilt of piracy of the book. And where the art it teaches 
cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams used to 
illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and 
diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given 
therewith to the public […]60 
 
Selden could not copyright the system itself, and, the court argued, because the system 
required the use of the particular ledgers that Selden had published, he could not 
copyright the ledgers either. That is, because the ledgers represented the only way to 
implement the system (or within very few variations), the idea and its expression had 
merged. 
 However, as mentioned, Baker’s versions of the ledgers employ a different 
arrangement of columns and different headings. The design of Baker’s ledgers differed 
                                               
60 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) 
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slightly, and it used different fonts. They could certainly have used different colors and 
orientation as well. With this array of differences open to Baker, one must ask, how many 
variations need to be possible for an idea and its expression to fail to merge? Copyright 
cases provide no answer, and only further problems for idea/expression dichotomy. 
 In May of 1922, Anne Nichols’ play, Abie’s Irish Rose, opened on the stage of 
New York’s Fulton Theater, having previously played in San Francisco and Los Angeles. 
In its new home, the play garnered critical acclaim, going on to become the longest-
running production in Broadway history. One year before Nichols’ play arrived in New 
York, Aaron Hoffman’s play, Two Blocks Away (1921), saw a short run in George M. 
Cohan’s Theatre, also on Broadway. Although its Broadway run lasted less than a month, 
Hoffman’s play was adapted into the Universal Pictures film, The Cohens and Kellys 
(1929). Arguing substantial similarity between the film and her play, Nichols filed suit 
against Universal Pictures. 
 Nichols’ play presents the story of two young lovers in New York: the daughter of 
an Irish Catholic widower, and the son of a Jewish widower. The boy and girl have been 
secretly wed, but the son introduces his secret wife to his father as a Jewish girl in whom 
he is merely interested. The boy’s father becomes infatuated with the girl, decides they 
must marry, and prepares a Jewish wedding for them. The girl’s father, meanwhile, 
thinking she is to wed an Irish Catholic, travels with a Priest from California. He arrives 
too late for the wedding celebration, however, and the two fathers become enraged, each 
seeking a means to dissolve the union of their children. About a year later, the young 
couple, estranged from their respective fathers, have had twins. The fathers, receiving 
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word of the birth, travel to the couples’ home and, after some slapstick comedy, 
eventually exchange amenities. 
 The Cohens and Kellys, meanwhile, presents the story of two poor New York 
families, one Irish and one Jewish. The daughter of the Jewish family and the son of the 
Irish one have fallen in love and secretly married, but remain living with their respective 
families. The Jewish father learns from a lawyer that he has inherited a substantial 
fortune, and moves his family into a luxurious home. The Irish boy seeks out his wife in 
the new home but is chased away by her father. The Jewish father and Irish boy become 
adversarial, and the girl’s father becomes so sick from the fight that he must leave the 
city just before the daughter reveals the marriage to her mother. Upon his return, the 
girl’s father finds his daughter has borne a child, and learns of her alliance to the Irish 
son. He subsequently disowns her. Having done so, however, he also learns that, by a 
twist of fate, the inheritance half-belongs to his new son-in-law. Despite attempted 
machinations by the lawyer (who himself seeks to marry the Jewish daughter), he seeks 
out his daughter and son-in-law, and a reconciliation ensues. 
Despite a few passing elements of similarity, the court found there was not 
enough similarity between the play and the movie to warrant the complaint of 
infringement. Justice Learned Hand notes: 
 
The stories are quite different. […] The only matter common to the two is 
a quarrel between a Jewish and an Irish father, the marriage of their 
children, the birth of grandchildren and a reconciliation.61 
 
                                               
61 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931) 
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The characters themselves, however, are substantially different, as are the string of events 
that make up each play. Hand argues: 
 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of 
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the 
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general 
statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its 
title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no 
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of 
his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his property is never 
extended. […] Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and 
nobody ever can.62 
 
This is to say, the more general or abstract a plot, the less likely that it may be protected 
by copyright because it will qualify only as an idea. Conversely, the more detailed it is, 
the more likely it will be found to be an original expression of the idea. As the general 
idea cannot be copyrighted, it cannot be infringed. The particular detailed expression, 
however, can be both copyrighted and therefore infringed. The issue, Hand admits, is that 
the point where the “number of patterns” becomes detailed enough to qualify as a plot 
may well be impossible to fix. 
 Surely, however, this famous assessment is in error. To see the problem, consider 
some description of the plot of a literary work, x. This level of description is too general 
or abstract to qualify as an expression, and so is merely an idea, according to Hand. Now 
                                               
62 Ibid. 
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add some more detail to the description, y, so that we have the description, (x + y). 
Suppose this will not yet include enough detail to qualify as an expression, so we can add 
more description, z, and consider (x + y + z). What Hand argues is that, at some point in 
this building of detail in the description, (x + y + z + … n), we will have added enough 
detail to our description for our description to qualify as an expression. The problem with 
this approach is that it seems the description will not have changed from the description 
of an idea to that of an expression, but that the idea described will have become detailed 
enough to qualify as an expression. And, if this is the case, it seems, the idea has 
somehow become an expression. And, if an idea has become an expression, surely we 
must say that the idea and the expression have merged, for what else is it that the 
expression expresses but itself? The unfortunate consequence is this: a plot that has less 
than the necessary level of detail to qualify as an expression will be merely an idea, and 
therefore non-copyrightable. Adding more and more detail, the plot will eventually have 
enough detail to qualify as an expression, but then the idea and its expression will have 
merged, and since works that represent a merger of idea and expression cannot be 
copyrighted, nor can this plot. Indeed, it seems, whether rich or impoverished in its 
description, a plot can never be copyrighted. 
 Hand has two options open to him: either he can accept the result that plots, by 
their nature, cannot be protected by copyright (which, I suspect, is counterintuitive both 
to Hand and to the layman), or he can reassess this method of distinguishing idea from 
expression (which, unfortunately, has become ingrained in the history of copyright law, 
and has set the basis for many cases that would follow it). Distinguishing ideas from 
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expressions, in kind, as well as determining into which category entities like plots fit, is, 
again, an essentially metaphysical issue, and one for which the law provides no basis. 
 
Building an Ontology 
Attempting to assess the nature of the objects of copyright subsequent to, or as a 
consequence of, assessing the rights of copyright is like trying to build the supporting 
frame and foundation of a house only after one has built the house itself. If it can be done 
at all, it will surely require major structural revisions, but will most likely result in an 
ongoing series of stopgap measures intended to keep the whole thing from collapsing. 
And this is precisely what has happened throughout the history of copyright law. 
It is my goal in the following chapters, to develop a comprehensive, coherent, and 
consistent account of the ontology of authored works that can reasonably be used as a 
basis on which to administer copyright law. As such, it should be designed to meet both 
the practical and theoretical concerns of copyright law, while accommodating our 
intuitions regarding the nature of its objects. Given the original purpose and current 
applications of copyright law, this ontological account should apply to the various forms 
of intellectual property embraced by it, as well as those foreseeable in the future. It 
should be subtle enough to illuminate the differences between kinds of authored works, 
yet powerful enough to encompass these works, generally. As such, so far as copyright is 
concerned, the account needs to be able to differentiate the nature of literature from that 
of film, or music, or sculpture, while at the same time being able to apply to authored 
works generally, and across the lines that differentiate these kinds of works.63 
                                               
63 I am not, it should be made clear, attempting to give a full-blown ontology of art, but only one pertinent 
to the assumptions and decisions made in copyright law. 
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Predictably, this account will require some major alterations to copyright law, while 
nevertheless leaving it in at least a largely recognizable form. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Atomic Dimension of Authored Works 
 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I provided a tour of the conceptual problems that plague the 
domain of copyright law. Establishing that the central concepts employed in the law are 
essentially of a metaphysical sort, I further argued that the wealth of problems arising 
from these concepts points to a foundational issue that is likewise metaphysical in nature. 
I argue that the law (embodied in the Copyright Act, its underlying legislative history, 
and the court decisions based on them) assumes some metaphysical basis to the objects of 
copyright, but does little to indicate what this nature is. And it is from this ambiguity that 
the problems arise. 
In the following chapters, I will outline the basis of an ontological foundation that 
I believe will serve to ground the program of copyright law. Specifically, I argue that the 
copyrightability of an authored work depends upon four factors: the work’s atomic 
dimension, its causal dimension, its abstract dimension, and its categorial dimension. In 
the following four chapters I will investigate each of these ontological factors, with the 
ultimate goal of showing how the relationship of these factors can provide the perfect 
rules for determining (i) when a work may be protected by copyright, and (ii) when 
another work infringes upon that copyright.  
In this chapter, I will focus on the atomic dimension of an authored work, 
meaning the parts that make up the work, the particular arrangement of these parts, and 
the relationship between these parts and the whole. It should be made clear, however, 
that I am not seeking in this chapter to provide an “atomic definition” of authored works, 
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nor am I proposing that the identity of an authored work is reducible to its atomic 
constituents. Indeed, I argue that the nature of a work is multifaceted, with the atomic 
dimension of a work being but one of four aspects of a work that pertain to its position 
within copyright. 
I approach the atomic aspect of a work first for two reasons. First, I expect the 
claims I make in this chapter to be the least contentious, which is not to say I expect they 
are uninteresting or obvious. Second, a claim of atomic similarity is the primary basis for 
most copyright infringement suits: an author sees a film that is strikingly similar in plot to 
a play she has written (as in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp); a composer hears a 
song that uses the same musical phrase as one of his own works (as in Boosey v. Empire 
Music Co.); and so on. 
Determining whether copying of a work in part or in whole has, in fact, taken 
place requires determining whether two works can be differentiated. If they cannot, they 
are the same work.  The first, and most obvious, means of attempting to differentiate two 
works is by comparing their respective parts and properties—in other words, their 
respective atomic dimensions. 
 
What Constitutes a Work? 
On a simple view, a work of literature is a series of words, a musical work is a string of 
notes, and a film is a sequence of images and sounds. Similarly, it might be said, a 
sculpture is composed of particular materials formed into particular shapes, and a 
painting is composed of colors, lines, and shapes. The multifarious kinds that fall under 
the heading of “authored works” allow for an array of such composite parts. Moreover, a 
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given authored work may be extremely complex, or it may be very simple. Beethoven’s 
Piano Concerto No. 4 in G major, Op. 58 is performed in three movements using piano, 
flute, two oboes, two clarinets, two bassoons, two horns, two trumpets, timpani, and 
strings. The concerto consists of hundreds of measures, with a given performance lasting 
roughly 30 minutes. Contrast this with John Cage’s 4'33", consisting of three very short 
movements without a single note being played on a single instrument (in Cage’s words, 
“the work may be performed by any instrumentalist(s), and the movements may last any 
lengths of time.”1). Analogous extremes might conceivably be found in all media. 
Regardless of whether one is working with words, notes, or stone, and whether 
one’s final work is rich or impoverished in detail, the act of composing any authored 
work involves both selection and arrangement. As such, a composer creates a musical 
phrase by selecting notes and arranging them in a particular sequence. A writer does 
precisely the same with words. It might be said that a painter creates a certain line or 
field of color, but he selects the colors he uses to create these lines and fields. An 
authored work might even be composed of a single selected item, be it the color red or a 
single musical note. But even here, the artist must decide the dimensions for the field of 
color, or the duration of the musical note, and imposing such limits on the selected item 
constitutes creation.  
As soon as an artist has created an item from selected elements, or has created the 
bounds for a single selected element, the artist has done what is necessary to create an 
authored work. Granted, most works involve innumerable such elements, but as little as a 
single brushstroke or the selection of a single musical note may constitute the creation of 
an authored work.  
                                               
1 Introductory note in the “sheet music” for John Cage: 4'33". For more on this work, see footnote 3, below. 
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A Note on Unfinished Works 
There are countless examples of unfinished works, either abandoned by their creators or 
left unfinished on their creators’ deaths. Edmund Spenser had published six books of The 
Faerie Queene by the time of his death in 1599, making it the longest epic poem in all of 
English Literature. But Spenser had planned the poem to encompass twelve books. In 
1822, Franz Schubert began work on his Symphony No 8 in B minor, but seemingly 
abandoned it. He died six years later, leaving what has become known as the Unfinished 
Symphony with only two movements and some fragments of others. Cartoonist Georges 
“Hergé” Remi died in 1983 before finishing his twenty-fourth book in the celebrated 
Tintin series, Tintin and Alph-Art. The book was published posthumously in 1986, 
despite its unfinished status. 
 History is littered with unfinished works, some published or hanging in galleries, 
others tucked away in attics, vaults, and other hiding places. In some cases, we know 
these works are unfinished because their creators have left behind sketches, notes, or 
other indicators of how they were to be completed. In other cases, the works simply look 
unfinished: patches of bare canvas, stories cut off in mid-stream, sculpted figures only 
partially emerging from chunks of unhewn stone.  
However, a work’s “finished” or “unfinished” status is not always a clear matter. 
A painter may continue to touch up her work for years until she is finally satisfied, or has 
sent the work to a gallery. An author may continue to revise his work until the final 
moment of sending it off to his publisher. Of course, even then, his editor may request 
changes. Certain events may signal the completion of a work, or, more properly, indicate 
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that a work is finished: the publication of a work of literature, the installation of a 
painting or sculpture in a gallery, or the screening of a film. But if a work has not been 
put on public display in one of these manners, it should not be thereby assumed that the 
work is unfinished. Certainly, a manuscript may sit for years in a drawer, or a painting for 
years in a studio, and receive no alterations prior to being put on public display. 
Conversely, even absent any apparent indications that it is unfinished, one should not 
assume that a work is complete. Rather, the decision that a work is complete seems 
entirely at the discretion of its creator. And even where a creator has decided that his 
painting, symphony, or sculpture is “complete,” he seems always to be free to make 
alterations after this event.2 Similarly, a creator’s lack of declaration or decision that a 
work is complete does not seem to indicate that it is unfinished: the manuscript may be 
sitting in the drawer because the author is not satisfied with it, but decide years later that 
it is without making any modifications to it. If the painter chooses to leave patches of 
bare canvas in his work, or the sculptor chooses to leave a figure half-emerged from a 
block of marble (as Donatello did with his non finito pieces), this seems entirely up to the 
artist. At any point in the creation of a work, the artist is free to declare the work 
“complete.” Despite claims by some sculptors that they are chiseling away to reveal the 
form within the stone, it seems entirely at the artist’s discretion to determine when that 
form has in fact been revealed: there is nothing about the work itself that might indicate 
this to the audience. 
                                               
2 I believe there is an interesting argument to be made here, that putting a work on public display so 
indicates that a work is finished that any alterations to the work after this event, even by the original artist, 
will result in a different work, not a mere modification to the original. See my Hick, Darren Hudson (2008) 
“When Is a Work of Art Finished?” in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (66:1). 
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Given that the artist is free to declare his work complete at any time, at each stage 
during the process of its creation, I argue that we should consider a work as we have it as 
provisionally complete. As such, we should be free to discuss that work’s atomic 
dimension (or, equally, its causal, abstract, or categorial dimension), aware that that may 
change. 
 
Higher and Lower-Level Properties 
As touched on above, the diverse kinds of authored works allows for equally diverse 
perceptual properties. At bottom, for example, a painting is composed of particular colors 
in particular shapes of particular sizes and particular orientation. A musical work, 
meanwhile, is composed of particular notes or particular tones of particular duration. A 
work of choreographed dance is composed of particular body parts making particular 
poses or particular movements at particular speeds, and for some particular duration. In 
each kind of authored work, I shall call such individual properties aesthetic “simples”. 
And while an exhaustive list of the simples that make up the numerous kinds of authored 
works seems possible, I expect the examples I have provided will suffice. More formally, 
however, I shall define a “simple” as: 
 
Simple (df): any one of the formally-definable, bottom-level perceptible 
properties of an authored work, only instantiable in a given work in 
combination with other simples. 
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The second part of this definition requires some further explanation. A painter cannot 
simply instantiate a color. Rather, she instantiates a field of color, with particular 
boundaries, shape, size, and orientation. Likewise, a musician does not simply instantiate 
a tone; he instantiates a tone with a particular duration.3 Contrasted with simples, then, 
are aesthetic “complexes”: 
 
Complex (df): one of the perceptual elements of an authored work 
composed of simples, such that the removal of any one of its composite 
simples would result in the complex not being instantiable. 
 
Simples and complexes are the building blocks of authored works, discernible by merely 
perceiving such works, and requiring no specialized knowledge or sensitivity on the part 
of the viewer. All that is required to perceive such properties or elements is the standard 
array of sensory organs, and the standard conditions for viewing or hearing (or, perhaps, 
touching, tasting, or smelling) such properties.  
Some, like Nelson Goodman, have pointed out the potential difficulties involved 
in distinguishing or privileging properties or elements that are perceptually discernible by 
“merely looking”. The argument is that such a designation picks out an arbitrary point on 
the scale of perceptibility.4 Certainly, for example, a magnifying glass will help us to pick 
out elements of a work that we do not ordinarily notice, and a microscope will help us to 
                                               
3 Cage’s 4'33", mentioned above, poses something of an issue, here. As this composition includes no notes, 
and seemingly only duration, it might be thought that Cage has managed to instantiate an aesthetic simple 
on its own. Of course, we can ask, duration of what? In my estimation, Cage’s composition consists of 
three long rests or breaks, totaling four minutes and 33 seconds. The rest is as integral a part of the 
language of music as is the note or tone, and like the note or tone, is traditionally specific in its length in a 
given composition. Cage is simply playing on this—rather than as a rest between notes, the rest stands on 
its own. That Cage’s own sheet music for 4'33" does not reflect this hypothesis should not deter us. 
4 See Goodman, Nelson (1976). Languages of Art, pp. 103-112 
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pick out elements of a work that we perhaps could not perceive without being so aided.5 
Similarly, an individual with poor eyesight or hearing may not perceive the work as the 
artist or average audience member will. 
However, I think it only appropriate to privilege such properties or elements, 
given that they are what the creator of an authored work expects her audience to be able 
to pick out, unaided, given the standard array of sensory organs and the standard 
conditions for viewing such properties. To clarify, consider the authored works created 
by painters and graphic designers working on computers. Where Georges Seurat expects 
the standard viewer to perceive the dots of color that make up Sunday Afternoon on the 
Island of La Grande Jatte (because they are easily discernible by an individual with 
standard sensory organs in standard conditions), a graphic designer generally does not 
expect (nor even want) a viewer to specifically perceive the pixels that make up her latest 
work. While the dots of color in a pointillist work are meant to be noticed by the viewer, 
the pixels in a computer graphic are not. A pointillist’s dots are a part of the work—the 
aesthetic object—while the graphic designer’s pixels are only a part of the “physical” 
object, not the aesthetic object, per se. 
 Certainly, the “standard conditions” for viewing a work may differ by work. 
Standardly, for example, a painting is expected to be viewed from some range of distance 
and some range of angles under some range of lighting conditions. In most cases, the 
standard conditions need not be specified simply because they are standard. Some works, 
however, may require specific conditions for viewing that do not fall within what is 
standard for that kind of work. A work may be painted in anamorphic perspective (as in 
the case of Holbein the Younger’s The Ambassadors) or created on an enormous scale 
                                               
5 A variety of other instruments will serve the same functions in cases of auditory works. 
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that requires a “bird’s eye” perspective (as in the case of Robert Smithson’s Spiral Jetty). 
As such, if the creator does not somehow specify the appropriate conditions, determining 
which properties and elements are the work’s aesthetic simples and complexes may not 
be obvious. Similarly, we can imagine a gifted physicist or geneticist who composes 
“works” on an infinitesimal scale out of protein strings or atoms, or a musician who 
composes works at a frequency above or below that which is normally perceptible to an 
unaided individual. Viewing such works as their creators expect us to will require what 
would otherwise be non-standard conditions. However, these will be the standard 
conditions for viewing such works. 
 Over and above the aesthetic simples and complexes is another class of formal 
properties of authored works, supervening on, and emerging from, the simples and 
complexes. Moreover, they will arise from relations between the simples and complexes. 
For the sake of nomenclature, then, I will refer to these properties as aesthetic 
“relationals”. These will include such properties as balance, harmony, symmetry, 
contrast, proportion, and patterning. Such properties are supervenient, or asymmetrically 
dependent on their bases, in that a change in a work’s balance or patterning will require 
some change to the work’s aesthetic simples or complexes, but a change to the simples or 
complexes will not necessarily result in a change to the work’s balance or patterning. As 
such, altering a work’s balance, for instance, will require altering some aspect of its 
composite colors, shapes, or other basic formal properties, but altering its colors, shapes, 
or other such properties need not result in a change to its balance.  
 Further, such relationals may emerge from a wide array of simples and 
complexes. A musical work may be as symmetrical, for example, as a painting, but in 
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each case the works will be symmetrical as a result of different kinds of simples and 
complexes. As such, two works may have some of the same relationals but entirely 
different simples and complexes. 
 Perceiving relationals may require a more advanced level of knowledge or 
sensitivity than is required for perceiving a work’s simples or complexes. Such properties 
as harmony or patterning, for example, may not be immediately perceptible to an 
audience, and may require more than “merely looking” at a work.  
It is worth noting that similar arguments have been made regarding the non-
formal, paradigmatically “aesthetic” properties of works, such as beauty, grace, delicacy, 
elegance, and the like. Frank Sibley famously argues, for instance, that such properties 
supervene on the “non-aesthetic” properties of a work, and require some special 
sensitivity or knowledge on the part of the audience.6 This argument has merit, but my 
theory is agnostic as regards the sorts of properties with which Sibley is primarily 
interested.  
 
Higher and Lower-Level Entities 
I want to turn now from primarily discussing the various levels of properties of an 
authored work to discussing the various levels of entities that make up an authored work. 
To make this distinction more clear, in this discussion a property is something predicated 
of a work or element thereof, while an entity is that of which the property is predicated. 
As with the properties of a work, we can find the elemental entities of a work at 
various levels. Let us begin, then, with a work’s most basic entities. In many cases, a 
work’s base entities will be identifiable with its aesthetic complexes. Such will be the 
                                               
6 Sibley, F. (1959). “Aesthetic Concepts” in Philosophical Review (68:4). 
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case in paintings or musical works. In other cases, however, the base entities will not be 
identifiable with aesthetic complexes, as in the case of a sculpture’s material make-up, 
the words that make up a work of literature, or such elements as bricks, concrete, and 
glass in architecture. In the case of a blue square of such-and-such a size and orientation, 
or a note or tone of such-and-such a duration, the entity is formally definable. In the case 
of the linguistic elements of a literary work, or the material elements of a sculptured or 
architectural work, the entities are not, strictly speaking, formally definable.  
Unlike the properties of a work, the levels of entities that compose a work are not 
neatly categorized as high (as with relationals) or low (as with simples). Rather, basic 
entities may be combined and recombined into higher and higher-level entities. 
Sculptures may be composed of a single material, or of many materials. Words are 
combined with punctuation into sentences or phrases, sentences into paragraphs or 
stanzas, and these into chapters. In a painting, drawing, or other such visual work, fields 
of color are combined with other fields of color in more and more complex ways. While 
entities, as such, have a cascading effect, some higher-level entities do hold a privileged 
status. Among these are such entities as representations in pictures and sculptures, 
melodies in musical works, plots and characters in narrative works, and such elements as 
rooms, courtyards, and hallways in works of architecture. Here, again, we find a 
supervenient relationship, with these higher-level entities supervening on lower-level 
properties or entities. The representations of a painting, for example, supervene on the 
painting’s lower-level entities (its composite lines and fields of color). Likewise, the plot 
of a novel will supervene on the scenes or events in the narrative work, which are built on 
the words, sentences, and paragraphs at the lower levels. In such cases, the higher-level 
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entities will possess a range of properties that are absent in the entities upon which they 
supervene. The scenes that make up a plot may each be symmetrical, for instance, 
without the plot therefore being symmetrical. The lines that are drawn to represent a 
figure may be black in colour, while the figure that the lines are used to represent is not. 
Returning to one of the case studies from the last chapter will help to clarify this class of 
entities.  
 
Case Study: Hand’s “Pattern Test” Revisited 
Let us return to Hand’s “Pattern Test” for determining whether a plot may be protected 
by copyright. Recall that for Hand, there is a sliding scale: at one end are plots so 
impoverished in detail that they qualify only as ideas; at the other end are plots detailed 
enough to qualify as expressions. According to this test, the less developed a plot, the less 
likely that it may be protected by copyright because it will qualify only as an idea. 
Conversely, the more detailed it is, the more likely it will be found to be an original 
expression of the idea, and thus be protected by copyright. 
While Hand seems to allow that expressions might be variously rich or 
impoverished in detail, he is arguing by implicature that ideas are essentially 
impoverished things. Surely, however, this in error: that an idea is complex presumably 
does not preclude it from being an idea. 
Unfortunately, neither the Copyright Act nor its legislative history offers 
definitions for “idea” and “expression”, and so we are left to our own devices. As such, 
let us propose some definitions that, at least provisionally and intuitively, will provide a 
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foundation for the distinction, and, I think, reflect the motivations of copyright law 
generally: 
 
Idea (df): the content of a thought, feeling, emotion, desire, and/or other 
cognitive state or event. 
 
Expression (df): the manifestation or embodiment of an idea or ideas in a 
perceptible form. 
 
Given these definitions, the term “expression” will always be an ellipsis for “expression-
of-an-idea” or “expression-of-ideas”, though an idea need not always be connected with a 
given expression. These definitions are admittedly broad in their scope, and may require 
further modification, but this much should be readily apparent: ideas are a class of 
entities internal to the mind, while expressions are a class of entities external to the 
mind.7 
Given this difference, an immediate implication arises for Hand’s assessment: 
Ideas and expressions, while related, are different sorts of entities, and when Hand 
implies that an idea can become an expression, or vice versa, he is attempting a sort of 
ontological alchemy. A description of an idea may be indistinguishable from a 
description of an expression, but the object of one is not the object of the other, and it is a 
strange claim indeed to say that a description of an idea can become a description of an 
expression simply by adding more detail to the description. 
                                               
7 Alternatively, we might say that ideas are entities instantiated in the mind, while expressions are entities 
instantiated outside the mind. There is an interesting distinction to be made between these notions of ‘idea’, 
but as I believe my theory applies equally as well to either, I shall not pursue the distinction here. 
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A correlated problem that arises for Hand is that comparing descriptions of ideas 
and descriptions of expressions is not the same activity as comparing the ideas and 
expressions themselves. Indeed, a description of an idea is almost certainly an expression 
of the idea, given the definitions above. 
With the foundation of Hand’s “Pattern Test” left in a questionable state, let us 
return to the issue of plots. A reasonable first question to ask is, does a plot qualify as an 
idea or as an expression—that is, is it the content of a cognitive state,8 or is it the 
embodiment of such content in perceptible form? If plots are expressions, they at least 
potentially fall within the bounds of copyright protection; if they are ideas, they 
categorically do not. 
First, let us consider the proposition that plots are ideas. Certainly, there is some 
intuitive evidence that points to this conclusion. We speak of plots as being constructed, 
and, unlike constructing a house, this certainly seems to be a cognitive activity. Indeed, 
one might certainly state, “I have an idea of a plot,” or “I have an idea for a plot,” and I 
would hazard to guess that in most cases of writing a story, the author begins with an idea 
of the plot, and works to construct the narrative around it. In this view, the plot, as such, 
provides the skeleton that holds together the meat of the story, and the same skeleton 
might be filled out with an array of such meats, resulting in a number of stories, each 
embodying the same plot. Given this view, we might analogize the relation between plots 
and narratives to that of theatrical scripts or musical scores and their performances, with 
the plot, like the script or score, provides the structure, and the narrative, like the 
performance, embodying the structure in perceptible form. To give it a name, let’s call 
                                               
8 That is, something that can be thought (but which is not necessarily being thought). 
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this position the “idealist view of plots,” maintaining that a plot is an idea, and that the 
narrative is the embodiment or expression of that idea.  
Although perhaps intuitive, this idealist view of plots ultimately fails to stand up. 
First, just as an idea of a house is not itself a house, I would argue, the idea of a plot is 
not itself a plot. Rather, it seems, the plot, like the house, is the object of an idea or 
thought-act. And while a plot or a house may be the object of an idea, we shouldn’t 
confuse the idea’s object with its content. Rather, the content of an idea is a 
representation of its object, and the two possess wildly different properties.9 An idealist 
about plots might point out that in the sorts of cases just discussed, there exist no such 
objects to be represented, and as such the unwritten plot exists only in the mind. Ongoing 
work in the philosophy of mind and elsewhere, however, pulls the force of this punch: 
just as one can have an idea of the house one wants to retire in, which does not yet exist, 
so too can one have the idea of a plot one has not yet written. The unwritten plot is 
something of an intentional object—and merely an intentional object, the representation 
of which may be richly detailed, but which is, nevertheless, not the object itself, for the 
object itself does not exist. 
If this is the case, then, what sort of object is a plot? Given our original 
dichotomy, if a plot is not an idea, perhaps it is an expression. Now, if my assessment is 
correct, one does not, strictly speaking, express a plot, for a plot is not an idea. However, 
it may be the case that a plot is an expression of a different sort of idea. Let’s leave aside 
for the moment what sort of idea this might be, and simply consider the possibility that a 
                                               
9 I recognize that representational theories of mental content are not unanimously accepted. Even so, I 
expect my argument could be easily modified to account for competing theories. 
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plot is some sort of expression. What seems immediately apparent is that if a plot is an 
expression, it’s a strange sort of expression. 
Recall again our definition of an expression, being the embodiment of an idea or 
ideas in a perceptible form. We have granted that a plot may express some sort of idea, 
but what seems to pose a problem is that idea’s being expressed in “perceptible form”. 
Certainly, the plot of a narrative work is not immediately perceptible to the audience. It is 
not like the colors or shapes of a painting. To use the terminology introduced earlier in 
this chapter, a plot is neither an aesthetic simple nor an aesthetic complex. Rather, the plot 
of a narrative work becomes apparent to the audience upon experiencing that work, or 
during the experience of the work. As the narrative plays out, the audience progressively 
grasps the overall plot of the work. 
 As such, the analogy to a script or score and its performance no longer seems to 
apply. One perceives the elements of a script or score at the very same time one perceives 
the performance itself. The performance is an embodiment or realization of the script or 
score, and while it adds perceptible elements, the elements of that which is embodied are 
also perceptible. They have become perceptually bonded: the audience perceives the 
elements of the script or score at the very same time it perceives the elements of the 
performance; to perceive one requires perceiving the other. Not so with the plot of a 
narrative. At no point does one hear, see, or otherwise perceive the plot, however 
apparent that plot might be to the audience. To hear the dialogue of a novel or to view 
the performance of a scene is not ipso facto to perceive the plot. 
 It might reasonably be argued that a plot is no more than the succession of scenes 
in a narrative work. And, as such, when one perceives a given scene (itself composed of 
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dialogue and various descriptive elements), one is, in fact, perceiving a part of the plot. 
And, as such, it is only upon having read or viewed the entire narrative work that one can 
say one has, in fact, perceived the plot as a whole. Aristotle makes a related point in The 
Poetics, arguing, “[A]s bodies and animals must have a size that can easily be perceived 
as a whole, so plots must have a length which can easily be remembered.”10 Just the 
same, it should not be concluded on this basis that a plot is simply reducible to its 
composite elements.  
Stephen Davies makes a similar point with regard to melodies in Musical Works 
& Performances (Oxford: 2001). He argues that a melody is not to be identified with its 
notes, nor can it be reductively analyzed as tonally-structured note strings. Rather, he 
argues, a melody is a “higher” structure than its notes, and can survive small-scale local 
changes.11 Similarly, I suggest, small-scale changes to scenes or events in a narrative 
work will not change the plot that they contribute to. Had Hamlet confronted Gertrude in 
the garden, rather than her bedroom, it seems reasonable to say that the plot of Hamlet as 
a whole would nevertheless survive this change. Had he confronted her at the beginning 
of Act 2, rather than the end of Act 3, however, it seems the plot would be very different. 
 Plots are more complex than simple chronologies. Executing a series of similar 
scenes back to back in a play might give the plot a certain rhythm, while portraying them 
simultaneously on separate sides of the stage will give the plot a certain harmony. 
Opening a play with a death scene and closing it with a birth scene will give it a sense of 
balance, while both opening and closing it with a death scene, or the same scene repeated, 
will give it a particular symmetry. Having those scenes occur elsewhere in the execution 
                                               
10 Aristotle, The Poetics, §1451a 
11 Davies, Stephen (2001). Musical Works & Performances, pp.54-58 
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of the narrative, however (even if they occur in the same relative points in the chronology 
being portrayed), will certainly alter these formal properties. The properties possessed by 
plots are not necessarily the same properties possessed by the scenes or events of which 
they are composed: plots may be variously balanced, symmetrical, proportioned, 
contrasting, or rhythmic, all to varying degrees, regardless of the higher-level properties 
possessed by the scenes, individually. Chronologies have none of these properties—they 
are simply strings of scenes or events. So, while a work’s chronology undoubtedly 
contributes to its plot, a plot is not exhausted by its chronology. Rather, a plot has formal, 
higher-level properties that depend on how the chronology is executed in the narrative, 
properties that depend upon the relations between scenes and events as portrayed in the 
narrative, not only as they occur in the chronology.12 
The relations between scenes and events occurring in the narrative will in most 
cases be causally related, such that event A is depicted as causing event B, and such a 
relation will largely depend upon the story’s chronology. But scenes or events as 
composing nodes in the plot will also be related in ways not dependent upon the 
chronology, but upon how the chronology is structured within the plot. Some, like 
George M. Wilson, have contended that the structure of a story’s telling itself provides 
meaning over and above the meaning contributed by the scenes or events so structured: 
 
Narratives assign meaning or significance to the events they incorporate 
by situating them within an explanatory pattern that typically delineates 
                                               
12 The work of “narratologists” like Tzvetan Todorov (The Poetics of Prose, 1977), Seymour Chatman 
(Story and Discourse, 1978), and Wallace Martin (Recent Theories of Narrative, 1986) have established 
other reasons for distinguishing a work’s plot from its chronology, but these fall outside the scope of this 
argument. 
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both their causal roles and their teleological contributions to the needs and 
goals of the characters.13 
 
Although Wilson speaks primarily in terms of “narratives” and not “plots,” and where his 
focus is on meaning and mine is on properties, we seem to be playing similar games, and 
making parallel distinctions. That is, a plot is not to be identified with the scenes or 
events depicted in a story, nor strictly with the chronology of the story. Rather, it 
possesses an array of properties (and if Wilson is correct, meaning) distinct from these 
other elements of a work. 
 Having reached this understanding of plots, I think we can safely hazard a 
definition: 
 
Plot (df): a formally structured web of relations that hold between scenes 
or events in a narrative work. 
 
It is this formally structured web of relations that possesses the properties of balance, 
symmetry, contrast, and the like, not the scenes or events that form its nodes. And, while 
the plot undoubtedly depends on these nodes, it should not be identified with them, in the 
same way that a melody should not be identified with its constitutive notes.  
 In our hierarchy of entities discussed earlier in this chapter, plots are found at a 
very high level. A plot is not merely composed of lower-level entities, as sentences are 
composed of words and punctuation, and words are composed of letters. Rather, the plot 
                                               
13 Wilson, George M. (2003). “Narrative,” p. 394. See also Wilson, George M. (1997). “On Film Narrative 
and Narrative Meaning” (in R. Allen and M. Smith, eds., Film Theory and Philosophy). 
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of a narrative work supervenes on the scenes or events portrayed in the work. Alterations 
to the scenes of a work will not necessarily result in an alteration to the plot, but 
alterations to the plot certainly require alterations to the scenes or their arrangement 
within the work. 
 A narrative work may be identified at least in part with a particular structure, but 
this structure will exceed that of a plot. The identity of a work of literature depends in 
part upon the particular words used by the author. As such, while the original Russian 
and the English-language translation of Notes from Underground undeniably have the 
same plot, they should probably not be identified as the same literary work. So, while a 
narrative work may be identified in part with a particular structure, and its plot may be a 
part of this structure, the plot is not exhaustively constitutive of it. The work, in other 
words, is not a simple instantiation of the plot, though a change to the plot will 
undoubtedly result in a change to the work, so the plot is certainly a part of the work. 
Though a plot is not an idea, it may qualify as an expression. However, as 
previously noted, if so, it is a strange sort of expression.14 First, a web of relations is not 
the sort of entity that is immediately perceptible to the audience, though it may certainly 
be apparent to the audience. Second, as a formally structured web of relations holding 
between scenes or events in a narrative work, a plot cannot be embodied without some 
such scenes or events as told in a work. So, while one might outline a plot, this outline is 
not the plot itself. Rather, the outline is a description of the plot, and this description need 
not possess the same properties as the plot that it describes. This said, while a plot cannot 
                                               
14 It may be asked at this point, if a plot is an expression, what is it an expression of? We might as easily 
ask, what are paintings—or, more properly, the composition of paintings—expressions of? I doubt any 
single answer will apply to all cases, and even in single cases, will probably require as complex an answer 
as the plot itself is complex. 
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stand on its own as an expression, nor is it likely to be immediately perceptible to the 
audience, it is nevertheless a part of the narrative work as a whole. 
Neither is the plot the chronology of the story. At least in cases of non-fiction, a 
chronology is no more than a fact about the world—a mere sequence of events.15 As 
such, at least as it stands, a chronology cannot qualify for copyright protection. 
Considering fiction as an analog, then, it would seem that a fictional chronology is most 
likely an idea, the expression of which being the particular and original way that its nodes 
are arranged within the story, and to what effect. At least as I have described it, this is 
none other than the story’s plot. And so, it seems, at a best guess, the idea that the plot 
expresses is the chronology. 
Similar analyses are imaginable for each of the highest-level entities that make up 
authored works, including but not limited to melodies in musical works, characters in 
narrative works, and representations in pictorial and narrative works. While such analyses 
would be exhaustive, it seems reasonable to say that in each of these cases, the higher-
level entity supervenes on lower-level entities such as notes, words, and fields of color. 
And, while apparent to or adduced by the attuned audience, the higher-level entity will 
not be strictly perceptible as such.  
 
Discounted Elements 
Having looked at higher and lower-level elements of authored works (both properties and 
entities), it is worth noting that certain elements of the physical object (or objects) 
                                               
15 Recalling the case of A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1980) from last chapter, it should be 
apparent that the plot of a “factual” narrative work like Hoehling’s is as much an expression as is the plot 
of a fictional one. That is, while the chronology of Hoehling’s book on the Hindenburg conspiracy likely 
qualifies merely as a fact, the way that the chronology is portrayed in the book (i.e., its plot) is not. 
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embodying the authored work seem to fall outside the boundaries of work itself. For 
example, we might imagine that your copy of Middlemarch is a softcover edition, 
published by Penguin Books in 1987. My copy is the hardcover first American edition, 
published by Harper & Brothers in 1873. The typefaces are different, and my edition has 
no copyright page (though it does have four pages of ads), but we would, I imagine, want 
to say that we both own copies of George Eliot’s Middlemarch. And if I copy the text of 
Middlemarch word for word onto a file on my laptop computer, without any copyright 
page or ads, it seems I have nevertheless copied the whole of the work, regardless of the 
font used in my file.  
 In this case, we can identify two types of elements of the physical object (the 
book) that are not elements of the authored work, Middlemarch. The first type includes 
both the copyright page and the ads. While perhaps integral to the object of the book, and 
perhaps aesthetic objects of their own right, they are not integral to the work itself. They 
have, quite simply, been added by the publishers of the book, and not the author of the 
work (though, in the case of the ads, they were probably added with the knowledge of the 
author). The second type of element is the font. Unlike the copyright page and the ads, 
the work requires some font, typeface, or other means of conveying the words in order to 
embody the work.16 However, the work does not require any particular such font. As 
such, included in the boundaries of the work are the words themselves, but not the 
particular means of conveying them, however aesthetic.  
 George Dickie, by way of Monroe Beardsley, raises analogous cases elsewhere in 
the arts. In particular, he provides the case of the “Chinese property man”: 
 
                                               
16 Included under “means of conveying the words” would, of course, be the spoken word. 
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Consider the property man in traditional Chinese theater, who appears 
onstage among the actors while the play is going on. He arranges 
properties and scenery and does such things as hold a certain kind of flag 
in front of the face of a “dead body” as it walks off stage. […] The onstage 
movements and actions of the actors are clearly aspects of the aesthetic 
objects of plays. The movements and actions of Chinese property men, 
while aspects of the performance of plays in a broad sense, clearly belong 
to another domain from the movements and actions of actors. […] The 
Chinese property man is an aspect of an aesthetic object because he is an 
aspect of a visual design, but he is not an aspect of the aesthetic object of 
the play.17 
 
As with the copyright page and ads in editions of Middlemarch, the Chinese property 
man is perhaps a part of an aesthetic object, and is certainly a part of the physical objects 
that embody the work, but is not, thereby, a part of the work itself. And, like the font of 
Middlemarch, such works may require property men in order to be performed, but the 
property man is not, therefore, a part of the work. The property man is more like the stage 
curtains, footlights, theater seats, and other elements that come with performances, but 
are outside the boundaries of the works in question. 
 Perhaps even further outside the boundaries of the work are elements like the 
backs of paintings, the marks on the stage indicating where actors should stand, and the 
                                               
17 Dickie (1974). Art and the Aesthetic, pp. 166-7 
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strings of ones and zeros that make up the object code of a video game.18 Such elements 
may be functionally required for the works to be physically sustained, like scaffolding, 
but are not elements of the works themselves. Had the painting been painted with a white 
back rather than red, the play performed without stage marks, or the video game created 
with a different object code, the painting, play performance, and video game would not 
thereby be altered. 
As these elements of the physical objects are not elements of the work, and as 
copyright pertains only to the works themselves, it seems clear that such elements should 
be excluded from any claim to copyright on the works. However, determining which 
elements fall within and which outside the work is not always a simple task.  
Many of the first editions of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories 
were published with illustrations by Sidney Paget. Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland 
and Through the Looking Glass were originally published with illustrations by John 
Tenniel. Should we consider these illustrations parts of the respective novels they 
illustrated? (They certainly seem to have more of a claim than do the ads in the printed 
edition of Middlemarch.) Alternatively, should we consider the illustrations as separate 
works? Or, finally, should we consider the published work a compilation of two separate 
such works, one literature, and one visual, together forming some new work? Similar 
such problems arise for prefaces, forewords, and the like.  
Taken even further, consider the Griffin & Sabine trilogy, by Nick Bantock. 
Griffin & Sabine is a three-part epistolary work (or, alternatively, three epistolary works), 
involving the correspondence of the title characters. Unlike other epistolary works, 
                                               
18 That said, the backs of paintings, stage marks, and computer object code may qualify as authored works 
of their own, but if so these will be different authored works than the front of the painting, the play 
performance, and the video game itself. 
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however, the correspondence in Griffin & Sabine is told in both postcards and letters. 
Like actual postcards, on the reverse side of the pages on which the correspondence is 
handwritten, Bantock has illustrated the cards. Where the title characters turn to 
corresponding by letter, the reader must open envelopes glued onto pages in the books 
and remove the letters in order to read them. Here, it seems clear that typing up the letters 
word for word on my computer does not amount to copying the work as a whole. Not 
only the illustrations, but the handwritten form of the letters (or typewritten, in some 
cases) seems to be a deliberate choice of the author. We find similar cases in comic 
books and strips in which the dialogue in word balloons is traditionally handwritten. In 
the series of Classics Illustrated comics that adapted great novels for the comic format, 
the dialogue was typed in a standardized sans-sarif font, ostensibly to “establish a tone of 
stateliness and legitimized power.”19 In Walt Kelly’s classic comic strip, Pogo, the voices 
of many characters were written in a variety of typefaces, allowing additional elements of 
tone and character to be visualized for the reader. Clearly, here, as with poster design, 
Dadaist art, and other media employing text, font choice can be critical to a work. The 
question remains when this and other such elements should be discounted, and when they 




As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, claims of atomic similarity tend to be the 
primary bases for most copyright infringement suits. Where an individual does not admit 
                                               
19 Witek, Joseph (1989). Comic Books as History: The Narrative Art of Jack Jackson, Art Spiegelman, and 
Harvey Pekar, p. 23. 
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to copying, US copyright law focuses first on substantial similarity between works as 
evidence that copying has taken place. However, given the various levels of entities and 
properties that make up any authored work, analyzing atomic similarity between two 
works is no simple matter. 
 First, similarity may occur at both higher and lower levels, and with regard to 
both properties and entities. Focusing first on properties, let us start with some relatively 
simple examples. First, certainly, a painting of a blue square will be similar to a painting 
of a blue rectangle insofar as each includes some field of blue color. As well, a rectangle 
is certainly similar to a square insofar as each has four right angles and four sides. With 
this in mind, however, simple examples quickly become quite complex. Intuitively, for 
example, one square is more similar to another square than it is to any rectangle. 
However, a two-foot wide blue square might be thought to be more similar to a two-foot 
wide blue rectangle than to a three-inch wide red square. How are we to judge this? 
Establishing similarity between any two things is essentially a matter of finding 
points of correspondence between them, such that the more points of one-to-one 
correspondence holding between two things, the more similar these things will be. When 
looking to establish atomic similarity between two authored works, one such dimension 
of similarity will be that which holds between aesthetic complexes and the aesthetic 
simples of which they are composed. Certainly, this will be the easiest to illustrate. For 
example, the properties of one painting of a blue square may line up in one-to-one 
correspondence with the properties of another painting of a blue square given the shade 
of blue used in each, the lengths of the sides of the squares painted, the orientation of the 
squares and so on. There will, however, be less similarity between a painting of a blue 
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square and a painting of a blue rectangle, or between a painting of a blue square and that 
of a red square, and all the less so as the sizes of the figures and their orientations differ. 
Generally, however, the more aesthetic simples held in common between two works, the 
more similar they will be. Further, where one painting of a blue square of a particular 
shade, size, and orientation will be extremely similar to another painting of a blue square 
of the same shade, size, and orientation, if the latter painting also depicts a red triangle, 
yellow circle and green rectangle, the two will be less similar, as there will be a dearth of 
simples in the former to which those of the latter can correspond. Paintings, of course, 
tend to be much more complex in their depictions than are the examples discussed here, 
and establishing the degree of similarity between any two such paintings will likewise be 
more complex. However, the same principle of similarity will apply as more and more 
properties of works are compared. 
This arena of similarity thus becomes larger as we consider not only the aesthetic 
simples of a work, but also their arrangement and relation to the work as a whole. As 
such, a painting with a blue square in the lower-right corner will, ceteris paribus, be more 
similar to another painting with a blue square in the lower-right corner than it will be to a 
painting with a blue square in the lower-left corner. The possible points of similarity 
continue to grow as works become more and more complex. 
The painting as a whole will have certain simples that apply to it as well, so it 
might be thought that a painting with a blue square in the upper-left corner need only be 
rotated 180 degrees to be made more similar to a painting with a blue square in the lower-
right corner, but each painting has a particular orientation, and rotating the first painting 
will not actually make it more similar to the second. 
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These same points will, of course, apply to different kinds of authored works. 
Two musical works will be substantially similar if they contain precisely the same tones, 
for example, but will be less similar if those tones are presented in a different order in 
each work, or for a different duration in each.  
Beyond aesthetic simples, degrees of similarity may hold between two works with 
regard to their aesthetic relationals. As the aesthetic simples and complexes differ 
between works, so too may such properties of the works as their respective symmetries, 
patterns, harmonies, and the like. As supervenient properties, however, two works may 
differ in their aesthetic simples and complexes at various levels of composition, and yet 
still be substantially similar with regard to their aesthetic relationals. This said, where the 
aesthetic simples and complexes of two works vary wildly, establishing the similarity 
between two works with regard to their respective aesthetic relationals will be a matter of 
degree. That is, one work may be more or less symmetrical than another, or more or less 
harmonic, but determining precisely how similar these works are with regard to their 
respective symmetry or harmony will be more difficult given how these works are 
symmetrical or harmonic, which is to say, upon which aesthetic simples and complexes 
the aesthetic relationals of each work supervene. 
Atomic similarity between works is not restricted only to the dimension of 
properties, but may also be found in the dimension of entities. Of course, as aesthetic 
complexes are entities composed of nothing more than aesthetic simples, cases of 
comparing these entities simply grow out of comparing the simples themselves. As 
discussed above, however, other entities are not formally defined. For instance, two 
sculptures will be more or less similar as their relative material composition differs, even 
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where the shapes of the sculptures are precisely alike. Naturally, the same is true of the 
linguistic entities that make up literary works, the material entities that make up 
architectural works, and so on. As such, two works of literature will be more or less 
similar with regard to the literary entities that make up each, and with regard to their 
arrangement in the respective works, and the same will be true for other kinds of authored 
works.  
The same principle holds with regard to the higher-level entities that make up 
works. Two architectural works, for example, may be more or less similar with regard to 
their kinds and numbers of rooms, courtyards, and the like. Two musical works may be 
more or less similar with regard to their respective melodies. And, as discussed at length 
earlier in this chapter, two literary works may be more or less similar with regard to their 
respective plots. Further, just as works may be more or less similar with regard to their 
higher-level properties independent of their lower-level properties, so too may works be 
more or less similar with regard to higher-level entities independent of their lower-level 
entities. For example, as touched on above, the original Russian and the English 
translation of Notes from Underground will have precisely the same plot (a higher-level 
entity), and yet will vary wildly, if not entirely, with regard to the words that make up 
each (lower-level entities). 
This distinction between higher and lower-levels becomes particularly relevant 
when considering similarities between works across media. Similarity between works 
composed in different media will usually be restricted to similarity in higher-level entities 
and properties. For example, consider the case of Michael O’Sullivan, the protagonist of 
Max Allan Collins and Richard Piers Rayner’s graphic novel, Road to Perdition. Collins 
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and Rayner’s graphic novel was adapted into a film by 20th Century Fox, starring Tom 
Hanks as the now-renamed Michael Sullivan. The film, meanwhile, was adapted into a 
novel, not surprisingly written by Collins himself. The character of O’Sullivan/Sullivan is 
as such variously depicted in comic form (in the graphic novel), in a painting (used for 
the cover of the graphic novel), in the film adaptation of the graphic novel, and in the 
novelization of the film—this, despite the fact that very little similarity may be found in 
the lower-level entities across these media.   
Whether dealing with higher or lower-level properties, or higher or lower-level 
entities, similarity is a sliding scale, from no similarity between works to total similarity, 
as between copies of the same novel, movie, or other such work. 
With this in mind, let us consider again the tests for substantial similarity 
discussed last chapter. Recall that where “extrinsic” or “pattern” tests are used to 
compare the individual features of works, “intrinsic” or “ordinary observer” tests ask 
whether an “ordinary, reasonable observer would find a substantial similarity of 
expression” of the ideas shared between the two works, or if there is a substantial 
similarity in “the total concept and feel of the works.”20 Extrinsic tests tend to be 
undertaken by experts in a given field. Especially where similarity is argued to hold in 
higher-level properties or higher-level entities, employing expert witnesses is a 
reasonable strategy, as comparing such properties and elements often requires some 
heightened or specialized sensitivity or knowledge. Intrinsic tests, however, pose more of 
a problem. 
                                               
20 Again, see Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984); Pasillas v. McDonald’s Corp., 
927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991); MicroStar v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998); Smith 
v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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As just mentioned, intrinsic tests depend upon an ordinary observer declaring 
some similarity in the “total concept and feel” of the works. Each of these conjuncts, 
however, is problematic. All that seems required for two works to be substantially similar 
in “total concept” is that the works express the same idea or ideas. However, as ideas are 
specifically left unprotected by copyright, creators are free to express the same ideas as 
others have before them. “Total concept” is as such a non-starter. The other half of the 
conjunct proves equally unpromising. While an ordinary observer’s finding that two 
works are substantially similar in “feel” may be indicative of some atomic similarity (for 
two works that are atomically identical will almost certainly have a substantially similar 
“feel”), such a finding is certainly not conclusive. An ordinary observer may, of course, 
find a similar “feel” in an Edvard Munch painting, an Edward Gorey drawing, and a 
Richard Wagner composition. Such a finding, however, does not clearly indicate 
anything substantially similar in the works themselves. Instead, such a finding only 
allows us to conclude a substantial similarity in the observer’s reaction to these works, 
and this sort of similarity should not be confused with the other. 
 
Perceptual Indistinguishables 
Even where two works are atomically similar, or even atomically identical, what then? 
Are they the same work? In his seminal work, Languages of Art, Nelson Goodman 
claims, “To verify the spelling or to spell correctly is all that is required to identify an 
instance of the work or to produce a new instance. […] Merely by determining that the 
copy before us is spelled correctly we can determine that it meets all requirements for the 
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work in question.”21 In other words, according to Goodman, for one work of literature to 
instantiate the same linguistic entities as another such work is sufficient for them to be 
identical. As such, creating a new literary object that is word-for-word indistinguishable 
from some previously-existing literary object is simply creating a new instance of that 
first work. 
On its face, this seems a fairly obvious assertion. If I publish a poem that is word-
for-word identical with Dylan Thomas’ “Do not go gentle into that good night,” it seems 
commonsensical to say that all I have published is Thomas’ poem. While initially 
intuitive, however, Goodman’s claim ultimately runs afoul of how we tend to think about 
such works. By way of example, let us first consider Jorge Luis Borges’ “Pierre Menard, 
Author of the Quixote.” In this short story, the narrator describes how Pierre Menard, 
through an unexplained mechanism, manages to laboriously rewrite selections of 
Cervantes’ masterpiece, Don Quixote, without direct reference to the original. However, 
because Menard is writing in what is for him an archaic style, and because Menard’s 
intellectual and cultural context is entirely different from Cervantes’, Menard’s Quixote 
possesses wildly different aesthetic properties than does Cervantes’. The narrator’s 
argument amounts to this: despite being word-for-word indistinguishable from each 
other, the two versions of Don Quixote are not the same work.22 
                                               
21 Goodman (1976), p. 115. This claim is part of a larger argument on Goodman’s part about the ontology 
of artworks. I will be discussing Goodman’s more general argument in detail in Chapter Four: The Abstract 
Nature of Authored Works. 
22 Borges’ story has served for contemporary philosophers as an illustration of the difference between 
“work” and “text”. This distinction is traditionally made on intentional bases (particularly in Jerrold 
Levinson’s “contextualism” about art), with regard to the audience’s participation (especially in the 
deconstructionist criticism of Roland Barthes and his followers), or by contrast of the disparate properties 
of works and texts (see Currie (1991). “Work and Text” in Mind (100:3)). While endlessly interesting, and 
as much as I would like to engage them here, these interpretive approaches go beyond what is required of 
my theory.  
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 While Borges’ story seems perhaps fantastic, as much for the scale of the work(s) 
at issue as anything else, let us consider a more compact literary form: the haiku. In its 
English form, the haiku standardly consists of 17 syllables broken into lines of five, 
seven, and five syllables. Now, while the haiku form effectively allows for countless 
possible poems, it does not seem unthinkable (or, perhaps, even unlikely) that one poet 
might independently string together the same 17 or fewer words in the same order as has 
another poet. Based on their atomic indistinguishability alone, however, it seems 
problematic to say that the author of the first haiku should have any claim over the 
second, or the second over the first. For the first author did not write the second haiku, 
and the second author did not write the first haiku. Rather, they each wrote their own 
haikus, and the most we can say is that the second author wrote a haiku that is composed 
of the same linguistic entities as that produced by the first author, and perhaps that it 
possesses the same higher and lower-level properties.23 While the haiku of the second 
author is not novel, it seems to at least possess its own originality, inasmuch as it has a 
unique origin.24 The improbable circumstances of Borges’ story are essentially an 
extension of this same principle.  
 Analogous issues arise in other media as well, and may help to clarify the issue at 
hand. Consider Arizona’s Grand Canyon National Park, which plays host to some five 
million visitors every year. At any given time, a handful of these visitors stand atop the 
same observation platform taking photographs of the same scenery. As a result, some of 
                                               
23 Following the argument embedded in Borges’ story, and made explicit in Jerrold Levinson’s 
“contextualism”, the two works may have wildly different ‘aesthetic’ properties, depending on the context 
in which they were created, but, as previously mentioned, my theory is agnostic regarding such properties. 
24 Where by “novelty” I mean something like, atomically unique; by “original” I mean, having a unique 
origin. Where the subject of atomic properties, similarity, and uniqueness have been the subject of this 
chapter, the issue of uniqueness of origin falls under my discussion of the causal dimension of authored 
works, to be taken up next chapter. 
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these visitors will walk away with photographs that are atomically identical and 
perceptually indistinguishable from those of other visitors. As with the haiku poets, each 
shutterbug has taken his or her own photograph, and it seems flatly incorrect to say each 
of these photographs is the same photograph as the others. Rather, they are atomically 
indistinguishable in the same way that one identical twin is genetically indistinguishable 
from the other, but nevertheless a different person. If one photograph were copied from 
another (or the two from the same negative), we would probably more comfortably 
describe them as the same photograph (or as instances of the same photograph), but 
perceptual indistinguishability alone cannot ground this difference. Instead, we must look 
to another dimension of authored works: their causal dimension. For one work to be 
atomically identical to another does not suffice for its being identical to it tout court, for 
two works might be atomically identical and yet causally differentiated. The causal 
dimension of authored works is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Causal Dimension of Authored Works 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the atomic dimension of authored works. Although 
undoubtedly complex, so far as copyright is concerned, a work’s atomic dimension holds 
a privileged position from the audience’s point of view: the atomic dimension of a work 
is largely perceptual. As such, you can tell a lot about a work’s atomic dimension simply 
by perceiving it, and this is undoubtedly why it serves as the impetus, and forms the 
initial basis of discussion, for many copyright disputes. The same, however, does not 
hold true for the remaining factors that I wish to discuss. That is to say, observation of an 
authored work—be it a novel, a painting, a play, a sonata, or any other—will tend to 
reveal little about its causal, abstract, or categorical dimension. Such observation may 
give us hints, and lead to probable conjecture, certainly, but observation alone cannot tell 
us anything definitive. Indeed, as we have seen, reliance on observation alone risks 
erroneous findings in the realm of copyright. A claim of infringement by one tourist on 
the basis that another’s photograph of the Grand Canyon is indistinguishable from his 
own seems groundless. That the two photographs happen to look the same is not nearly 
sufficient to grant one photographer some claim over the photograph of another. The 
same is true for the haiku poets who happen to write linguistically indistinguishable 
poems, and, I would imagine, for similar circumstances arising in any medium. To 
ground any claim to another’s purportedly original work seems to require something 
further—to borrow from Arthur Danto, it requires something “the eye cannot descry.” As 
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such, we shall have to investigate the non-perceptual dimension of authored works. I 
shall begin with their causal dimension. 
 By “causal dimension”, I am referring to what are essentially two factors that 
contribute to a work’s unique nature: its context of creation, and its place in a historical 
chain of which that work is a link. My discussion of each of these factors is inspired by 
the work of Jerrold Levinson, and as such requires some initial discussion of Levinson’s 
relevant theories. With regard to the context of creation, I look first to Levinson’s “What 
a Musical Work Is” (1980), one of the most influential of a body of theories challenging 
purely structural approaches to the ontology of art. With regard to a work’s place in a 
historical chain, I will begin with a discussion of Levinson’s “Defining Art Historically” 
(1979), which challenges the non-essentialist definitions of art provided by George 
Dickie and others. In neither case, it should be noted, am I wholly endorsing or defending 
these theories, particularly as I am not looking to provide a definition of works—be they 
art works or authored works. Rather, I am simply looking to glean from and expand upon 
these theories so as to better ground the nature of authored works in the context of 
copyright. 
 
What a Musical Work Is 
In “What a Musical Work Is,” Levinson is in part responding to two extreme approaches 
to the ontology of art. At one extreme is the view that musical (as well as literary and 
other) works are in essence purely mental, a position held by Benedetto Croce, R.G. 
Collingwood, and select others.1 At the other extreme is the school of thought variously 
                                               
1 See Croce (1902). Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic, and Collingwood (1938). 
The Principles of Art. 
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embraced by such theorists as Joseph Margolis, Richard Wollheim, and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, that musical works are essentially sound structures—that is, structures 
composed of pitches, rhythms, timbres, dynamics, accents, and other such elements.2 
As Levinson points out, the view that works of art are essentially mental suffers 
from many problems, not the least of which is that on such a view artworks are 
inaccessible to all but the artist himself. Certainly such a position flies in the face of the 
common view that in hearing a song or reading a poem we are, indeed, experiencing the 
work. Further, if we were to embrace the Croce-Collingwood position, it seems, we 
would thus have to abandon any standard notion of an audience for artworks. As 
discussed at the end of the last chapter, however, the position that a work of art is 
essentially nothing but a structure fares no better, for such a position would entail that 
any two works that are structurally (or, in my terms, atomically) identical are thus the 
same work. As the examples of the identical haikus and photographs of the Grand 
Canyon illustrate, such a position quickly leads to counterintuitive results. The same, 
Levinson argues, holds true for musical works. 
It is against this backdrop that Levinson presents his theory, one central to his 
larger project of “aesthetic contextualism.”3 Looking for a defensible position between 
these two extremes, Levinson argues that a piece of music is a sort of structural type (and, 
as such, is both non-physical and publicly available)—at its core is a sound structure plus 
a performance means/structure. But more importantly, Levinson claims that a musical 
work is not a pure structure, but rather an impure or indicated structure, to wit, a 
                                               
2 Stevenson, Margolis, and Wollheim (as well as many others) thus contend that musical and other works 
are essentially abstract objects. As I will be discussing the abstract dimension of authored works in Chapter 
Four, I will withhold discussion of the details of this approach until then.  
3 See also discussion of Levinson’s “Historical Definition of Art,” below. 
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sound/performance means structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t, with X being the composer, 
and t the time of composition.4 
To begin, Levinson appeals to our intuition that composers do, in fact, create their 
compositions. This is, after all, one reason we revere composers as we do. The view that 
musical works are simply abstract sound structures, however, serves only to obscure this 
basis for reverence. Levinson argues, “If musical works were sound structures, then 
musical works could not, properly speaking, be created by their composers. For sound 
structures are types of a pure sort which exist at all times.”5 This, Levinson argues, is due 
to the fact that a given sound structure could be instantiated at any time. In this way, a 
sound structure is like a geometric figure or other mathematical entity. That is, the string 
of notes that make up Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5 in C Minor could have been 
instantiated prior to 1808, by Beethoven or any other composer, if only it had been 
thought of earlier. For that matter, it could have been sung by a chorus of birds or 
accidentally produced by some harmonic clanking and whirring of machinery. This being 
the case, the sound structure simpliciter must have existed prior to Beethoven’s 
composition. And as such, Levinson argues, “If we conceive of Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony as existing sempiternally, before Beethoven’s compositional act, a small part 
of the glory that surrounds Beethoven’s composition of the piece seems to be removed.”6 
If the Fifth Symphony existed prior to Beethoven’s act of composition, it seems, then 
Beethoven did not create the work at all; rather, he merely discovered or selected it from 
amongst the countless such works floating about in the ether. This idea that composers 
                                               
4 Levinson also considers a musical work as a sound/performance means structure-as-indicated-in-musico-
historical-context-C, but feels the version given above more adequately fits our intuitions. 
5 Levinson, Jerrold (1980a). “What a Musical Work Is” in Journal of Philosophy (77:1), 7. 
6 Ibid, 9. 
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merely discover or select entities, rather than create them, Levinson argues, flies in the 
face of deeply-embedded intuitions. 
Somewhat in the manner Nicholas Wolterstorff has proposed,7 Levinson argues 
that if we are to claim that a work such as Symphony No. 5 in C Minor has been created 
by its composer, the composer must be contributing something further than the sound 
structure, itself. As Wolterstorff states, “Perhaps the correct view is that though the entity 
which is a musical work exists everlastingly, it is not a musical work until some composer 
does something to it.”8 What the composer does, Levinson claims, is twofold: indicating 
the core structure in a certain “musico-historical context,” and envisaging that structure 
as involving specific means of performance in mind. 
 Considering cases similar to the identical haikus and photographs discussed last 
chapter, Levinson argues that certain attributes of musical works are dependent on factors 
outside the sound/performance means structures of those works. These factors make up 
the “musico-historical context” in which the composer is situated when composing the 
work:  
 
The total musico-historical context of a composer P at a time t can be said 
to include at least the following: (a) the whole of cultural, social, and 
political history prior to t, (b) the whole of musical development up to t, 
(c) musical styles prevalent at t, (d) dominant musical influences at t, (e) 
musical activities of P’s contemporaries at t, (f) P’s apparent style at t, (g) 
                                               
7 See Wolterstorff (1975). “Toward an Ontology of Artworks” in Nous (9), 138-139.  
8 Ibid, 139. 
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P’s musical repertoire at t, (h) P’s oeuvre at t, (i) musical influences 
operating on P at t.9 
 
We might, for instance, consider Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 4 in F Minor. Composed 
in 1877-8, Tchaikovsky’s Fourth Symphony is heavily influenced by Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony. Had the sound structure been instantiated, say, in 1778 by Mozart, rather than 
when and by whom it in fact was, calling it Beethoven-influenced would be nonsensical. 
Composed by Tchaikovsky in the late 19th Century, the work is almost inevitable—it 
seems to be a natural progression in Tchaikovsky’s oeuvre. Composed in 1778 by 
Mozart, the Fourth Symphony would be decidedly bizarre, especially given that the 
fourth movement of the symphony incorporates a famous Russian folk song as one of its 
themes. Such properties as these, Levinson argues, arise from the work’s being created in 
a given musico-historical context, and would serve to differentiate it in fact from any 
other works identical in sound structure. 
 Further, Tchaikovsky’s Fourth Symphony is scored for piccolo, two flutes, two 
oboes, two clarinets, two bassoons, four horns, two trumpets, three trombones, tuba, 
timpani, triangle, cymbals, bass drum, and strings. Such instrumental specification, 
Levinson suggests further, is integral to the work’s identity. Since composers specify 
means of production, and not merely patterns of sound, these means of production are 
arguably thereby part of what make up the work. That is, were Tchaikovsky to be 
audience to a presentation of his Fourth Symphony performed by a sophisticated 
synthesizer or computer, he would certainly be amazed, but might also legitimately 
question the integrity of the performance as a performance of his symphony, even if it 
                                               
9 Levinson (1980a), 10-11. 
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was sonically identical to what he had composed. According to Levinson, a musical work 
is as much about the instrumentation to be employed as it is about the notes to be played. 
 Complicated by fusing both sound structure and performance means, Levinson 
argues, a musical work is not merely a sound/performance means structure simpliciter, 
but a sound/performance means structure indicated (in the act of composition) by a 
particular individual at a particular time: a sound/performance means structure-as-
indicated-by-X-at-t. Unlike a sound structure simpliciter, which always exists and merely 
awaits discovery, the contextually-indicated structure that is the musical work only 
begins to exist when initiated by an intentional human act. As such, Levinson contends, 
his explanation satisfies what he feels are the critical criteria of any account of musical 
works: 
 
I. The Creativity Requirement: “(Cre) Musical works must be such that 
they do not exist prior to the composer’s compositional activity, but 
are brought into existence by that activity.”10 
II. The Fine Individuation Requirement: “(Ind) Musical works must be 
such that composers composing in different music-historical contexts 
who determine identical sound structures compose distinct musical 
works.”11 
                                               
10 Ibid, 9. 
11 Ibid, 14. 
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III. The Inclusion of Performance Means: “(Per) Musical works must be 
such that specific means of performance or sound production are 
integral to them.”12 
 
Further, Levinson argues, an account of musical works must be able to distinguish: (i) 
instances of the work; (ii) instances of the sound structure of the work; (iii) instances of 
the sound/performance means structure of the work; and (iv) performances of the work.  
 For something, a, to qualify as an instance of the work, w, Levinson argues, a 
must conform completely to the sound/performance means structure of w, and exhibit the 
“required connection” to the indicative activity whereby w was originally composed. This 
required connection, Levinson assumes, is “primarily, if not wholly, intentional.”13 For a 
to qualify as an instance of the sound structure of w, it seems, a merely need line up with 
w note-for-note. For it to qualify as an instance of the sound/performance means structure 
of w, a must line up with w not only note-for-note, but also instrument-for-instrument. 
Finally, for a to qualify as a performance of w, Levinson contends, it must be “a sound 
event which is intended to instantiate” w, and which “succeeds to a reasonable degree.”14  
 
The Context of Creation 
Although Levinson’s account focuses on the specific case of musical works, it is not 
difficult to see how such an approach might apply to authored works generally. To begin, 
let us consider the criteria that Levinson argues must be satisfied in any adequate account 
                                               
12 Ibid, 19. 
13 Ibid, 26 (footnote 31). 
14 Ibid, 26. What qualifies as a reasonable degree, Levinson contends, may depend upon the ability of an 
informed and sensitive listener to discern. 
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of musical works. First, Levinson contends, “musical works must be such that they do not 
exist prior to the composer’s compositional activity, but are brought into existence by that 
activity” (the Creativity Requirement). The impetus here seems to be to preserve our 
intuitions that composers, in the act of composition, are doing something more than 
merely discovering or selecting their works from the supply of sempiternal sound 
structures floating about. Rather, we want to say, they are creating their works. Certainly, 
this sentiment applies to other sorts of authored works as much as it does to musical ones. 
Most closely, we might consider literary works, composed of word-and-punctuation 
sequences: these sequences might be considered roughly on par with the sound structures 
that Levinson considers,15 and so too do we want to say that in the act of writing a given 
literary work, the author has, indeed, created that work and not merely discovered it. 
Further, we consider the painter, the sculptor, the choreographer, and so on, creators of 
their works, respectively, and not simply selectors or discoverers of them. And, for those 
of us who are more broad-minded about art, we want to say that while Duchamp did 
select the bottle rack to be used in Bottle Rack, the work Bottle Rack did not exist prior to 
Duchamp’s authorial activity, but was brought into existence by that activity. Given this, 
we might reasonably generalize the Creativity Requirement for authored works broadly 
considered: authored works must be such that they do not exist prior to the author’s 
compositional activity, but are brought into existence by that activity 
                                               
15 I say “roughly,” as it might be pointed out that word-and-punctuation sequences are built from human-
invented elements, and thus are not truly analogous to the sound structures of music. This contention loses 
some of its force, however, if we consider musical works as being composed not merely of sound 
structures, but of note structures, which are similarly human-invented. Ultimately, however, we can say 
that, having been created, these words and elements of punctuation can then be combined in all possible 
arrangements, with those sequences existing, if not sempiternally, then at least from the point at which their 
composite elements were created. 
 87 
As discussed at the beginning of last chapter, the act of composing any authored 
work involves both selection and arrangement. That is, as soon as an author has created 
an item from selected elements, or has created the bounds for a single selected element, 
the author has done what is necessary to create an authored work. Now, where the focus 
of last chapter was on the elements selected, and how works can be individuated 
atomically, we now turn to the context of creation as a basis for individuation, and so to 
Levinson’s second criterion, the Fine Individuation Requirement. 
 Just as the Creativity Requirement seems generalizable for authored works, so too 
does the Fine Individuation Requirement. Here, Levinson states that musical works must 
be such that composers composing in different musico-historical contexts who determine 
identical sound structures compose distinct musical works. Again, the impetus for this 
requirement seems clear: without this criterion, even where different composers 
independently create compositions, there is a real risk that these composers will 
independently create the same work, if their works were structurally (or atomically) 
identical. As discussed with regard to the identical haikus and photographs of the Grand 
Canyon, it seems deeply counterintuitive to say that these individuals have created the 
same work, or that the author of one should hold any claim over the creation of the other. 
The same rings true for musical compositions. 
 It should be noted that in making his case for the Fine Individuation Requirement, 
Levinson shows how creation in different musico-historical contexts results in works 
with different aesthetic properties. Recall again the example of Tchaikovsky’s Symphony 
No. 4 in F Minor: were the Fourth Symphony composed by Mozart in 1778 rather than 
by Tchaikovsky a century later, the work could not sensibly be called “Beethoven-
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influenced”. Again, where Tchaikovsky’s Fourth Symphony represents a natural 
progression in the composer’s work, being an understandable sequel to the Third 
(“Polish”) Symphony, as written by Mozart, it would be decidedly bizarre. As I noted last 
chapter, however, my theory is agnostic about such properties as grace, delicacy, 
elegance, and the like. I also wish to include among this list such properties as that of 
being bizarre. I further wish to remain agnostic here towards such properties as being 
Beethoven-influenced, as I believe such properties will be sufficiently covered by my 
discussion below of weak and strong historical links. That said, Levinson employs 
divergence in such aesthetic or artistic properties as evidence of fine individuation, not as 
antecedent to fine individuation. In other words, were two composers to independently 
create compositions with identical sound structures and identical aesthetic properties 
(perhaps because they were composing in sufficiently similar, if not identical, musico-
historical contexts), I suspect Levinson would say, they would nevertheless not thereby 
be creating the same work.16 
 Ultimately, Levinson’s preferred account of a musical work as a 
sound/performance means structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t does not make explicit 
mention of musico-historical contexts, though it does specify the creator and time of 
creation of the work. Indeed, Levinson’s account of what makes up a musico-historical 
context focuses on the prominent musical and other factors impinging on the creator and 
                                               
16 Indeed, in choosing his preferred account of a musical work over that of a sound/performance means 
structure-as-indicated-in-musico-historical-context-C, Levinson provides an argument to this effect. He 
argues that two composers who determine the same sound/performance means structure in the same 
musico-historical contexts will nevertheless compose distinct works even if they are structurally, 
aesthetically, and artistically identical at the time of composition. His reasoning is that the two works may 
diverge in their aesthetic and artistic properties at some later point, given differences in the composers’ 
respective oeuvres. See Levinson (1980a), 24-25. (Notably, Levinson later shows more openness to the 
alternative, context-based formulation. See “Art as Action” in Levinson, Jerrold (1996). The Pleasures of 
Aesthetics.) 
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time of creation. This being the case, the musico-historical context seems to be an 
implicit, rather than an explicit, factor in his account. Just the same, it seems reasonable 
to think that a similar contextual story could be told for any medium by modifying the 
account of musico-historical contexts to specify contextual painterly, literary, or other 
such factors. Indeed, as it would not be unusual for an artist working in one medium (say, 
music) to be influenced by works in another medium (say, painting), or for an artist to 
work in more than one medium, it might make more sense to modify Levinson’s account 
of musico-historical contexts so as to make it medium unspecific. 
Let us turn now briefly to the third criterion of Levinson’s account, the Inclusion 
of Performance Means. Where the Creativity Requirement and Fine Individuation 
Requirement seem generalizable for authored works, the Inclusion of Performance Means 
seems more strongly specific to music, stating that musical works must be such that 
particular means of performance or sound production are integral to them. Although such 
a criterion might conceivably be easily expanded to include other performance-kinds 
(drama, dance, opera, etc.), it is at first glance difficult to see how such a criterion would 
apply to authored works more generally, or further why it should. Levinson’s reasons for 
including this criterion seem to be to strengthen the case that musical works are more 
than mere sound structures. By tying sound structures to specific instrumental means of 
production, Levinson provides an account of musical works that supersedes a purely 
structural account, and further ties it to the individual creative act and the composer’s 
intentions.  
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 Let us assume for the sake of argument that Levinson is correct about paradigm 
Western musical works being instrument-specific.17 If this is indeed the case, then might 
we find analogs in other media? Recall from last chapter the discussion of the elemental 
entities that make up an authored work: where some such entities are formally-definable 
(“aesthetic complexes” made up of “aesthetic simples”), others are not. The former group 
includes such elements as fields of color and notes of particular duration, while the latter 
group includes such base entities as the material used in sculpture, the linguistic entities 
of literature, and the bricks and mortar of architectural works. If Levinson is correct about 
musical works being instrument-specific, it seems reasonable to think that the instruments 
used to properly perform Tchaikovsky’s Fourth Symphony are analogous to the bronze 
used in Rodin’s The Thinker: each is an integral element of the work. As such, if a 
performance of the Fourth Symphony is made using a synthesizer or computer, or a copy 
of The Thinker is made using lime Jell-O, we might reasonably question the integrity of 
each as a legitimate copy of the work. As the particular notes and instrumentation of the 
Fourth Symphony, and the particular shapes and materials of The Thinker, are arguably 
equally basic elements of the respective works, altering the instrumentation of the 
symphony is as much a violation of the work as is changing the notes, and altering the 
material of the sculpture is as much a violation as is changing its shape. As such, 
instrumentation is an aspect of the atomic dimension of art, rather than the causal 
dimension. 
With instrument-specificity thus covered under the auspices of the atomic 
dimension of art, I will now focus on the creation and individuation of works. In 
                                               
17 There is some contention about this issue, raised by Stephen Davies (2001) and others. I will investigate 
the matter further in Chapter Five: The Categorial Dimension of Authored Works. 
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particular, I take it that, for any authored work, there is a particular context of creation, 
made up of the time, the place, and the author or authors. That is, a given work, w, was 
caused by some particular author or authors, A, at some particular time, T, and in some 
particular place, P.  
As properties of a work, we can as such point to a (the property of having been 
created by author A), t (the property of having been created at time T), and p (the property 
of having been created at place P). Picking out some particular created atomic structure, 
along with its a, t, and p properties, picks out some unique work. And, while two distinct 
works may share the same a, t, and p properties (as it seems not inconceivable that some 
author might create two distinct works at the same time and place), where any of these 
properties differ, a different work has been created. So, if some item, w1 has the 
properties a1, t1, and p1, and another item, w2, has some different property, a2, t2, or p2 (or 
any combination thereof), then w1 and w2 are different works in virtue of having different 
“causal properties”, even if they are atomically indistinguishable. A change to a, t, or p 
may result in different atomic properties, and it may not: atomic properties are 
independent of causal properties.18 A work may also possess different causal properties 
than do its composite elements. In the case of Duchamp’s Bottle Rack, mentioned above, 
the bottle rack of which Bottle Rack is composed will have been created by a different 
person, at a different time, and in a different place than was Bottle Rack. And, if Levinson 
is right about the nature of sound structures, in the case of a musical work, its composite 
elements may have no causal properties such as a, t, and p, existing sempiternally as 
                                               
18 As well, a change to a, t, or p may result in different aesthetic properties, and it may not. This is a further 
distinct issue from any difference to the work’s atomic properties. Again, if two authors produce 
structurally identical works, these works may nevertheless possess wildly different aesthetic properties. Of 
course, it might be said, they may not. 
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sound structures do.19 Certainly, the creation of the musical work is to be distinguished 
from the particular sounds issuing from the particular instruments performing the work. 
 Just as we can distinguish the creation of a work from the creation of its 
composite elements, so too can we distinguish the creation of a work from its 
instantiation. As the properties of the composite elements that make up the original work 
are to be distinguished from the properties of the work itself, so too should be the 
properties of the material comprising any instantiation of the work. For instance, as the 
light-sensitive paper on which a photograph is developed is distinguished from the 
photograph as a work, so too is the light-sensitive paper on which future copies of the 
photograph are developed. And just as the composite elements (material or otherwise) 
that make up the work may have a distinct context of creation (or none at all) from the 
work itself, so too does a duplicate of the work have a distinct context of creation from 
the work itself. For the sake of clarity, let us refer to the former as the “context of 
instantiation,” composed of the instantiator (who may or may not be the same individual 
as the author of the work), the time, and the place of instantiation. The act of instantiation 
does result in something new—a new instance of the work—but it does not result in a 
new work.20 As such, where we have a new work, we will have contexts of creation for 
the composite elements (where such are in fact created) and a unique context of creation 
for the work itself. Where we have a copy of the work, we will have contexts of creation 
for the composite elements (some of which may be the same as those of the composite 
elements making up the original, and some of which may not), the context of creation for 
                                               
19 The relation between a work’s properties and the properties possessed by its physical elements will be 
further discussed in Chapter Four: The Abstract Dimension of Authored Works. 
20 This claim may be considered contentious with regard to some categories of authored work, specifically 
as regards the issue of forgery. This topic will be taken up in detail in later chapters. 
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the work itself (which will be the same context of creation for the original work, as they 
are instances of the same work), and a context of instantiation, unique to that instance.  
The issue of instantiation is complicated, however, by cases of imperfect 
instantiation. Photographs might be reproduced blurrily, works of literature reproduced 
with typos, musical works performed with errors, and all sorts of other works reproduced 
with all sorts of errors introduced in the duplication process. So what is the relation 
between these imperfect duplicates and perfect ones? Let us recall the discussion from 
the end of last section on what qualifies as an instance, and what qualifies as a 
performance, of a given work. According to Levinson, for a to qualify as an instance of 
the sound structure of w, it seems, a merely need line up with w note-for-note. For it to 
qualify as an instance of the sound/performance means structure of w, a must line up with 
w not only note-for-note, but also instrument-for-instrument. Finally, for a to qualify as a 
performance of w, Levinson contends, it must be “a sound event which is intended to 
instantiate” w, and which “succeeds to a reasonable degree.” With instrumentation again 
being one of the atomic elements of the work, I agree with Levinson’s various 
assessments of what qualifies as an instance of the sound structure of w, and what 
qualifies as an instance of the sound/performance means structure of w. His assessment of 
what qualifies as a performance of w, however, is suspect. After all, intending to do 
something is different from succeeding in doing so. Were Tchaikovsky to be audience to 
a presentation of his Fourth Symphony performed using the proper instrumentation, but 
altering some of the notes or their sequence (whether intentionally or otherwise), he 
might legitimately question the integrity of the performance as a performance of his 
symphony. Calling such a performance an attempted performance of the Fourth 
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Symphony is one thing; calling it an actual performance of the symphony is another thing 
entirely. A failed performance of some work w is not, I would contend, a member of the 
class performances of w, but rather to the class non-performances of w, just as a failed 
leap over a fence is in fact no leap over a fence at all.  
Adding, removing, or changing elements of the work means changing the work. 
And if the duplicate of the work changes the work, it thereby does not qualify as a 
instance of the work, either. It is something else: it is perhaps at best a new work. 
Levinson might legitimately ask, but who created this work? Was it the orchestra or 
conductor of the performance? Putting the question another way, however, we might ask, 
is this the work that the original author created? The composer would most likely answer, 
no, it is not the work that he created: it is very close, but it is not the same. As such, the 
new work was created by whoever introduced the elements diverging from the 
composer’s original, be it the orchestra, the conductor, or someone else. Unlike the cases 
of identical haikus written by independent poets, and identical photographs taken by 
independent tourists, however, in such a case as an improper performance or other 
imperfect duplicate, even given the result of a new work, it seems, the author of the new 
work owes something to the original author. Put another way, the original author 
intuitively has some claim over the new work. The basis for this claim, however, will be 
spelled out later. 
 Before leaving this topic, let us consider one final example. Next to a photograph 
in Washington’s National Portrait Gallery is a note indicating that the photograph on 
display is a copy of the original, the original having been removed to halt further 
deterioration from light exposure. The note does not indicate how the duplicate was 
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made, however. It may have been made by printing a new copy from the same negative 
used to create the original, though, given the age of the original, this seems unlikely. 
More likely, it was made by photographing the original to produce a new negative, from 
which the copy was printed. In either event, the instantiation may have been imperfect. 
And, as such, regardless of the method of reproduction, if the duplicate does not 
atomically line up with the original, it is not the same work as the original. Conversely, it 
seems, if the duplicate does line up atomically with the original, it is the same work as the 
original, again regardless of the method of reproduction.21 The same principle applies 
across media. Two performances of a musical work may be made using the same sheet 
music. Alternatively, the second performance may be made by transcribing the notes 
from the first performance to create new sheet music, and performing from this. In either 
event, if the second performance is atomically identical to the first, it is a performance of 
the same work; if it is not, then it is at best a performance of a different work, some 
change having been made at the transcription or performance stage. 
 Again, as stressed last chapter, it cannot be the atomic similarity alone that makes 
these two performances of the same work. That is, it is not atomic similarity that results 
in the two performances having the same context of creation (for as I have said, atomic 
properties are independent of properties of the context of creation). Rather, it is some 
other connection between these instances that makes them performances of the same 
work, and it is to this connection that I now turn. 
 
                                               
21 This issue was introduced in the Foreword to this dissertation, and will be taken up again, below and in 
Chapter Five, with reference to the interesting case of photographers Walker Evans and Sherrie Levine.  
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The Historical Definition of Art 
Where Levinson’s “What a Musical Work Is” was developed largely as a response to 
structural and mental theories of art, his paper “Defining Art Historically” (1979) was 
largely a response to George Dickie’s “Institutional Theory of Art.”22 Dickie’s theory 
rejects classical approaches to defining art (and classifying given objects as works of art), 
which tend to focus on observable characteristics of works, such as their representational 
or expressive nature. Responding to changes in the art world that saw such innovations as 
Duchamp’s Fountain, Dickie argues that what makes a given item a work of art is that it 
occupies a certain place in the art world, such that it has had the status of art “conferred” 
on it.23 Pointing out in particular the problem of private works of art (works of art never 
offered by the artist to the world at large), Levinson claims that Dickie’s approach is little 
able to accommodate such works. 
Agreeing with Dickie and others, however, that what makes a given item a work 
of art is not something discernible by merely perceiving it, Levinson argues that what 
makes one item a work of art is some special connection it has to other works of art. That 
is, he argues, some item, x, is a work of art just in case it bears the right relationship to 
some previously-existing artwork, y. And y, in turn, is a work of art because it bears the 
same relationship to some other work, z, and so on. The challenge facing Levinson is 
what this special connection is. 
Levinson’s approach to defining art parallels a particular move in the biological 
sciences. According to phylogenic approaches to species classification, a species is a 
particular group of organisms that share a lineage to a common ancestor. As such, some 
                                               
22 See in particular Dickie (1974, 1984, 1992). 
23 Dickie (1974). Dickie has since modified his theory. 
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organism, x, is considered a member of the same species as some other organism, y, if 
and only if x can be shown to belong to the same genetic chain as y. If x has parents of a 
different species than y, then x cannot be of the same species as y. This approach to 
species classification is in contrast to the more classical morphogenic approaches, 
according to which x is considered a member of the same species as some other 
organism, y, if and only if x shares a substantial physiological similarity to y. The 
advantage that the phylogenists claim over the morphogenists is twofold: (i) that two 
animals can be physiologically very similar without being even remotely related, and (ii) 
that parents can produce offspring that does not in any substantial way resemble its 
parents. Put simply, if it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it might yet be a 
cormorant.  
 For the same reason, Levinson discounts external similarity as the critical factor 
connecting any two items as art. Certainly, even considering the emblazoned “R. Mutt 
1917,” Duchamp’s Fountain bears a more striking similarity to men’s room urinals than 
it does to any previously-existing works of art. Indeed, much modern art bears more 
similarity to scrap yard refuse than it does to any other gallery showpieces.  
 Further, Levinson argues, the critical factor that connects artworks is not that one 
work is intended to afford the same pleasure or experience as another work. Reasonably, 
one might encounter the same pleasure or experience in viewing a beautiful person or a 
beautiful landscape as in viewing a painting or photograph of the same. Indeed, even 
certain drugs might afford the same pleasure or experience as that of a work of art, but we 
would rightly refrain from calling such drugs works of art. These examples and countless 
others show that the pleasures and experiences derived from art are not necessarily 
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unique to art, and thus cannot be the critical factor connecting works of art and only 
works of art. 
 Levinson argues, instead, that the critical factor connecting some new work to 
some previously-existing work or works is that the new work is intended to be treated or 
regarded in the same way as the previously-existing ones. In particular, Levinson argues 
that some object, X, is an artwork at time t just in case:  
 
X is an object of which it is true at t that some person or persons, having 
the appropriate proprietary right over X, nonpassingly intends (or 
intended) X for regard-as-a-work-of-art – i.e., regard in any way (or ways) 
in which objects in the extension of ‘artwork’ prior to t are or were 
correctly (or standardly) regarded.”24  
 
How exactly this “regard” is to be spelled out is a challenge, as how we regard works of 
art is not a stable condition. That is, we do not treat art in the same way today as we did 
100 years ago, nor did they treat art in the same way as did people 100 years before them. 
For this reason, Levinson anchors the categorization of an item as a work of art to a 
particular time, t, and to how works of art are correctly or standardly regarded at t, this 
being a critical aspect of the work’s context of creation. 
 
Weak and Strong Historical Links 
Levinson argues that what makes a given object a work of art is this particular 
relationship it holds to some previously-existing work or works. Although I will remain 
                                               
24 Levinson, Jerrold (1979). “Defining Art Historically” in British Journal of Aesthetics (19:3), 240. 
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agnostic as to whether this relationship is definitive of what makes a given object a work 
of art, I suspect Levinson is correct in arguing that such a relationship does exist, and, 
with this having been established, I want to analyze some other important relationships 
linking works along similar lines.25 
One work might be related to another work in myriad ways: for instance, they 
may have been created by the same artist, they may be representations of the same 
subject, or they may simply be hanging in the same gallery. In particular, however, I am 
interested in the sorts of connections holding between works in the causal dimension. 
Certainly, most artists are influenced by works and artists that have come before them, 
and these influences tend to be apparent in their subsequent works. As Levinson points 
out with his historical definition, art is not produced in a vacuum. Indeed, if Levinson is 
correct, the very notion of art depends upon connections between works. And just as the 
connection between works may account for their being art, it also serves to explain the 
evolution of art. Present art builds on past and contemporary art: artists are influenced by 
their predecessors, by their contemporaries, and even by their own past work. And in 
some rarer cases, one artist might directly reference, appropriate from, or pay homage to, 
some other work or artist. Where, however, can we draw the line between such cases as 
constitute the ordinary evolution of art, and those cases where an artist might hold some 
claim over the work of another? 
                                               
25 Importantly, where Levinson is interested in defining art, my interests here take in a larger class of items. 
That is, where the category of “authored works” includes such items as boat hulls, computer programs, 
textile patterns, and potentially even men’s room urinals, in addition to standard artworks, I am not looking 
to restrict myself to this relationship holding only between artworks. Nevertheless, as artworks undoubtedly 
make up the largest and most obvious group of “authored works”, it is on these that I shall primarily focus. 
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To begin, let us consider an example: Andy Warhol’s painting, Myths: Mickey 
Mouse (1981)26. Although his name eventually came to be synonymous with pop art—a 
movement typified by its focus on American popular culture, both in form and in 
content—Warhol’s foray into the movement was preceded by the work of such artists as 
Jasper Johns, Robert Rauschenberg, and, notably, Roy Lichtenstein. Warhol’s early 
printed works focused on celebrities, commercial products, and iconic images of the 
1960s such as civil rights protesters and mushroom clouds. Already, Warhol’s style was 
clearly influenced by the works of Lichtenstein and others, featuring an adaptation of the 
simplistic, heavily-lined and flatly-colored illustrative technique of contemporary 
advertising and comic-book art. With Myths: Mickey Mouse, Warhol turned to a source 
of content popularized by Lichtenstein: the direct appropriation of images from popular 
culture sources, and adaptation of them to the print medium. In this case, the source was a 
1935 Walt Disney poster advertising Mickey Mouse animated films.27 Warhol’s work, 
reproduced in a series of screen prints, depicts the easily-recognized image of Mickey 
Mouse in almost precisely the same pose, and from the same angle, as the Disney poster. 
Moreover, where the look of Disney’s first mouse had evolved over the decades, 
Warhol’s painting represented the character’s classic look shown in the 1935 poster. 
With Myths: Mickey Mouse, we can thus see connections to a variety of works. 
Certainly, first, the style of the painting is heavily influenced by other works in the pop 
art movement. Second, the painting is influenced by Warhol’s own oeuvre over the 
previous two decades. And finally, the painting is clearly connected to the Disney poster 
                                               
26 See http://www.artbrokerage.com/artretail/warhol/_images/warhol_II.265mickey.jpg (Referenced 
January 28, 2007) 
27 See http://mickey01.webcindario.com/1935%20Mickey%20Mouse%20(ing)%20(promo)%2001.jpg 
(Referenced January 28, 2007) 
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whose art Warhol appropriated for his own purposes. I want here to separate the sorts of 
connections between Myths: Mickey Mouse and other works into two categories. In the 
first category, I include the other works already in the pop art canon, both Warhol’s own, 
and those of others, which served to influence Myths: Mickey Mouse. In the second 
category, I place the Disney poster that Warhol used as his source. I will call the sort of 
relationship between Myths: Mickey Mouse and those works in the first category weak 
historical links and that between Myths: Mickey Mouse and the Disney poster a strong 
historical link.  
Both weak and strong historical links connect a given work to some previously-
existing work or works. Where there is a strong historical link, some property or 
properties of a new work depends on some property or properties of some particular 
previously-existing work. Alternatively, where there is a weak historical link, some 
property or properties of a new work depends on some property or properties of a body of 
previously-existing works.  
 Certainly, weak historical links are much more common than are strong ones, so 
let us begin by looking at this the weaker variety. A weak historical link can perhaps best 
be categorized as an influence relation, a weak sort of asymmetric dependency relation 
holding between works. Where there is a weak historical link, a given work is the way it 
is—has the atomic properties that it has—in part because of some body of previously-
existing works. To return to Myths: Mickey Mouse, the dominant stylistic influence is the 
body of pop art works preceding it. As such, I argue, had the pop art movement 
(including Warhol’s own contributions) not preceded the creation of the work, the work 
itself would not exist, or at least would look very different. Put another way, Myths: 
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Mickey Mouse could not have been created, say, in 1940, because it depends so heavily 
on the influence of the pop art movement from the 1950s to the 1970s. Some analog of 
Myths: Mickey Mouse might have existed, but it would certainly not be the same work, 
atomically-speaking, without the pop art influence. 
Importantly, with a weak historical link, we are talking about a body of work to 
which the new work is connected. In most cases of mere influence, a new work’s 
properties will not depend on the properties of any single, previously-existing work. 
Rather, the multiple influences have a cumulative effect, such that the alteration or 
removal of any one such influencing work is unlikely to have an effect on the new work. 
A neoclassical work such as Jacques-Louis David’s Napoleon at Saint Bernard Pass 
(1800), for instance, is heavily influenced by the works of the ancient Greeks and 
Romans, but any change to a single work in the classical period would be unlikely to 
produce any atomic change in Napoleon at Saint Bernard Pass. A change to a large 
number of them, however, might certainly have had such an effect. The same holds true 
for Myths: Mickey Mouse: removing any given work from the pop art canon, even one of 
those depicting Mickey Mouse,28 would be unlikely to have an atomic effect on Warhol’s 
piece. Removing all of them, however, almost certainly would.  
 Note that a weak historical link is not a direct link between works; it necessarily 
operates via the artist creating the new work. As such, we can talk about David being 
classically-influenced, and alternatively about Napoleon at Saint Bernard Pass being 
classically-influenced (which is to say Napoleon at Saint Bernard Pass possesses a weak 
historical link to the body of works in the classical period). Levinson includes under the 
                                               
28 Such as Roy Lichtenstein’s Look Mickey (1961), Claes Oldenburg’s Geometric Mouse (1971), or any of 
Keith Haring’s 1981 Mickey Mouse drawings. 
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list of factors that make up a musico-historical context the “musical influences operating 
on P at t.” And certainly for some work of art to possess a weak historical link to some 
previously-existing body of works, the artist at very least had to have been exposed to the 
works that make up that body. In other words, Napoleon at Saint Bernard Pass will not 
have a weak historical link to all works in the classical period, as many of these works 
will not have survived to David’s time, and David is unlikely to have been exposed to all 
such works that did so survive. As well, the influences acting on an artist at a given time 
will not thereby be identifiable with the weak historical links of any given work, for 
where any number of influences may be operating on a given artist at a given time, only 
some of these will actually make it into the final work.  
 Certainly, establishing a work’s particular weak historical links is an epistemic 
challenge for several reasons. First, a work may possess any number of weak historical 
links. That is, not only will a given weak historical link connect a given work to some 
particular body of previously-existing works, but that given work may be so connected to 
several bodies of works, each having its own effect on the new work. Untangling these 
links will in many cases be very difficult, if not impossible. 
Second, weak historical links operate as chains. Consider again Levinson’s 
historical definition: some new work, a, qualifies as a work of art because it was intended 
to be regarded as some other work, or body of works, b, is regarded, and b is art. 
However, b qualified as art because it was intended to be regarded as some other work, or 
body of works, c, was regarded at the time that b was created, and c was art. And so on, 
ad infinitum, or nearly so. The same is true of weak historical links: some new work, d, is 
connected to some body of works, E, by a weak historical link, and each work in that 
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body (e1…en) may be connected by a weak historical link to some previously-existing 
body of works, F…N, and so on. As such, it may appear to the common observer that d 
has a weak historical link to the body of works, F, because it shares some stylistic 
similarities with works in F, but it may instead be the case that d has a weak historical 
link to the body of works, E, some member of which, e1, in turn, has a weak historical 
link to F. 
Third, weak historical links can operate across media. As touched on earlier, it 
would not be unusual for an artist working in one medium (say, music) to be influenced 
by works in another medium (say, painting), or for an artist to work in more than one 
medium. Certainly, artistic movements do not tend to restrict themselves to any given 
medium. As such, some given work (say, a painting) may possess a weak historical link 
to works in various media (paintings, literature, film, etc.). A work by a surrealist poet 
might be influenced by (possess a weak historical link to) works by composer Bohuslav 
Martinu, films of Luis Buñuel, and paintings of Salvador Dalí and René Magritte. 
Certainly, artist H.R. Giger’s work is influenced by the writings of H.P. Lovecraft, and 
director Tim Burton’s films are influenced by the cartoons of Edward Gorey. The 
difficulty with establishing weak historical links across media is that the properties 
involved are not usually low-level atomic properties, but such higher-level elements as 
mood, character, and the like. As established in the preceding chapter, such elements may 
not be immediately apparent to a general audience, but will require a spectator with 
heightened sensitivity or knowledge. 
Fourth, a weak historical link between some given work and some body of 
previously-existing works may not result in the new work being similar to the previously-
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existing ones. That is to say, the new work may have been created in response to some 
body of work, and those properties in the new work linked to properties in the body of 
previously-existing works may not be similar at all. For example, we might look to the 
primitivist style of improvisational dance developed by Isadora Duncan in the early part 
of the 20th century. Raised and trained in traditional dance, Duncan became disillusioned 
with the rigidity and structure of the form. Where classical ballet stressed upright posture 
and geometric formation, Duncan’s revolutionary style responded with organic fluidity. 
Where classical ballet employs music designed for choreography, Duncan specifically 
chose music not written to be danced to.  Although tied to the body of traditional dance 
through weak historical links, Duncan’s performances embody everything that classical 
ballet does not. 
Finally, establishing a work’s particular weak historical links can be a challenge 
for even the artist may not be aware of the active influences on his or her work. While it 
is necessary that the artist have been exposed to some body of work for his or her work to 
possess a weak historical link to such a body, it does not seem necessary that the artist be 
consciously influenced by such works, or that he or she even recalls that exposure.  
Many of these same epistemic challenges arise for establishing a strong historical 
link between some new work and some previously-existing work or works. As mentioned 
above, where a weak historical link holds between some given work and some 
previously-existing body of works, a strong historical link holds between some given 
work and some particular previously-existing work. We might thus characterize this sort 
of link as a strong asymmetric dependency relation holding between particular properties 
in particular works. The strong historical link may be most perspicuously expressed as a 
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counterfactual relationship between the properties of the works involved. Roughly, for 
works x and w, there is a strong historical link between w and x if it is the case that, had 
some particular property of x been different, this difference would have resulted in a 
corresponding difference in some particular property of w. 
Although weak historical links are undoubtedly much more common than strong 
historical links, cases of strong historical links tend to be much easier to establish. 
Consider some examples: 
 
(i) Where Warhol’s Myths: Mickey Mouse possesses a weak historical link to 
works in the pop art canon, it holds a strong historical link to the 1935 
poster advertising Mickey Mouse animated shorts. As such, were Mickey 
drawn in the 1935 poster without buttons on his shorts, the character 
would presumably likewise be depicted in Warhol’s paintings without 
buttons on his shorts. However, it presumably would make no difference if 
the poster’s background were blue rather than yellowy-orange, as Warhol 
painted the mouse on a black background. That is, where there is a strong 
historical link between one set of properties of Warhol’s painting and the 
1935 poster, there is no such link between the property of the background 
color of one and that of the other. 
(ii) In another example discussed above, Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 4 in F 
Minor includes a famous Russian folk song, “In the Field Stood a Birch 
Tree”, in its fourth movement. Tchaikovsky chose to incorporate the song, 
it seems, not simply because of its particular musical qualities, but because 
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he wanted to set a scene of folk merriment in this movement, one which 
the familiar Russian song would evoke in his audience. Had the song been 
different, Tchaikovsky’s Fourth Symphony would have been similarly 
different to bring about this effect. 
(iii) Artist Sherrie Levine experimented by photographing already-existing 
photographs by Walker Evans and others. One such work by Levine, 
Untitled (After Walker Evans) (1979) is a photograph of Evans’ Alabama 
Tenant Farmer Wife (1936). Had the subject of Walker’s photograph, 
Allie Mae Burroughs, been photographed in front of a brick wall, rather 
than a wall of wooden siding, Levine’s photograph would have been 
similarly altered. Certainly, it might be argued, Levine’s photograph is not 
a photograph of Burroughs herself, but of Evans’ photograph.29 
Ultimately, however, the strong historical link is not between the subject 
of one work and the subject of the other, but between the atomic properties 
of one and the atomic properties of the other. 
(iv) Just as a photograph of a photograph is sure to establish a strong historical 
link between one work and the other, so too is a painting of a photograph, 
a technique employed by photorealist and hyperrealist painters. Richard 
Estes, for example, would photograph urban storefronts so as to capture 
not only what was behind the glass, but what was reflected in it. He would 
then work to reproduce the image in oils on a large scale, though at times 
Estes would make alterations from the photograph in his final paintings 
for compositional reasons. Here again, there will be a strong historical link 
                                               
29 Robert Stecker points this out in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art (1995), p. 195. 
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between many elements in the painted work and the photograph, and not 
between other such elements (those that Estes altered for compositional 
reasons). 
(v) Thomas Mann wrote the novella “Death in Venice” in 1912. The work 
was translated into English from the original German by Kenneth Burke in 
1925, by Helen Lowe-Porter in 1928, and by David Luke in 1988. In each 
case, aside from person and place names, the translations bear no 
linguistic resemblance to Mann’s original. However, there will 
nevertheless be strong historical links between the English translations and 
the original German. Translators, seeking to bring the work across the 
language barrier, work to best approximate though English equivalents 
what is said in German. Had Mann written something else, so too would 
have the translators. Strong historical links may be even more apparent 
between the higher-level entities employed in each work: the characters, 
the plots, and so on. The same sort of strong historical links between the 
higher-level entities in works tend to arise in cases of adaptations between 
media. 
 
As with weak historical links, strong historical links are artist-dependent. With 
that in mind, where the examples above seem to indicate that strong historical links are 
the result of particular intentions on the parts of the respective artists, a strong historical 
link need not be the result of deliberate intention. Consider the case of former Beatle 
George Harrison’s song, “My Sweet Lord”, in which Harrison was alleged to have 
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subconsciously appropriated elements of The Chiffon’s “He’s So Fine”.30 Putting aside 
the legal issues of the case, it seems not altogether unlikely that a tune might occur to a 
musician apparently “out of the blue”, but in fact be occurring because that tune belonged 
to a song the musician had previously heard. If the musician’s creative process were such 
that he tended to compose songs based on tunes that just “popped into his head”, he 
might naturally assume that this was also the case here. As such, while the musician 
might not be aware of the tune’s origin, if the musician then uses the tune in a new 
composition, that composition will have a strong historical link to the earlier work. 
 Before moving on, it is worth considering two related complications arising from 
this discussion of strong historical links. First, in example (iii), above, it was noted that 
the strong historical link holding between Levine’s Untitled (After Walker Evans) and 
Evans’ Alabama Tenant Farmer Wife operated over the atomic properties of each, not the 
subject of each. But, it might be pointed out, based on the characterization I have given of 
strong historical links, and given that the scope of authored works is broader than that of 
artworks, isn’t there a strong historical link between, say, Evans’ photograph, and his 
subject, Allie Mae Burroughs? That is, had Burroughs herself had a large mole on her 
forehead, wouldn’t Evans’ photo also be respectively different? And, this being the case, 
wouldn’t Levine’s photograph of Evans’ photograph be similarly altered? Indeed, this is 
the case. However, as Burroughs herself does not fall within the bounds of “authored 
works”, this particular detail is unlikely to arise in the realm of copyright.31 
                                               
30 See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). 
31 The same will be true in the case of identical photographs of the Grant Canyon, raised earlier. Note that 
where cases of copyright involve representation of particular people, such cases may be further complicated 
by issues of publicity rights, and this detail may thus become relevant. 
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Nevertheless, it does appear that a strong historical link can operate transitively. 
Where a given work, W, has a strong historical link to another work, X, operating 
respectively over the atomic properties a, b, and c in W and d, e, and f in X, if another 
work, Y, has a strong historical link operating over atomic properties h, i, and j in Y and 
properties e, f, and h in X, then, in seems, Y will have a strong historical link to W. 
However, the strong historical link will only operate over unbroken chains in atomic 
properties. That is, if the artist behind X reproduced some elements of W, and the artist 
behind Y reproduced some of these same elements, but from X, then there will be a strong 
historical link between Y and W for transitive reasons. However, had Y reproduced 
elements of X, but not the elements that X had reproduced from W, then there will be a 
strong historical link from Y to X, and another from X to W, but no strong historical link 
between Y and W. Such transitivity issues, however, do not seem to arise as clearly for 
weak historical links. 
 The next complication arises when we consider not the relation between a work 
and its subject, but that between a work and its materials. To begin, let us consider 
Duchamp’s Fountain. As noted above, Duchamp’s Fountain bears a more striking 
similarity to men’s room urinals than it does to any previously-existing works of art. As 
discussed in Chapter One, according to current copyright law, if the aesthetic elements of 
a urinal can be conceptually separated from its functional elements, then men’s room 
urinals are not obviously excluded from the domain of authored works, and the collected 
aesthetic elements have at least some tentative claim of copyrightability. This being the 
case, we might reasonably discuss a strong historical link between Fountain and the 
men’s room urinal of which it is composed. That is, if the urinal had some different 
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atomic properties (some change to it shape, or the number of holes in its drain, for 
example), the atomic properties of Fountain would be likewise altered. While the status 
of a urinal as an authored work is perhaps questionable, similar issues arise in the 
medium of collage, where previously-existing works are not reproduced in a new work, 
but are incorporated into that work. So, where a collage incorporates a photograph or 
drawing, there exists a strong historical link between the collage and the work it 
incorporates, such that if the atomic elements of the previously-existing work were 
different, so too would be the atomic properties of the collage.  
In cases of both weak historical links and strong historical links, there is a causal 
connection between some given work and some previously-existing work or works. What 
marks the difference between the two is that, in cases of strong historical links, some 
given particular work depends upon some particular previously-existing work, but not so 
with weak historical links. Where some work has a weak historical link to some body of 
previously-existing works, its properties do not depend upon any one particular work 
from that body. As such, no artist whose work is among that body can reasonably claim 
that, had it not been for his particular work, the work to which it is connected by a weak 
historical link would be in any way different. However, where a strong historical link 
connects two works, it seems, the artist behind the previously-existing work can make 
such a claim. 
 To now connect the issue of strong and weak historical links to the earlier 
discussion of the context of creation, I believe we can say that where some given work is 
connected to some previously existing work by a strong historical link operating over all 
of the properties of both works, and where the properties so connected are the same in 
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each respective work, the new work is a duplicate or instance of the previously-existing 
work, and not a new work at all. Where there is anything less than a “complete” strong 
historical link, we will have two distinct works, however similar. In the latter case, each 
work will have its own context of creation; in the former case, the two works will share 
their context of creation, and the newer of the two will have a context of instantiation to 
distinguish it from the original. On these grounds, a plagiarist might defend the 
uniqueness of his text by pointing out that, though his written work lines up word-for-
word with some previously-existing text, and indeed the word choice depends upon that 
of the previously-existing work, since he has used a different font, a different color, and 
so on, his work does not have a “complete” strong historical link with the previously-
existing work, and thus is not a duplicate or instance of that work. Here, the plagiarist 
should be reminded that not all of the perceptual elements of an art object are part of the 
work itself. As discussed last chapter, while a literary work requires some font, typeface, 
or other means of conveying the words in order to embody the work, the work may not 
require any particular such font. The same will be true of the font’s color, size, and a host 
of other such properties. Likewise, if Levinson is correct, a performance of a paradigm 
musical work will require a particular type of instrumentation, but will not thereby 
require that it be played on particular oboe, some particular strings, or the like.32 As 
such, two art objects may differ wildly in terms of their perceptual and other properties, 
and yet be the same work. 
                                               
32 However, if the plagiarist contends that his work is not an instance of ‘pure literature’, but some other 
sort of work that depends upon the font and colors chosen, he might very well have a case. Which elements 
of an art object are part of the work, and which are not, depends upon what category of work we are dealing 
with. This is a topic that will be taken up in Chapter Five: The Categorial Dimension of Authored Works. 
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 It might now be contended that this claim is all well and good for works of 
literature, but that it fails where other kinds of work are concerned. In particular, it might 
be claimed, a painting is not the sort of work that can be properly duplicated, and that 
apparent duplicates are nothing more than forgeries, or at any rate, mere reproductions. 
This is, indeed, a contentious issue, and will require some further background before 
being taken on. As such, we now turn to the subject of our next chapter, The Atomic 
Dimension of Authored Works. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Abstract Dimension of Authored Works 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I investigate the abstract dimension of authored works. By this, I am 
referring to those aspects of an authored work that are to be distinguished from its 
physical, tangible instantiation. Several of the arguments made in previous chapters have 
foreshadowed this discussion. In particular, I argue that authored works, generally, are of 
a type/token sort, be they works of literature, music, sculpture, painting, or otherwise. 
Probably the most contentious aspect of this claim is that all kinds of authored works are 
of a type/token sort, including those such as paintings which are widely considered to be 
particulars not capable of admitting of multiple instances, a claim that I shall attempt to 
undermine below. Before considering the details of my type/token account, however, let 
us first survey some competing theories that attempt to establish the abstract dimension 
of works in other ways. Although the theories I consider below are not exhaustive of the 
field of alternative considerations, I believe they represent some of the strongest 
contenders, both traditional and contemporary.  
 
Universals and Particulars 
When we speak of some work, say, Dickens’ Hard Times, we are in most cases not 
referring to any particular copy of Hard Times, but to something else. According to a 
universal/particular account, we are referring to the universal. Put bluntly, the work is a 
universal, while any given copy is merely a particular. On a standard, Platonic view of 
the universal/particular relationship, universals exist prior to any particulars. They can be 
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neither created nor destroyed. Rather, they exist without beginning or end. Particulars, 
meanwhile, participate in universals by embodying them. As such, while an artist might 
mold, shape, or print a given particular, he does not create the universal itself; he merely 
gives it physical form. That is, he does not create the work, but discovers it. 
One difficulty with this view, owing to Jerrold Levinson, was raised in last 
chapter. This is that the idea that a composer simply discovers a work, rather than 
creating it, flies in the face of our deeply-embedded intuitions. If we were to accept such 
a view, Levinson argues, it would also take away a major ground of our reverence for 
artists, generally. This is, however, a bullet that some theorists seem willing to bite.1 
After all, we still revere scientists and mathematicians despite generally recognizing that 
their work consists more in acts of discovery than it does in acts of creation. The 
difference between scientists and mathematicians on the one hand, and artists on the 
other, it might be said, is in the nature of their discoveries. 
Even with this issue put to the side, the universal/particular account faces further 
problems. As noted in the last chapter, Levinson argues that musical works are not 
merely sonic structures, but rather are instrument-specific. That a musical work consists 
in more than a string of tones and other such sonic entities does not, in itself, indicate that 
such a work is not abstract. It does, however, seem to preclude its being of a 
universal/particular sort. That is, while a sonic string seems to be the sort of thing that 
could exist sempiternally, and be instantiated at any point in time by any person, the same 
does not hold true for instrumentation. Let us recall again Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 4 
in F Minor (composed 1877-1878). As discussed last chapter, the Fourth Symphony has 
                                               
1 See Currie, Gregory (1989). An Ontology of Art (more on Currie’s view below); and Kivy, Peter (1993). 
The Fine Art of Reproduction: Essays in the Philosophy of Music. 
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the property of being Beethoven-influenced. Had the sound structure been instantiated a 
century earlier by Mozart, calling it Beethoven-influenced would be nonsensical. When 
we consider that instrumentation is an integral aspect of the work, we realize that it could 
not have been instantiated by Mozart. The Fourth Symphony is scored for piccolo, two 
flutes, two oboes, two clarinets, two bassoons, four horns, two trumpets, three trombones, 
tuba, timpani, triangle, cymbals, bass drum, and strings. Notably, the tuba was developed 
in the 1830s by German trombonist Wilhelm Wieprecht. This act took place decades after 
Mozart’s death. Sonic structures may exist sempiternally, but works that depend on the 
particular instrumentation cannot reasonably exist prior to those instruments having been 
created. The same, it seems, will be true of any work whose essential properties include 
base entities that are not structurally definable. Just as a musical work that depends upon 
particular instrumentation cannot reasonably be instantiated prior to the invention of 
those instruments, neither can an architectural work be instantiated prior to the invention 
of its materials, nor a work of literature prior to the development of the linguistic entities 
of which it is composed. 
 Other approaches to the universal/particular relationship attempt to avoid these 
apparent difficulties for the traditional Platonic view. A more Aristotelian view of the 
universal/particular relationship holds that the universal is what is held in common 
among some set of particulars. As such, the many copies of Dickens’ Hard Times have in 
common a certain linguistic structure. This structure, abstracted from the various copies, 
is the universal, and those objects embodying this structure are the particulars. With 
regard to structure-based works, the apparent advantage of the Aristotelian view over the 
Platonic is that on the former works can be created and destroyed, where on the latter 
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they cannot. For example, prior to Dickens’ writing Hard Times, there was no object that 
embodied that linguistic structure, and there was no object for that linguistic structure to 
be abstracted from. The same would be true were all copies of Hard Times to be 
destroyed. In the interim, however, the universal exists because the particulars exist, and 
those only because of Dickens’ creation. As such, the Aristotelian view of the 
universal/particular relationship also circumvents the problems raised above regarding 
instrumentation and other such non-formal base constituents of a work. 
If we take the Aristotelian view, however, we still find problems, the first of 
which is determining the boundaries of a work. If the universal, Hard Times, is what is in 
common among its particular instances, and all of those instances have been printed with 
some particular font, then, it seems, Hard Times is font-specific. That is, it is font-
specific until it is printed in some other font. But then, it seems, what is held in common 
between these particulars excludes the font. If we are to identify the “work” with the 
universal (as opposed to the particular), then it seems the work is subject to potential 
change with each new particular. If a copy is printed with a page upside-down or missing, 
it seems that page is no longer held in common between all particulars of the work, and 
is, as such, no longer a part of the work. Certainly, this cannot be correct. Rather, I think 
the Aristotelian will hold that that copy simply does not qualify as a true instance of the 
work. But then we are left with the more difficult question of determining what is, and 
what is not, an instance of the work. If the universal, Hard Times, is what is held in 
common between the particulars, how are we to tell what is among the particulars that the 
universal is abstracted from, if not by appealing to what they have in common?  
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 Equally problematic on such a view are examples of atomic indistinguishables, 
such as the identical haikus and photographs of the Grand Canyon, discussed earlier. 
According to an Aristotelian view, if two haikus or photographs are indistinguishable in 
their properties, then they are particulars of the same universal. That is, they are instances 
of the same work. However, as discussed in previous chapters, if these haikus or 
photographs have been created independently of one another, we do not want to call them 
the same work, but rather indistinguishable, but nevertheless independent, works. We do, 
I think, want to hold that there is a relationship that holds between copies of Hard Times 
that does not hold between these indistinguishable but independent haikus and 
photographs, and both the Platonic and the Aristotelian view seem incapable of capturing 
this difference. 
 
Kinds and Instances 
In Works and Worlds of Art (1980), Nicholas Wolterstorff argues for the position that an 
artwork is a norm-kind, capable of having both correct and incorrect examples. On his 
view, the artist selects for a work certain properties as “criteria for correctness”. As such, 
a certain set of properties determined by the artist is normatively associated with a work. 
In the case of a musical work, these properties will consist in a string of sounds, in the 
case of literature, a fixed sequence of words, and so on. In each case, the selected 
properties specify what counts as a correct instance. Thus for example, a correct 
occurrence of a musical work will be some live performance or else reproduction of a 
performance (say, on a phonograph or player piano) that has all of the properties 
normatively associated with that work. An incorrect performance of a work, meanwhile, 
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What the composer does must be understood as consisting in bringing it 
about that a preexistent kind becomes a work—specifically, a work of his. 
To compose is not to bring into existence what one composes. It is to 
bring it about that something becomes a work. And the composer does that 
by selecting certain properties as criteria for correctness in occurrence. 
Though a composer may be eminently creative in his selection, he is not a 
creator. The only thing a composer normally brings into existence is a 
copy, a token, of his score. In music, creation is normally token creation.3 
 
Of course, on my view, this is what the creation of art and other authored works largely 
amounts to: selection and arrangement of pre-existent entities. However, as I have 
previously stated, while it might be reasonable to refer to a flawed performance of 
Tchaikovsky’s Fourth Symphony as an attempted performance of the work, calling it an 
actual (if incorrect) performance seems problematic. The same seems to be true of other 
instantiated works that admit of multiple instances. 
 None of this, however, seems to directly contradict Wolterstorff’s view that the 
properties of works are essentially normative, set by their respective authors, such that for 
some item to qualify as an instance of some work, it should have such-and-such 
                                               
2 Wolterstorff (1980), 86. 
3 Ibid., 88-89. 
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properties. This said, the notion of a kind is broader than that of a type, and Wolterstorff 
admits that at least most cases of musical (and presumably other art-kinds) will be of a 
token-type sort. As such, it seems the only remaining major point of disagreement is that, 
according to Wolterstorff, the artist does not bring into existence any type, but only 
tokens. However, as argued above, most authored works involve elements that do not 
(and, I think, cannot) exist sempiternally, including instrumental, material, and linguistic 
components. As such, by connecting some sound structure to some instrumental 
components, by including some material elements in some architectural schema, or by 
arranging some linguistic entities in some particular order, the author has created 
something that cannot exist sempiternally—something new. 
 In a related vein, as Gregory Currie notes, on Wolterstorff’s theory, if two artists 
pick out the same norm-kind by selecting the same properties as “criteria for 
correctness,” they have picked out the same work: “Once we know how a work is 
properly to be played, then we know all there is to know about the identity of the work 
itself.”4 The same will hold true, it seems, for works of literature, visual works, and so on. 
As such, according to Wolterstorff’s view, the poets who independently produce word-
for-word identical haikus, and the tourists who independently produce visually 
indiscernible photographs of the Grand Canyon, have brought about the same work. As 
we have seen, this is a deeply counter-intuitive result. 
 
Action Types and Action Tokens 
Gregory Currie argues in An Ontology of Art (1989) that an ontology of works must 
account not only for the structural elements of a work (the sound structure, word 
                                               
4 Currie (1989). 
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sequence, etc.), but also the context of composition. It must allow for cases of works that 
are structurally indiscernible without being identical, and should avoid including as 
constitutive those elements that are inessential to the work. Finally, he argues, an 
ontology of works must contribute to our understanding of appreciation.5  
In light of these constraints, Currie argues that works of art are “action types”. Put 
simply, artworks consist in the actions of discovering certain structures by certain 
heuristic paths, where a heuristic path is best described as the process whereby the 
structure was arrived at. As such, although art works display a type/token ontology, a 
work is not a type that has as its tokens copies of books, prints of photographs, or musical 
performances. Rather, tokens of a work will consist in tokens of creation enacted on 
particular occasions by particular people. 
To formalize matters, on Currie’s view, Beethoven’s composition of the 
Hammerklavier Sonata would be characterized as the event, [B,S,H,D,t], where B 
represents Beethoven, S the particular sound structure of the work, H Beethoven’s 
heuristic path to S, D the three-place relation x discovers y by means of z, and t the time 
of composition. This is will be a token of the action type, [x,S,H,D,t ], or the discovering 
of S via heuristic path H. Where D is a constant element in all works, and x and t  are 
“open places” that may be filled by any particular person and time so as to describe a 
given token, a work’s “identifying elements” are its structure and its heuristic path.6 
Following this, two poets who independently produce word-for-word identical 
haikus do not produce identical works unless they arrive at the same structure via 
identical heuristic paths. What constitutes a heuristic path—the process whereby the artist 
                                               
5 Currie (1989), 64-65. 
6 Ibid., 70-71. 
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arrives at the work’s structure—is left largely unspecified by Currie, but it seems that it 
should include at least those elements described by Levinson in the preceding chapter as 
making up the “musico-historical context” in which the work is composed (or their 
medium-unspecific equivalents). As such, while it is possible that two poets might create 
the same work, it is extremely unlikely that they should be situated in identical contexts 
of composition. As well, a photographer who photographs a photograph taken by another 
photographer invariably produces a different work because she will have arrived at the 
identifying structure by a different heuristic path.7  
 As such, Currie argues that he has met the conditions for an ontology of works set 
out above. And so, it seems, he has. However, his account is unsatisfying for a number of 
reasons. Most damningly, Currie is arguing that a work is to be identified with a 
generative process, not with the end result of this process. As many have noted, it is more 
than a little counterintuitive to claim that the book in my hand, and the music I hear, are 
not, in fact, instances of the works created by George Eliot and Beethoven. However, 
seemingly, unless the printer or performer followed the same heuristic paths as the 
respective artists themselves, the book I read and the music I hear cannot properly be 
considered instances or performances of those works. Moreover, on Currie’s account, the 
canvas painted by Leonardo Da Vinci and currently hanging in the Tribune room of the 
Louvre is not, itself, a work of art, nor an instance of a work of art. Rather, it is merely 
the instantiation of a structure, and none but the artist himself seems capable of 
experiencing the work.8  
                                               
7 See my discussion of Sherrie Levine and Walker Evans, last chapter. 
8 Stephen Davies suggests that, on this view, we might encounter the work, properly speaking, only if we 
were present at its creation (see “Ontology of Art” in Jerrold Levinson, ed. (2003), The Oxford Handbook 
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Part of Currie’s basis for arriving at his action-type theory is that, in appreciating 
a work of art, we are appreciating the artist’s achievement, his heuristic path. As 
Levinson points out, however, “When all is said and done, in art we primarily appreciate 
the product, viewed in its context of production; we don’t primarily appreciate the 
activity of production, as readable from the product.”9 Currie claims, as I do, that all 
works are of a type/token sort—that is, that all works admit of possible multiple 
instances. However, Currie’s theory seems to imply that the vast majority of works will 
have only one such token, and further, that most of us will never experience these works. 
 Following Currie’s lead, David Davies argues in Art as Performance (2004) that 
works should be identified not with their final product, but with the performance—the 
actions or processes—by which the products are brought about. Looking to avoid some of 
the problems encountered by Currie, however, who argues that a work is to be identified 
with the action type, Davies contends that the work should be identified with action 
tokens (which he calls “doings” or “happenings”10). Davies provides three main 
arguments for his view, the most ontologically interesting of which is an argument from 
modality. Regarding any given work, Davies contends that the very same product (what 
he calls the “work-focus”) could have been painted, sculpted, or otherwise composed at 
some time or place other than when and where it was in fact created. For instance, 
Picasso could have performed the same creative activities that brought about Guernica a 
week later than when he actually created the product, and Davies contends that said 
actions would be the same actions, and Guernica the same work, and not merely distinct 
                                                                                                                                            
of Aesthetics, 174). However, even here, it seems the most we can do is to view the work, and not actually 
experience it. 
9 Levinson, Jerrold (1996). The Pleasures of Aesthetics, 141. 
10 Davies, David (2004). Art as Performance, 116. 
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instances of some action type. As such, Davies argues, what constitutes the work is some 
particular token—some “doing” or “happening”—which is time- and place-contingent.  
 While Davies’ conclusion is different than Currie’s, it faces many of the same 
problems already noted: that the book I read and the music I hear cannot properly be 
considered instances or performances of works, nor can it ever reasonably be said that I 
can encounter the work, unless I am the artist herself, or in her presence when the work is 
“performed”. 
Before putting Davies’ theory to the side, however, it calls for further 
consideration in that it seems to directly contradict my claim from last chapter that a 
given work, w, is created by an author, a, at time t, and in place p, and that where any of 
these factors differ, a different work has been created. Davies, it seems, wants to argue 
that, at very least, the time or place of creation could differ, and the work would 
nevertheless be the same. To show the problem with this claim, however, let us consider 
an admittedly unlikely scenario: an artist is working on some piece of sculpture. Having 
finished the work, the sculpture accidentally rolls off its pedestal and lands on the 
sculptor’s head, rendering him unconscious. The sculpture rolls to some unlit corner of 
the studio, and the sculptor wakes with a headache and, more importantly, a complete 
loss of memory for the period in which he sculpted the work. Over the next few hours or 
days, he goes on to perform precisely the same actions as before, resulting in a work 
indistinguishable from that which sits in the darkened corner of the studio. According to 
Davies, having performed the same actions, but at a different time, the sculptor has 
nevertheless “performed” the same work. I would argue, rather, that while his actions of 
chiseling may be considered tokens of some event-type, what results cannot be identified 
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as the same work. In our case, both the products and the processes that brought them 
about are indistinguishable. What is missing, however, is any connection between one 
process and the other, or one product and the other, on the basis of which we should 
identify them.  
As Currie contends, a reasonable ontology of works requires a basis for 
individuating works whose instances are structurally indiscernible. While Davies’ theory 
allows for some cases of structural indiscernibles to be ontologically distinguished—
cases where artists arrive at structurally indiscernible products through different 
actions—he argues that where the actions that bring about those products are identical, so 
too are the works. What Davies seems to overlook in his theory are cases where the 
actions performed by artists are the same, but their final products are structurally 
discernible. To show this, let us consider another case: two artists, A and B, are working 
independently on sculptures, and perform precisely the same actions in doing so. 
However, due to some flaw in the stone being chiseled at by Sculptor A, several fissures 
appear in his sculpture that are not reflected in the work of Sculptor B. Sculptor A 
accepts the fissures as part of his work (or perhaps does not even consciously notice 
them), and continues along, performing precisely the same actions as does Sculptor B. It 
seems that, on Davies’ account, having performed precisely the same actions, Sculptors 
A and B have created (i.e. “performed”) the same work. However, I think it is reasonable 
to contend that where two sculptures differ in their structural properties, even where the 
actions that brought them about are identical, the works cannot be so identified. On the 
face of it, if there is some difference in the structural properties of two works, we have 
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sufficient reason to consider them distinguishable works, however indistinguishable the 
generative processes that brought them about. 
Davies might retort that Sculptor A’s action amounts to ‘chiseling in such-and-
such a way despite fissures’ and B’s, ‘chiseling in such-and-such a way without inducing 
fissures,’ and so are different actions. In doing so, however, Davies would be defining the 
action in reference to its product, and this seems antithetical to his program. As regards a 
given work, Davies demands that the action, not the product, be given conceptual 
priority. If the action is defined by its product, however, the inverse relation seems to 
hold. 
 
Types and Tokens 
The ontological distinction between types and tokens was first introduced by Charles 
Sanders Peirce in “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906): 
 
A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or a printed 
book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about 
twenty the’s on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In 
another sense of the word ‘word’, however, there is but one word ‘the’ in 
the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly 
on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single 
thing or a Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do 
exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A 
Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one 
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happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any 
one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring 
just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a 
single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. […] 
In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which 
shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I 
propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the Type. Thus, 
there may be twenty Instances of the Type “the” on a page.11 
 
Peirce thus distinguishes between objects on two levels: first, between a type and its 
tokens, where the former is some “definitely significant Form” and the latter is some 
single object or event that serves as an instance of the former; and second between 
individuals tokens which, although both tokens of the same type, are nevertheless 
singular. Introduced by Peirce within his theory of signs, the type/token distinction has 
since been employed and developed in various fields of philosophy. 
 Types have often been treated as equivalent to universals, with tokens as 
particulars. Certainly, both types and universals are abstract, where tokens and particulars 
are concrete. Likewise, universals are instantiated in particulars, and types are 
instantiated in their tokens. Beyond these factors, however, the similarities end. 
Universals are typically thought to be predicated of particulars: to say that some 
particular sheet of paper participates in, or is an instance of, the universal ‘whiteness’, is 
                                               
11 Peirce, C.S. (1906). “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism”. The Monist (16), pp.492-497. 
Reprinted in C.S. Peirce (1933). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce: The Simplest Mathematics, 
Vol. 4. Hartshorne and Weiss (eds.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, §4-537. Peirce interchangeably 
refers to ‘types’ and ‘legisigns’, and to ‘tokens’ and ‘sinsigns’. He further introduces a third concept, 
‘tones’ or ‘qualisigns’, which has largely disappeared from contemporary debate. 
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to say that ‘white’ is a predicate of the sheet of paper, and certainly this reflects our 
ordinary language. The same sort of talk, however, does not seem to apply as easily to 
types and tokens. An instance of “the” on the page cannot comfortably be described as 
participating in ‘the-ness’, nor does it seem that an instance of “the” has some predicate 
‘is the’.12 
 Further distinctions are pointed out by Richard Wollheim, who introduced the 
type/token distinction into the field of aesthetics in Art and Its Objects (1968). In 
particular, Wollheim notes that although both types and universals bear similarities in 
their relationships to their instances, many of the sorts of properties held in common 
between a type and its tokens are not those found in common between a universal and its 
particular instances. That is, a token of the Union Jack is rectangular and thus so too is its 
type, but where a particular sheet of paper is white, and so instantiates the universal 
‘whiteness’, the universal ‘whiteness’ is not itself white. That is, the predicate ‘is white’ 
is not further predicated of ‘is white’.13 Whether we are discussing universals of the 
Platonic or Aristotelian variety, such talk simply does not make a lot of sense. 
Maintaining a universal/particular distinction becomes all the more difficult when dealing 
with authored works. To say that this book in my hand is a copy of Dickens’ Hard Times 
is not to say that Hard Times is predicable of it. 
 The theory that works of art are of a type/token sort is, I believe, most fully 
developed by Joseph Margolis, who employs the distinction to account for many of the 
ontological peculiarities of art. Contra Wollheim, Margolis argues that both types and 
                                               
12 This issue and others are described more fully in Linda Wetzel’s “Types and Tokens” (2006) in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens) 
13 See Wollheim, Richard (1968). Art and Its Objects, 74-79. 
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tokens should be individuated as particulars. 14  By this, he does not mean that both types 
and tokens are concrete, in any ordinary sense, but that both types and tokens (at least in 
cases of artworks) can be created and destroyed.15 Works of music, literature, paintings, 
and so on, are, as discussed earlier, created by their respective authors and artists. As 
such, while its sonic structure may exist sempiternally, prior to Tchaikovsky’s scoring of 
Symphony No. 4 in F Minor, the work itself did not exist. In this sense, while some sonic 
structure may qualify as a universal, the work is something over and above this. Further, 
Margolis claims, once all means of performing the work (whether from score or from 
memory) are destroyed, so too is the work. To employ type/token terminology, then, the 
type corresponding to Tchaikovsky’s Fourth Symphony only comes into existence with 
its first token16, and goes out of existence when all tokens and means of producing tokens 
have been destroyed. Margolis thus refers to types as ‘abstract particulars’ that are 
instantiated in their tokens. One does not directly experience a type, as it seems more 
than a little strange to say that one has heard, read, or seen an abstract object. Rather, one 
experiences the type instantiated in its tokens. Margolis further notes that types and 
tokens are not separable: they cannot exist independently of one another. That is, unlike 
universals, there can be no type without its tokens, and, conversely, no tokens without 
types. As types are instantiated by their tokens, to be a token is simply to be a ‘token-of-
a-type’. There are no tokens or types tout court. 
 Certainly, while reading a poem, viewing a painting, or listening to a piece of 
music, one experiences not only the work, but also some more concrete thing: the book in 
                                               
14 Ibid., 75. 
15 See Margolis, Joseph (1977). “The Ontological Peculiarity of Works of Art” in Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism (36:1), 45-46. See also Margolis, Joseph (1980). Art and Philosophy. 
16 Or, perhaps, with its first notation; more on this below. 
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which the poem is printed, the painted canvas, or the sounds emanating from the 
orchestra. As such, Margolis distinguishes between the properties of the work, and the 
properties of the physical object in which it is embodied. As discussed last chapter, the 
work Bottlerack did not exist prior to Duchamp’s authorial activity. However, certainly, 
the physical bottlerack of which it is composed did. And, it seems, the work Bottlerack 
may be destroyed without the physical bottlerack being also destroyed. The work and the 
physical object are not, as such, identical. The embodied particular, Bottlerack, possesses 
some of the properties of the embodying particular, say, being of a particular shape or 
size or color. However, Margolis notes, the embodied particular will also possess 
properties that the embodying particular does not, such as having been created by Marcel 
Duchamp. Moreover, he argues, the embodied particular possesses properties of a kind 
that the embodying particular cannot possess, such as being embodied in multiple places 
at the same time (a property that, it seems, only abstract objects can possess). Finally, 
Margolis argues, the individuation of the embodied particular presupposes the 
individuation of the embodying particular: there cannot be multiple tokens of Bottlerack 
embodied in only one bottlerack. 
 Now, we might ask, to what degree do we allow differences of the physical sort 
before having to admit of different types? That is, certainly, one performance of 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet may differ substantially from another performance; my copy of 
Middlemarch will have been printed in one font, and yours in another; my copy of a 
photograph will be wallet-sized, and yours poster-sized. On what grounds can we say that 
they are each tokens of the same respective types? As I have argued in previous chapters, 
a given work will possess a certain set of properties. A work of literature, for example, 
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will consist of a certain string of words and punctuation, structured as stanzas, chapters, 
or the like. And, while, to be printed, it will need to be printed in a certain font, the type 
identified with Middlemarch will not have the property of any particular font. It is, in 
other words, variable as regards fonts.17 The string of words, etc., however, will not be a 
variable feature of the type Middlemarch. In a similar way, a dramatic work, such as 
Hamlet, will consist of not only a certain set of spoken words, in a particular order, as 
spoken by players in particular roles, but also of stage directions, and the like. And, while 
the type, Hamlet, possesses the property that, in Act II, scene ii, the character of Prince 
Hamlet enters reading a book, there seems no restriction on which book Hamlet is 
reading.18 Again, to be an instance of the work (a token of the type), Hamlet must enter in 
Act II, scene ii, reading a book, but, like the font in which Middlemarch is printed, is 
does not matter which book. The particular font in which a copy of Middlemarch is 
printed, and the particular book that Hamlet is reading, are not properties of the 
respective works (the types or the tokens), but properties of the physical objects in which 
the works are instantiated. The same will be true of the particular instruments on which a 
musical work is performed (this tuba, that oboe), the size at which a photograph is 
printed, and so on.19 The same distinction will hold for other properties as well, such as, 
for instance, the weight of a work (Middlemarch, the work, has no weight, though every 
                                               
17 And, as noted earlier, a work of literature can be spoken, thus requiring no font at all for its instantiation. 
18 It may be argued that, given when Hamlet was written, the prince cannot come onstage reading a copy of 
Middlemarch and be historical accurate. I would argue, however, that performances of Hamlet that are 
outfitted in contemporary dress and set not otherwise specified by Shakespeare may qualify as genuine 
performances (and thus instances) of the work. Had the text of Hamlet specified the year in which the story 
takes place, however, I could foresee an argument that, by implicature, anachronisms in a performance will 
count against that performance being a genuine instance of the play. 
19 Certainly, one can imagine apparent counterexamples to what I have claimed. An author might, for 
instance, require that his poem be printed in a particular font, and a photographer might require that his 
photograph be printed only as 8 x 10 glossies. This point will be taken up in Chapter Five: The Categorial 
Dimension of Authored Works. 
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printed copy certainly will), the duration of a play (performances of Hamlet may vary 
wildly in duration; the work itself has no particular duration), and so forth.20 
 As described in Chapter Two, the sorts of properties had by an authored work can 
be both formally-definable (aesthetic simples and complexes), and otherwise (linguistic 
elements, instrumentation, building materials, etc.). There will, as well, be higher-level 
features arising from these foundational parts, including such elements as characters, 
plots, melodies, and rooms, and such properties as balance, symmetry, harmony, and 
patterning. Where some of the properties and elements of a work will be found in the 
physical embodiment of a token, such as its being of a certain size or material, others will 
not.  
 As outlined in Chapter Three, a work will also have causal properties, such as 
those that make up its context of creation (having been created by author a, at time t, and 
in place p). And, given the relationship between a type and its tokens, such properties will 
adhere to both the type and the tokens of a given work. As such, where a type was created 
by author a, at time t, and in place p, tokens will be distinguished from one another by 
their contexts of instantiation, such that while both tokens 1 and 2 will have the context 
of creation <a,t,p>, token 1 will have the context of instantiation <i1,t1,p1>, and token 2 
<i2,t2,p2>. The materials that embody the work, in turn, may have different properties 
relating to their creation or instantiation. So, where the bottlerack that embodies a token 
of Bottlerack will have been created by some artisan, and at some particular time and 
                                               
20 One might argue that a play like Hamlet has some range of duration, however, imposed by the limits of 
the work or medium, or what could reasonably have been allowed by its author. For example, it seems 
impossible that Hamlet could be performed in fewer than 15 minutes, and it seems unlikely that a 24-hour 
performance would have been envisioned by Shakespeare as an instance of the play. 
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place, these properties will not necessarily line up with the context of creation of the 
work, nor with the context of instantiation of the particular token.21 
 As such, for some item to be a token of some given type, it is not enough that the 
item have all of the same formal properties as the type, nor even all of the same 
“perceptible” properties. Rather, it must be properly causally linked to the type. As 
discussed last chapter, for some item to qualify as a copy of the work, it must have not 
only the same atomic properties as the work, but also a strong historical link operating 
over all of the atomic properties of both works, such that had there been a difference in 
the original work, there would likewise be a difference in the copy. This is, in essence, 
the relationship that holds between a type and its tokens: for some object to qualify as a 
token of type w, it must be the case that the token has not only the same atomic properties 
as w, but also a strong historical link operating over all of the atomic properties. And, 
where this is not the case, the object will not be a token of w. 
There are a number of ways that this duplication or multiple-instantiation may be 
brought about. Multiple copies of a work may be created by the original artist, with 
reference only to the type. This seems to have been the case, for instance, with 
Duchamp’s Bottlerack, with the first token being instantiated in 1914, and another in 
1961. Perhaps more commonly, some new token is created through conventional 
copying. I can photocopy an article, photograph a photograph, and so on. In each case, I 
have duplicated all of the relevant properties of the work and have maintained the 
                                               
21 The particular material bottlerack that embodies Bottlerack may, of course, be a token of another type, 
“bottlerack” or some such. This does not appear to present any particular problems for my view. 
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necessary strong historical links.22 Sculptor Auguste Rodin employed a device known as 
the Collas machine, which uses a pantograph system to make proportionately larger or 
smaller duplications of a sculpture. With the Collas machine, Rodin made enlarged and 
reduced tokens of several of his sculptures, including tokens of The Thinker as large as 
seventy-nine inches tall, and as small as fourteen and three-quarter inches (the original 
token being twenty-eight inches in height). With some kinds of works, however, tokens 
are made with reference to or through the intermediary of an outside item: a notation or a 
template. 
 
Notations & Templates 
Margolis and others have made special examination of notations, being certain objects 
with reference to which tokens of some particular type can be instantiated. These will 
include, for example, musical scores, theatrical scripts, architectural blueprints, and 
perhaps even paint-by-number kits. Properly speaking, a notation is itself not a token of 
the relevant work-type: a musical work does not consist in notes on a page, nor an 
architectural work in drawings on a blueprint. Rather, a notation serves as a schema for 
instantiating a token of that type. As such, it will describe, or specify, employing 
appropriate notational conventions, all of the relevant information required of a token to 
be a token of some particular type. That said, however, the schema may not specify, for 
instance, the color of brick to be used in constructing a token of some architectural type, 
or the style of dress to be worn by actors instantiating a token of a theatrical type. 
Although the bricks of a building must have some color, and the actors in a play some 
                                               
22 This applies, again, to standard works of literature and photography. A black-and-white photocopy of a 
work of literature for which color of text is an essential property, for instance, will not qualify as a token of 
the same type. More on this next chapter. 
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style of dress,23 such specifications are not included among the atomic properties of the 
work, and so are variable in token instantiations of the type. 
 With this said, although Margolis seems to include among his list of notation-
kinds the bronze casts used by sculptors like Rodin,24 it seem an important distinction can 
be drawn between such items and those notational-kinds discussed above. In service of 
this distinction, in A Philosophy of Mass Art (1998), Nöel Carroll introduces the notion of 
a template: 
 
To get from a film-type to a token performance, we require a template; to 
get from a play-type to a token performance, we require an interpretation. 
Moreover the different routes from type to token performance in theatre, 
versus film, explains why we regard different theatrical performances of 
the same play as artworks in their own right, while, at the same time, we 
do not regard film performances (i.e., film showings) as individual 
artworks. […] Each film showing is a token of the film-type; each token 
showing gives us access to the film-type. But in order to present a token 
performance of a film, we require a template—a film print or a video 
cassette or a laser disk—which template itself is a token of the film-type. 
The token film performance is generated from the template mechanically 
(or electronically), in accordance with routine technical procedures. Thus, 
                                               
23 To forestall at least one possible object, it should be noted that here, I consider nudity a “style of dress”. 
24 Margolis (1977), 46. 
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the token film performance—the film showing—is not an artistic 
performance and does not warrant aesthetic appreciation.25 
 
In addition to the sorts of templates that Carroll lists here with regard to films, we might 
similarly consider compact discs (with regard to musical works and other auditory kinds), 
bronze casts (with regard to sculptures) engraving plates (with regard to prints), negatives 
(with regard to photographs), computer programs and files (with regard to electronic 
media), broadcast signals (with regard to television and radio programs), printing plates 
(with regard to printed works of literature and others), and many more besides. Again, 
like a notation, the template for a work is not itself a token of the relevant work-type, 
particularly in virtue of not having the necessary atomic properties. What marks the 
difference between notations and templates, however, seems essentially to be that, in 
instantiating a token with reference to a notation, some work (perhaps creative work) 
remains to be done by the instantiator, where as with instantiating with the use of a 
template, this is not the case. 
 Although Carroll is correct that working from a notation requires an interpretive 
act on the part of the instantiator, what is interpreted in this act are not the atomic 
properties of the work, but rather (to borrow a term from Roman Ingarden) “spots of 
indeterminacy”, being properties not constitutive of the work, but required of an 
instantiation of the work. Where an instantiator works from a template, no such spots of 
indeterminacy seem to be left to be filled in.26 We might say that while a notation 
                                               
25 Carroll (1998). A Philosophy of Mass Art, 212-213. See also Carroll (1997). “The Ontology of Mass Art” 
in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (55:2), 192. 
26 We might more closely reconsider the case of sculpting molds and casts. Under my characterization of a 
template, there are no spots of indeterminacy to be filled in by the duplicator. However, there seems to be 
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provides what is necessary for producing a token of the type, a template provides what is 
sufficient for doing so.27 Properly used, a template will allow for a perfect replicate of the 
work.  
 This said, I believe Carroll is mistaken when he states that the “template itself [the 
film print, video cassette, or laser disk] is a token of the film-type.” I assume that a film’s 
atomic properties include certain visual and auditory elements spatially and sequentially 
arranged over a given duration. A film print, video cassette, or laser disk will not, 
properly speaking, possess these properties. Rather, it will allow some individual to 
instantiate the token, which does. Just as a notation is not a token of the relevant work-
type, neither is a template.  
 
A Note on Translations, Adaptations, and Megatypes 
Given the foundation of type/token talk in Peirce’s theory of signs, much ink has been 
spilled over how we are to regard signs with, say, identical meaning, but non-identical 
shapes or sounds. Should we regard “table” and “mensa”, for instance, as tokens of the 
same type, based on their shared meaning? Or should we regard them as tokens of 
different types, given their diverse shapes and sounds? Quoting from C.L. Stevenson, 
Margolis introduces the notion of a megatype: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
nothing about a mold that is specific to any given material except insofar as that material is liquid when put 
into the mold and solidifies thereafter. One might use bronze, but one might also use lime Jell-O. Assuming 
that one of these is the correct material element of the final sculpture, sculpting molds and casts do not 
unproblematically qualify as templates. But they clearly do not qualify as notations. 
27 This assumes that the template is properly used. For instance, a film print must be properly strung into a 
projector, the projector turned on and faced at an appropriately-sized screen, focused, and so forth. 
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Two tokens will belong to the same megatype if and only if they have 
approximately the same meaning; so it is not necessary that the tokens 
belong to the same language or that they have that similarity in shape or 
sound that makes them belong to the same type. Thus any token of “table” 
and any token of “mensa,” though not of the same type, will nevertheless 
be of the same megatype.28 
 
The same principle, Margolis maintains, holds for works of art of the type/token sort. In 
order to tell if two tokens belong to the same megatype, Margolis claims, we often need 
to refer to the “prime instance” of the work, often the signature manuscript of the work. If 
a token can be said to embody the same “design” (which Margolis takes as equivalent to 
the same “meaning”), even if not the same language as the prime instance, then, Margolis 
claims, it is of the same megatype.29 
 This characterization is, I think, problematic, though it may point us in the right 
direction. While it is surely an appropriate objective to explain in ontological terms the 
connection between Thomas Mann’s Der Tod in Venedig and its English translation, 
Death in Venice, according to Margolis’ view, the same connection would hold if the 
English text were written entirely independently of the German. And this much seems 
unsatisfactory. There would seem to be a much more intimate connection between an 
English translation and the German original than between an English text and a German 
text that, by happenstance, share the same meaning or “design”.  
                                               
28 Margolis (1980), 54. 
29 Ibid., 53 ff. 
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Nevertheless, I suspect, the notion of a megatype holds some value for us. That is, 
while on my view the English translation of Death in Venice cannot be identified as the 
same work as what Mann wrote (because it possesses some wildly different properties), it 
would at least be not unintelligible for me to say that I have read Mann’s book, and so my 
view should at least capture the right sort of intimate connection between the English 
translation and the original. In this regard, I suspect that we can continue to use Margolis’ 
term, but will need to modify how we characterize it. It seems that, atomically speaking, 
where translations and their originals differ is in their lower-level elements (the words 
and sentences of which they are composed), and where they coincide is in their higher-
level elements, such as their plots, characters, representations, and so on. The same again 
seems to be true of adaptations of a work from one medium to another. However, to rely 
on atomic similarity alone—at any level—will be to cast our net too broadly. Over and 
above similarity in their properties and elements, there must also be the right sort of 
causal connection holding between such works.  
Given these factors, I think we can best roughly characterize the relation of one 
type to another within the same megatype in terms of a dominant/subordinate relationship 
between the types, where the higher-level elements of one work are atomically similar to 
those of another work, and where those same higher-level elements of one have a strong 
historical link to those of the other. As such, some work-type will be of the same 
megatype as some other work-type if the two works possess substantially similar higher-
level elements and the higher-level elements of one type possess a strong historical link 
to those of the other. Alternatively, two different translations or adaptations of some work 
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may be said to belong to the same megatype on the basis that each has the proper 
derivative relationship to the original work.30 
We might also note, as was pointed out last chapter, that a proper translation of 
some work will also exhibit a strong historical link to the original operating over its 
lower-level properties (its words, sentences, and so forth), but there need not also be an 
atomic similarity holding between the lower-level properties of the translation and those 
of the original work. The same sort of relationship does not seem to hold as stringently 
with regard to works and their adaptations into other media. 
 
“Singular Works” and the Allographic/Autographic Illusion 
Probably the most contentious aspect of my view is my claim that all authored works are 
of a type/token sort, even those kinds that are traditionally considered singular works, 
such as paintings and carved sculptures. Wolterstorff, for one, argues that because 
painters and sculptors of that sort simply create their works rather than setting up 
normative conditions for their instantiation, such works cannot be considered, like 
literary and musical works, multiply instantiable kinds, and thus cannot admit of more 
than one token. However, lacking any specified conditions, it seems counterintuitive to 
claim that were some item exactly like an instance of a work, and possess the proper 
causal links to that work, it would nevertheless fail to have the necessary properties to 
qualify as another instance of the work. If it is exactly like a correct instance, and 
                                               
30 Exactly how many higher-level elements must connect two works, or to what degree of similarity, for 
these works to qualify as belonging to the same megatype, is an open question. Certainly, adaptations will 
differ as to how faithful they are to their originals. As such, while the notion of a megatype may provide 
some useful explanatory power in discussing the ontology of authored works, the boundaries according to 
which some work belongs to the same megatype as another are not clear. 
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possesses the requisite causal links to that work, it seems reasonable to think, it has not 
only the necessary properties to be, but simply just is, an instance of the work. 
Although Currie defends a type/token view of works that clearly differs from my 
own, he contends, as I do, that all kinds of art works allow for multiple instances. This is 
the Instance Multiplicity Hypothesis (IMH) proposed in the final chapter of An Ontology 
of Art. Currie centrally claims that a copy of a painting is a correct instance of the work if 
the substitution of the copy for the original will not affect appreciation of the work, and 
that this will be the case if the copy looks exactly like the original.31  
 While Currie’s view rests on the issue of appreciation, I would argue that, 
provided an item has the same atomic properties as some work, and all of these properties 
of this item are linked to those of the work by a strong historical link, then the item is a 
copy or correct instance of the work, which is to say, a token of the same type. Currie’s 
claim has been taken to imply the possibility of a sort of “super-Xerox machine,” and 
indeed before him P.F. Strawson argued, 
 
[I]t is only because of reproductive techniques that we identify these 
[particular paintings and sculptures] with works of art. Were it not for 
these deficiencies, the original of a painting would have only the interest 
which belongs to the original manuscript of a poem.32 
 
                                               
31 Currie (1989), 121-123. Currie argues that for some item to be an instance or copy of a work 
(presumably, whether “correct” or “incorrect”), it must possess the correct causal relation to the original, or 
to the notation. Currie describes this causal relation as one of counterfactual dependence much like my 
characterization of strong historical links. See Currie (1989) 98-101. 
32 P.F. Strawson (1959). Individuals, 231.  
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While mere science-fiction when Strawson was writing, several companies today have 
been working on the technology to do precisely what he imagined. One such company, 
Brushstrokes, uses optical and laser-scanning to capture in precise detail not only the 
forms and colors of original oil paintings, but also the depth, sweep, and force of each of 
the artist's brush strokes. The works are then reproduced on canvas in three dimensions 
with the same forms, colors, textures, and size of the original. And, although 
Brushstrokes does not do so, one can easily imagine this process being done using oil 
paints. Such an item would, I contend, qualify as a copy or instance of the work, a token 
of the type. 
Although accepting such a process for the sake of argument, Nöel Carroll 
nevertheless challenges the view that all art works are essentially multiply tokenable. To 
counter Currie’s claim, Carroll invokes examples of earthworks such as Robert 
Smithson’s Spiral Jetty, a 1500-foot coil of rocks and earth curling counterclockwise into 
Utah’s Great Salt Lake: 
 
Their relevance to the discussion of singular versus multiple arts is, of 
course, that the very vicissitudes these works undergo as they interact with 
their environments are part of what these artworks are about. These works 
are involved with processes, not merely with products. It is hard to 
imagine that, in the known physical universe, one could replicate the exact 
processes undergone by the original site-specific works by means of 
Currie’s super-Xerox machine. Let us grant that Currie’s super-Xeroxing 
machine can replicate a site-specific structure and its surrounding 
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environment at T1. Yet, it is unimaginable that physically all the events 
that the original undergoes from time T2 through Tn will occur in the 
putative replica. But if the future histories of the supposed replica do not 
experience the same events as the original, then the artworks are not 
identical. 33 
 
The question, here, is what does and does not qualify as a part of the work. To 
summarize, Carroll contends that, since it is integral to the nature of an earthwork 
sculpture that it weather, erode, and otherwise change as a result of its interaction with its 
environment, and since it is all-but-impossible to recreate this precise ‘erosion’ or 
‘development’ of the work, it is therefore all-but-impossible to multiply instantiate such 
works. 
Spiral Jetty was constructed during a period of drought in Great Salt Lake, and 
within a few years, the water level rose, and the work was submerged. It remained hidden 
beneath the surface of the lake until 1999, when the water level once again dropped, and 
the work again became visible. Due to recent runoff from record snow in the nearby 
mountains, Spiral Jetty is currently partially submerged. Since its reemergence, both the 
rocks and the water of Spiral Jetty have changed color, such that where it was once black 
against red, it is now white against pink.  
Certainly, it seems reasonable that Smithson would foresee his work being subject 
to the changes in its environment. And, certainly, it seems unlikely that Smithson would 
foresee the particular changes that it would undergo. However, we can ask how the case 
of Spiral Jetty is any different from that of the frescoes of the Sistine Chapel, which built 
                                               
33 Carroll (1997), 196. 
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up centuries’ worth of patina composed of candle smoke, soot, and layer after layer of 
poor-quality varnish, until recently restored in the 1980s and ’90s to their original 
condition. In both the Spiral Jetty and Sistine Chapel cases, the sorts of changes we seem 
to be talking about are changes to the material objects that embody the works, but not 
changes to the works, themselves. To explain, we might imagine a peculiar sort of 
individual who purchases world-famous portraits and, having hung them on the walls of 
his private gallery, paints moustaches on all of the faces. His having done so to 
Whistler’s portrait of his mother, and to the Mona Lisa, we do not want to say that these 
portraits are now representations of hirsute women (or, alternatively, hirsute portraits of 
unmoustachioed women). Rather, I think, we want to say that these are now damaged 
portraits, and that the works, themselves, do not include moustaches. To put the matter 
another way, I suspect we want to say that while the objects that embody the works have 
been altered or damaged, the works themselves remains unmoustachioed, just as they 
would be had some mud been splashed upon them. The moustaches, like the mud, do not 
serve to change the works; they serve to obscure them. And the same seems to be true for 
both the build-up of patina on the Sistine Chapel frescoes, and the changes to the salt and 
water in the environment of Spiral Jetty. That is, Spiral Jetty (the work) has not been 
changed; only the physical objects that embody it have. 
Carroll would likely object that Spiral Jetty is not like the frescoes, which, while 
likely created with the foresight that they would erode, were not created with the 
intention that they would erode. That is, where such erosion of the embodying objects of 
the frescoes was taken as inevitable by their creators but not thereby a part of the works, 
the erosion of Spiral Jetty is itself a part of the work. In this sense, then, Spiral Jetty 
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would be more like a performance piece than a standard sculpture. Here, however, we 
can ask, what is it exactly that Smithson intended? Since it is extremely unlikely that 
Smithson would foresee the particular changes that Spiral Jetty would undergo, it seems 
the most he could have successfully intended would have been that the work erode, 
perhaps over a set period of time, or with regard to such particular environmental factors 
as the rising and falling of water levels. In this, we might compare Spiral Jetty with a 
performance of John Cage’s 4'33", which, as discussed earlier, consists in a set of 
instructions to the composer to play no notes over three short “movements”. While we 
might consider the ensuing ambient noise from the audience a part of the performance of 
4'33", it seems a performance of the work is variable over any particular ambient noise. 
A similar issue would seem to be the case for Spiral Jetty, such that while we can 
consider the erosion of the work a part of the work, no particular erosion need occur for 
the work to be so instantiated. In this, the erosion is not unlike the fonts used in standard 
literature or the size of a photograph: just as it is essential that, to be instantiated, a work 
of literature have some means of conveyance, and a photograph some size, an instance of 
Spiral Jetty must be subject to some erosion, but not any particular erosion. 
As such, it seems that Spiral Jetty could be instantiated again, perhaps even on the 
same site as the original after its eventual disappearance, provided it was created with the 
correct atomic properties, and allowed to erode. Had the original Spiral Jetty eroded in a 
different fashion than that in which it in fact did, we should still want to call it the same 
work. And if this is true for the original, then I see no reason why a difference in the 
erosion of a second instantiation should disqualify it as an instance of the work.34 
                                               
34 It may be argued here that Spiral Jetty, if instantiated in 2008, would (or at least could) mean something 
different than it did in 1970. And this much seems true. However, the same seems to be true of a 2008 
 146 
 Such a conclusion, however, by no means puts an end to the debate. In the third 
chapter of Languages of Art (1976), Nelson Goodman proposes another means of 
distinguishing multiply tokenable kinds such as literature and music from essentially 
singular kinds like painting and sculpture. He calls allographic those works which admit 
of multiple genuine instances, and autographic those works which, even where 
duplicated exactly, do not. To put the matter another way, autographic works admit of 
forgeries, and allographic works do not, where a forgery is some item “falsely purporting 
to have the history of production requisite for the (or an) original of the work.”35 
On Goodman’s theory, a correctly-spelled copy of a work of literature, for 
instance, will qualify as a genuine instance of the work, where a copy of a painting, 
however perfect, will qualify only as a forgery. Goodman’s reasoning is that “an art 
seems to be allographic just insofar as it is amenable to notation,” and is otherwise 
autographic.36 In his impressive theory of notation, Goodman’s qualifications for 
notational systems are largely syntactic and semantic in nature, each amounting to a 
system of characters with specifiable rules of use. In this, Goodman’s concept of a 
notation seems to have a good deal of overlap with Margolis’, above, though architecture 
(with its blueprints) and theater (with its scripts) come out at best as quasi-notational in 
Goodman’s sense.37 In all, Goodman categorizes literature and music as allographic arts, 
and sculpture (both carved and cast), printmaking, and painting as autographic arts.38 
                                                                                                                                            
performance, say, of Shaw’s Arms and the Man. Yet as we do not, I think, want to say that a 2008 
performance and the inaugural 1894 performance are performances of different plays, we should not want 
to say that the 2008 instantiation of Spiral Jetty is a distinct work from the original instantiation.  
35 Goodman (1976), 122. 
36 Ibid., 121. 
37 See Ibid., 199-201, 218-221. 
38 Goodman also hesitantly includes dance as an allographic form, given the developing use of labanotation 
(named for Rudolf Laban) at the time of his writing. Since Goodman’s writing, however, dance became 
largely fractured into two camps, one following the tradition of Laban in its focus on body mechanics, and 
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 With this said, Goodman’s system of classification—or, at very least, his basis for 
the dichotomy of allographic and autographic categories—runs into some immediate 
counterexamples, even by his own admission. He states, for instance, that “even the most 
exact copy [of a print] produced otherwise than by printing from that plate counts not as 
an original but as an imitation or forgery.”39 Presumably, then, printing a copy from the 
original plate will qualify as an authentic instance of the work, despite printmaking being 
a non-notational form. Where a work’s being allographic entails its admitting of multiple 
instances, and a work’s being autographic entails the contrary, what are we to make of 
printmaking, which on Goodman’s admission admits of multiple genuine instances, but 
which does not employ a notational system as Goodman defines them? 
To remedy this apparent problem, Jerrold Levinson, in “Autographic and 
Allographic Art Revisited” (1980), attempts to save Goodman’s theory from Goodman. 
After examining the problems of Goodman’s approach in depth, he proposes the 
following condition: 
 
A work of art (and the artform it belongs to) is autographic(3) iff the 
identity of genuine instances of the work is not at all determined by 
identity of character in a notation or compliance with a character in a 
notation.40 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the other following the tradition of Isadora Duncan in its focus on a “body-liberating aesthetic”. With a 
further developing synthesis of these camps, labanotation has largely fallen by the wayside. See Sparshott, 
Francis (1993). “The Future of Dance Aesthetics”. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51(2). 
39 Goodman (1976), 114. 
40 Levinson, Jerrold (1980b). “Autographic and Allographic Art Revisited” in Philosophical Studies (38:4), 
376. 
 148 
As such, an allographic work or form is one in which genuine instances are determined 
either wholly or partially by its notational character. This will include literary, theatrical, 
musical, and dance forms, but not sculpture, painting, and printmaking, which have no 
notational character.  
 While still resting on the issue of genuine instances, and so in the spirit of 
Goodman’s project, on Levinson’s interpretation, the classes of autographic and 
allographic forms are not coextensive, respectively, with the classes of forgeable and 
non-forgeable forms. Levinson argues, rather, that we can find cases of forgery in both 
autographic and allographic forms of art as Goodman conceives them—where they differ 
is in how genuineness is determined. Where Goodman’s characterization of the 
allographic and autographic forms, on its face, does not allow for genuine copies of 
sculptures and prints (even those made using the original templates), Levinson’s 
interpretation has no such implication. Rather, it allows for standard cases of prints made 
from printing plates and sculptures cast from molds to count as genuine, while those 
copies made without the use of the proper templates will only qualify as forgeries. 
 Levinson distinguishes between two sorts of forgery: referential and inventive. 
Referential forgeries are those that directly copy some pre-existing work (and so, in a 
loose sense, “refer” to the earlier work), while inventive forgeries are those that purport 
to be by some artist who did not in fact create the work. Where inventive forgeries are 
relatively common in art (such as Han van Meegeren’s infamous Vermeer forgeries), 
most referential forgeries are probably not forgeries of artworks, but forgeries of 
currency. In both sorts of cases, the history of production of the object is other than what 
it purports to be, but where autographic forms allow for both referential and inventive 
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forgeries, allographic forms seem to only allow for the inventive sort. That is, if I make a 
copy of a literary, musical, or theatrical work, and present it as a work of the artist whose 
work I am copying, I have not thereby made a forgery. I have, rather, simply instantiated 
a token of the type. However, Levinson argues, if I do the same with a painting or 
sculpture, I have not made a genuine instance of the work, because I have misrepresented 
its history of production. As Levinson puts it, “the notion of essential structure is 
inapplicable to painting [and presumably to sculpture and the other autographic forms] as 
it presently exists. There simply is no structure-capturing notation for painting.”41 With 
no structure-capturing notation, Levinson contends, there is no way to check an instance 
against the essential structure prescribed by the notation—indeed, there is no essential 
structure. 
 Although I believe Levinson’s distinction between referential and inventive 
forgeries is both valid and valuable, and I believe that Goodman’s original notion of 
declaring something a forgery according to a misrepresentation of its history of 
production is correct, I think both Goodman’s initial ontological distinction between 
autographic and allographic kinds, and Levinson’s reimagining of it, are mistaken. While 
it seems patently true, as Levinson states, that we have no standard structure-capturing 
notation for painting, it seems strange to say that, by implication, there is not essential 
structure of paintings to be captured. 
 We might ask, what would it mean to say that paintings have no essential 
structure? Presumably by this we would not mean that any given arrangement of shapes, 
colors, and the like would as easily qualify as an instance of the work, or would be 
substitutable for the work—in other words, that all of the formal and material properties 
                                               
41 Ibid., 378. 
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of the work are inessential. Instead, I suspect that Levinson wants to say that because 
there is no structure-capturing notation available for painting, we simply have no means 
to distinguish the essential features of a painting from its inessential or accidental 
features. As such, it would seem to follow that we could not reliably make a “perfect” 
copy of a painting, and so could not have multiple genuine instances of it. However, this 
seems to be largely an epistemic issue, and it seems premature to draw a metaphysical 
conclusion based on this epistemic limitation. 
 To recall from above, I contend that any given work has essential atomic 
properties, both formal and material, and that the physical objects that embody tokens of 
these works will have some same, some different properties of that sort. What seems to 
be the difference between some work that employs notations or templates (such as music, 
theater, or cast sculpture), and some work that does not (such as painting or carved 
sculpture) is that in the former, there exists some object with reference to which the 
essential elements of a proper token can be established, and, in the latter, there is no 
referent by which what is essential to a work can be easily distinguished from what is 
accidental to its embodiment. This is not to say, however, that a painted or sculpted type 
may not have essential atomic properties to be distinguished from the accidental 
properties of its embodiment; rather, we simply have no independent means to determine 
what they are. 
Ensuring that what one is writing or printing qualifies as a genuine instance of a 
poem, or that some performance is a genuine instance of a musical or theatrical work, is a 
relatively easy process: one simply needs to check it against the notation. Ensuring that 
one is creating a genuine instance of a painted or carved type, however, allows for no 
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such easy procedure. Nevertheless, where an exact duplicate of such a work can be 
created, including both its formal properties (shapes, colors, size, duration, etc.) and its 
material ones (paint, canvas, marble, brick, and so on), it seems that the duplicate has all 
of the manifest properties required to be an instance of that work. Granted, where there 
are accidental properties in the original, those same accidental properties will appear also 
in the duplicate, but as this duplication of accidental properties would not seem to have a 
bearing on, say, tokens of a novel or token performances of a sonata, I cannot see how 
their duplication in these other sorts of works should make any difference. 
With forms admitting of notations, we can, indeed, partly determine if some 
object is genuine by referring to its notation (we will, of course, also need to establish the 
correct strong historical links). With other forms, however, we refer not to a notation, but 
to an exemplar, which in most cases will be the original token. On my view, where some 
object possesses the same atomic properties as the exemplar, and the correct strong 
historical links can be established, that object will simply be a token of the same type. 
With this said, most of us, I suspect, would much rather see the original token 
than some other token instance of a painting: we would single it out as being of 
particular value. And I do not mean to argue against this intuition. However, I contend 
that the same is true for those forms that admit of notations. That is, where we value, say, 
Hard Times as a work of literature, we would nevertheless single out Dickens’ 
handwritten manuscript as being of particular value. The sort of value that the manuscript 
has which subsequent tokens do not, however, is not a value of the work qua work, but a 
value of the object in which the work is embodied. That is, we would value the 
manuscript because Dickens’ own hand touched it, penned it, and so forth, in much the 
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same way that we would value a handwritten letter by Dickens. The manuscript is all the 
more valuable because it is so historically connected with the work that it embodies. It is, 
in other words, some historical property of the object that we are valuing over and above 
the work that it embodies. And the same, I contend, would be true for a famous painting 
that we could properly duplicate. 
 Goodman argues, “The only way of ascertaining that the Lucretia before us is 
genuine is […] to establish the historical fact that it is the actual object made by 
Rembrandt.”42 Goodman is correct that we need to ascertain that the object was made by 
the artist purported to have made it, but, I contend, the object we should be concerned 
with is not the physical object, but the abstract object identified as the work. Just as 
Dickens made Hard Times, irrespective of when any particular copy was printed, so too 
should we say Rembrandt made Lucretia, regardless of how many copies of it are made. 
If Rembrandt did not make Lucretia, then we are dealing with, in Levinson’s terms, an 
inventive forgery. 
It might be contended at this point that the foregoing comparison of works like 
Rembrandt’s Lucretia with those like Dickens’ Hard Times is a flawed one. That is, it 
might be argued, a painter’s actual handiwork—the traces of his manual skill—are part of 
the painting in a way in which the writer’s manual particularities—his handwriting, say, 
or typing—are not a part of the novel. In other words, it might be argued, it is essential to 
being an instance of some painting P that the object be fashioned by the artist’s own 
hand. 
This would be a very unusual requirement, indeed. To understand why, let us 
imagine an artist, A, who has lost the manual dexterity in his hands. Let us further 
                                               
42 Goodman (1976), 116. 
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imagine, however, that A has found an assistant, B, who is capable of following the 
artist’s every direction perfectly, without providing any personal input. Now, if a painting 
is made in a case such as this, to whom do we want to attribute the work: to A or to B? I 
suspect what we want to say is that the painting is a work by A, but perhaps constructed 
or crafted by B. Although this example is admittedly contrived, the arrangement very 
closely describes how many ‘singular’ sculptures and installations are made, especially 
those built on a large scale. For example, sculptor Mark di Suvero is renowned for his 
modern sculptures composed predominantly of steel I-beams. However, Suvero himself 
does not maneuver the I-beams into place. Rather, Suvero directs those who operate the 
cranes and other heavy machinery needed to fabricate the work. Still, like our imagined 
painter, I believe we want to attribute the work to Suvero, and Suvero alone, regardless of 
who physically manipulated the composing materials. 
On my account, then, most forgeries of authored works will be of the inventive 
sort, as any exact duplicate of a painting, sculpture, or other “singular” work will qualify 
as a genuine instance of that work. An inexact duplicate will be an inventive forgery 
because it will be purported to be an instance of a work which it is not, for it does not 
have (all of) the atomic properties essential to that work. We do not, however, have to 
entirely abandon the notion of referential forgeries of authored works. Rather, we can 
find, I think, two main sorts of referential forgeries: those that exactly copy some 
previously-existing work, but credit the creation of the work to someone other than the 
original author (an inverse of the inventive forgery); and those that exactly copy some 
previously-existing work, but purport it to be the original token. In the former case, the 
forger will be misrepresenting the context of creation of a work; in the latter, its context 
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of instantiation. In neither case, however, should the copy be discounted as a genuine 
instance of the work—it merely misrepresents the work’s history of production in one 
way or the other. In the end, a copy is a copy, whether authorized by its original creator 
or not. 
 Discussion on forgery of art has been a lively topic in aesthetics literature, and 
there remain many nuanced and inventive approaches that demand answers from my 
view. I endeavor to consider one such approach, established in a series of papers by Mark 
Sagoff, but to do so requires first outlining the final factor in my ontological account, the 
categorial dimension of authored works, and so this will have to wait until the next 
chapter. 
 
Some Points of Clarification 
Before moving on, it is worth taking a moment to address some potentially worrying 
issues arising from what has been said in this chapter. First, throughout the foregoing 
discussion, I have referred to “exact” duplicates, and it might rightly be pointed out that 
my use of “exact” requires some further explanation. That is, in discussing an “exact” 
duplicate, do I mean a molecule-for-molecule simulacrum? Do I mean some item that is 
simply indiscernible from the original to the trained eye? Need it remain indiscernible 
forever, or only be so at the moment of being made?  
 Given my account of creation as the selection and arrangement of pre-existing 
properties and elements, it would seem that the degree of exactitude required for being an 
instance of some work, or an exact copy of some pre-existing token, is determined by 
what properties and elements could reasonably have been selected and arranged by the 
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work’s author in creating that work. As the vast majority of authors are not working on a 
microscopic scale, say, in selecting and arranging atoms, this degree of exactitude 
exceeds what would be required for some item to be an exact duplicate of an original. As 
such the ultimate test would seem to be whether the copy instantiates those properties and 
elements selected and arranged by the author, and not whether a trained eye could 
distinguish two such copies. The central issue, as my argument in further chapters will 
illustrate, hangs on what was created by the author—that is, what the artist is responsible 
for. What constitutes the authored work is what was brought about by the artist’s creative 
act, and not how the embodying object changes over time, for unless selected and 
arranged by the artist in the creative act, such alterations do not constitute alterations to 
the authored work per se, but, like splashes of mud on a painting, serve only to obscure 
the authored work. 
 Here, the defender of a view of object-specific or inherently ‘singular’ works will 
beg to differ. After all, he has on his side a deeply-ingrained set of common beliefs 
regarding art objects that are not easily dispelled, no matter how coherent and self-
consistent the alternative. For example, the Mona Lisa is generally regarded as a strictly 
singular—and, moreover, physical—object, an object that has itself changed over the 
centuries, as it has faded, built up a patina, developed craquelure, and so on. The work, 
says the object fetishist, has changed over time, and damage to this object, he will 
contend, constitutes damage to the work. On my view, these changes do not alter the 
work per se, but only the vehicle for the work. With neither side gaining nor losing 
ground, a stalemate might reasonably be called, with the fetishist claiming that all I have 
managed with my type/token account is to provide a coherent and self-consistent 
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alternative to his own. However, as my view flies in the face of many ingrained folk 
beliefs held by both aestheticians and the public at large, it will seem decidedly 
revisionary by comparison. 
On this basis, we might endeavor to make a distinction between some item’s 
being an art work and its being an authored work, per se. To this point, I have been 
discussing the class of art works as a subset of the class of authored works, with the latter 
also encompassing such disparate items as bicycle racks and bathtub designs. An 
alternative view, however, is that authored works should be considered as entirely distinct 
from art works. This is not to say that a work of literature or painting must be considered 
exclusively as either an art work or an authored work, but rather that its properties as an 
art work will not necessarily be coextensive with its properties as an authored work. 
Instead, they may (and in most cases will) overlap. That is, what makes some item an 
authored work will not necessarily be what makes it an art work, though there will 
certainly be some commonalities between these conditions. 
As our choice is now between a revisionary view of art works and a view that 
adds an entirely new category of ontological kinds, I shall continue to lean towards the 
former in my discussion, first as it simplifies discussion of authored works, and second as 
it requires less ontological commitment. Ultimately, however, I believe that either view 





The Categorial Dimension of Authored Works 
 
Introduction 
In previous chapters, I have investigated the atomic, causal, and abstract dimensions of 
authored works. In this chapter, I will discuss the fourth ontological factor I believe is 
critical in contributing to the copyrightability of works: the categorial dimension. To 
begin, I will outline the theory proposed by Kendall Walton in his seminal paper 
“Categories of Art” (1970), and explain its relevance to the present project and 
application to the wider domain of authored works. After proposing what I believe is a 
problem for his stated theory, I will proceed to show how multiple works belonging to 
mutually-exclusive categories can be embodied in the same physical object. Finally, I 
will return to the issue I promised to revisit at the end of last chapter: the relevance of the 
categorial dimension of works to the problems raised by forgery. In particular, I will 
outline and analyze an interesting and intuitive argument proposed by Mark Sagoff that 
to assess a forgery as an instance of the work it copies is to incorrectly assess the work. I 
will show that while Sagoff’s argument is sound when applied to some kinds of forgery, 
it falters with regard to others. 
 
Categories of Art 
Perhaps one of the single-most influential articles in twentieth-century aesthetics is 
Kendall Walton’s “Categories of Art”, which has had direct or indirect repercussions on 
nearly every topic in the field. Walton’s central thesis is that the aesthetic properties that 
a work actually possesses are those that are found in it when it is perceived correctly. 
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Responding to views that a work’s history plays no role in its aesthetic evaluation, 
Walton contends that “(some) facts about the origins of works of art have an essential 
role in criticism, that aesthetic judgments rest on them in an absolutely fundamental 
way.”1 
Following Frank Sibley, Walton roughly distinguishes a work’s non-aesthetic 
properties from its aesthetic ones. Of the former sort are such familiar properties as colors 
and shapes, pitches and timbres—the sorts of properties I discuss as “aesthetic simples” 
in earlier chapters. Of the latter sort are a wide array of properties, including some of 
what I refer to as “aesthetic relationals” such as balance, symmetry, patterning, and the 
like, and such properties as grace, beauty, tension, and sentimentality. Walton also 
includes among the aesthetic properties “representational” and “resemblance” properties, 
which Sibley ignores, and which I classify as high-level atomic entities. In the end, 
however, Walton admits to only rough delimitation of the boundaries of these categories, 
and so, one imagines, is open to some revision. 
 Again following Sibley, Walton takes it as true that aesthetic properties arise or 
emerge out of a work’s formal or non-aesthetic properties. Walton diverges from Sibley, 
however, by contending that a work’s aesthetic properties depend not only on its non-
aesthetic ones, but also on which of its non-aesthetic properties are “standard”, which are 
“contra-standard”, and which are “variable”.  
 Walton’s standard, contra-standard, and variable properties are to be understood 
as properties relative to perceptually distinguishable categories of works of art, including 
media, genre, styles, forms, and so on.2 A feature of a work is standard with respect to 
                                               
1 Walton, K. L. (1970), “Categories of Art” in Philosophical Review (79:3), 337. 
2 Ibid, 338-339. 
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some category just in case it is among those features that tend to determine category 
membership. Conversely, a feature of a work is contra-standard with respect to some 
category just in case it is among those features that tend to negate category membership. 
With the category of paintings as an example, then, a standard property might be flatness, 
where a contra-standard property might be being kinetic. Likewise, then, another standard 
property of paintings would be being static, and a contra-standard property, having 
protruding materials. Where admitting of such, the converse of a standard property will 
typically be contra-standard as regards a particular category. A host of other features, 
however, are neither standard nor contra-standard, but variable with respect to a given 
category, and do not tend to determine or to negate category membership. In the category 
of paintings, this will include such properties as colors, shapes, size, dimensions, and so 
forth.3 
 Some properties standard for a given category will be standard as the result of 
limits to a medium, where others will be standard as a result of certain “rules” or 
conventions for producing works in that category. Works in musical categories, for 
instance, may be limited in their range of pitch, due to the instruments used, or in their 
tempo, due to physical abilities of their performers. But they may also be limited by 
conventional rules of composition, such as counterpoint.  
 For a feature to be contra-standard is not simply for that property to be rare with 
respect to some category. Rather, contra-standard features are misfit properties, and their 
appearance within a category often seems shocking, upsetting, or controversial. Clear 
examples are black-and-white paintings and film without movement. Where a work 
                                               
3 As Walton notes, some characteristics will be variable as regards a particular category, such as size or 
tempo, but a certain range will be standard. 
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features too many such contra-standard properties, we have difficulty viewing the work 
in the relevant category. Where a contra-standard feature becomes more prevalent in a 
category, however, it may become variable, or a new category may be recognized in 
which that feature is standard, as happened with the case of kinetic sculptures in the 
1950s and ’60s.    
 To perceive some work as being a work in a certain category, such as that of 
paintings, is, on Walton’s view, to perceive the “Gestalt” of that category in the work. So, 
to perceive a work as a painting involves perceiving the Gestalt of standard painterly 
qualities in that work—its being flat, static, and so on. The same will hold true for tighter 
categories such as that of impressionist paintings, paintings in the style of Cézanne, and 
so on, each with its own particular Gestalt. The standard features of the category are 
perceived combined into a single Gestalt quality. So perceiving a work, Walton argues, 
involves more than momentary recognition of the Gestalt quality—an “ah-ha!” 
moment—rather, it is a continuous state. Moreover, he contends, we can in some 
instances simultaneously perceive a work in several categories, provided the respective 
Gestalt qualities of those categories are not mutually exclusive. 
 Whether we view a work in one category or another may be influenced by a 
number of factors: what other works we are familiar with; what others have said 
regarding works we have experienced; and how we are introduced to that particular work. 
If one is unfamiliar with paintings, generally, or with impressionist paintings, or with the 
paintings of Cézanne, one will be likewise unfamiliar with the Gestalt of that category, 
and so will not perceive the Gestalt of that category in the work. Similarly, if one has 
been misinformed about the standard qualities of some category, one is unlikely to 
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perceive the true Gestalt of that category in a work. And, if one is told that the work 
before him is a Cézanne painting, and one is familiar with the Gestalt of that category, 
one will be likely to perceive it within that category. What remains to be determined, 
however, is whether this is the correct category for viewing the work. 
 Walton argues that in at least some cases it is correct to perceive a work in a 
certain category, and incorrect to perceive it in other categories: our judgments of it when 
it is perceived in one category are likely to be true, and in others false. Although he does 
not provide us with a precise method for determining into which category or categories a 
work is correctly perceived, Walton proposes four factors that weigh towards it being 
correct to perceive some work, W, in some category, C. 
 First, Walton contends, the presence in W of a relatively large number of features 
standard to C, and the absence of features contra-standard to C, count towards W being 
correctly perceived in C. Assuming some object is predominantly flat, composed of paint 
on canvas or wood, and has no protruding objects, then, all other things being equal, the 
object is probably correctly perceived in the category of paintings. 
 Second, Walton contends, if perceiving W in category C means the work will be 
more interesting, more valuable, or more worth experiencing, than had W been perceived 
in some other category, then all things being equal this counts towards W being correctly 
perceived in C. A given Dadaist work, for instance, may come off better when perceived 
in the category of paintings, than in the category of literature, despite the inclusion of 
literary elements. It will likely be all the more interesting or valuable perceived in the 
category of Dadaist paintings, than the category of representational paintings. As such, all 
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other things being equal, the object is probably correctly perceived in the category of 
Dadaist paintings. 
 Third, if C is the category in which the artist of W intended or expected W to be 
perceived, this counts towards W being correctly perceived in C. So, although perceiving 
W in the category C' may result in a more interesting or valuable work, if the artist was 
intending W to be perceived in category C, it seems on its face faulty to perceive the work 
in C'. Of course, if W is the first Dadaist painting, it seems a stretch to imagine that the 
work should be correctly perceived in the Dadaist painting category. After all, even if the 
artist imagined such a category, he couldn’t likely expect his audience to perceive his 
work in that category.  
 As such, finally, if C is a category with which the society in which W was 
produced and presented is familiar, and is the category in which the artist’s 
contemporaries would have, or would likely have, perceived the work, this counts 
towards W being correctly perceived in C.  
 Walton further contends that the third and fourth factors (the historical conditions) 
tend to outweigh the first, and certainly the second, factor. Again, if it were the case that 
correctly perceiving a work depended crucially on perceiving it within the category such 
that it comes off best, we could simply perceive each work in its own, uniquely occupied 
category. Every work would be artistically flawless. However, as we want to allow for 
reasonable cases of artistic failure, such ad hoc conditions are not an option. Instead, we 
want to consider a work, at least in part, against a background of the author’s intent, and 
within the category in which his contemporaries would have perceived the work.  
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Categories of Authored Works 
As mentioned several times in earlier chapters, my view is agnostic towards many of the 
“aesthetic” properties with which Walton is primarily concerned, such as that of a work’s 
being graceful, or beautiful, or elegant. As such, given Walton’s thesis, it might 
reasonably be asked, why am I employing Walton’s theory as one of the cornerstones of 
my own? The reason is that the category into which an authored work properly fits can 
have an enormous impact on that work’s copyrightability, and the degree to which that 
copyright might be said to be infringed by other works. 
As mentioned above, Walton’s taxonomy of properties differs from my own, as 
laid out in Chapter Two. Again, Walton restricts his class of non-aesthetic properties to 
formal properties such as colors, shapes, pitches, and the like, and this is roughly 
coextensive with my class of “aesthetic simples”. Walton’s class of aesthetic properties 
includes other formal properties such as balance, symmetry, and patterning, which I call 
“aesthetic relationals”, as well as such properties as grace, beauty, tension, and 
sentimentality. 
Notwithstanding these taxonomic differences, like Walton, I have argued that 
certain properties and entities depend on certain other properties and entities. In 
particular, for example, we would both agree that a work’s being balanced would depend 
upon its having certain other formal properties, such as shapes, colors, and pitches, in 
particular arrangements. There is, however, at least one sort of property that I consider 
which Walton does not. Interestingly, Walton makes no mention of material properties, 
such as particular instrumentation, or being composed of paint, marble, or brick. It seems, 
however, that such material properties would contribute to a work’s aesthetic properties 
 164 
(in Walton’s terms) in much the same way as the work’s base formal properties. It also 
seems that material properties are often standard, contra-standard, or variable relative to 
particular categories. That is, being composed of paint seems straightforwardly standard 
to the category of paintings, being composed of lime Jell-O seems contra-standard to the 
general category of sculptures, and being performed on stringed instruments seems 
variable to the category of classical sonatas. Given this, it seems odd to me that Walton 
makes no room for material properties in his discussion of artistic categories. On the 
letter of his theory, such properties seem necessarily excluded, though they seem to fit 
quite well with the spirit of his theory. As such, I expect the theory could be reconfigured 
without a great deal of trouble to accommodate material properties.4 
 Now, as the class of “authored works” that make up the domain of potentially 
copyrightable objects outstrips that of the class of artworks, we need to likewise consider 
the other sorts of objects to which copyright may apply. In particular, we need to consider 
what copyright calls “useful articles”, being items having “intrinsic utilitarian function 
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”5 
Certainly, categorial issues apply as easily to utilitarian and manufactured works as to the 
domain of artworks. Indeed, if anything, standard categories of utilitarian articles are 
even more widely recognized than those of artworks. That said, where standard and 
contra-standard properties of artwork categories tend to be shaped by convention, rules, 
and limits of the respective media, the standard and contra-standard properties of 
utilitarian categories tend to be shaped more by functional (and, in some cases, legally 
                                               
4 It is worth noting that Walton elsewhere does take account of material properties and their importance to a 
work, esp. in Walton, K. L. (1979) “Style and the Products and Processes of Art” (in Berel Lang, ed., The 
Concepts of Style); however, his doing so is not an attempt to explicitly include such within his theory of 
art categories. 
5 Copyright Act of 1976, §101, reproduced in Cohen et al. (2006b), 8. 
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mandated) considerations. Whether one is creating a bathtub, or a boat hull, or a ball-
point pen, the size, shape, and materials will heavily depend upon that item’s intended 
use, and such functional considerations will, I believe, tend to be standard across 
utilitarian categories. Further, where one is creating an item that may present potential 
safety or public concerns, such as a building, a vehicle, or an appliance, the law will 
mandate standard guidelines. And category membership seems to be determined by 
largely the same considerations as those of artistic categories. That is, whether some 
object should be classified as a hammer will be determined by (i) the number of standard 
and contra-standard properties that object has relative to the hammer category, (ii) 
whether the object comes off best in the hammer category (i.e. whether it hammers well); 
(iii) whether its creator intended it to be seen in the hammer category; and (iv) whether 
the creator’s contemporaries (his customers, perhaps) would have seen the object in the 
hammer category.  
With the properties standard and contra-standard relative to given utilitarian 
categories being determined largely by functional and legal constraints, the properties 
variable relative to a utilitarian category will include all those properties not standard or 
contra-standard relative to that category. That is, where properties standard relative to the 
hammer category will include, for instance, restrictions on shape, size, and material, what 
color the hammer is seems entirely variable, and disconnected from that object’s ability 
to perform its intended function. However, where the value we place on an artwork 
seems, on Walton’s theory, to be largely influenced by that work’s properties that are 
variable relative to its correct category, the value of a hammer qua hammer seems more 
heavily dependent on that object’s having certain properties that are standard relative to 
 166 
the hammer category. This said, as copyright seems to exclude considerations of value, 
this distinction between artistic and utilitarian categories appears to make no great 
difference so far as copyright is concerned. As with the issue of material properties, I 
expect that Walton’s theory is not damaged by this distinction between artistic and 
utilitarian categories, nor do I expect it to have any particular impact upon my own 
theory. 
 
Mutually-Exclusive “Correct” Categories 
I believe there is, however, a question that Walton leaves unanswered, and which does 
risk damaging his theory: how are we to deal with mutually-exclusive properties arising 
from viewing a work within categories, each of which seems to have equal claim to being 
the “correct” category in which to view the work? To illustrate this problem, let us 
consider a work such as Picasso’s La Celestina (1903). Here, we might ask, under which 
category (or categories) should the work be perceived? Certainly, we should consider it a 
work of art, but this will do us little good in determining the work’s properties. Given the 
wide berth of such a category as artworks, almost all properties will, of necessity, be 
deemed variable properties. That is, whether a work is made of a certain material, is 
performed or static, is visual, auditory, or otherwise, does not seem, in itself, to count 
towards or against some item’s being an artwork. 
So, rather, we might consider La Celestina within a tighter category, that of 
paintings. Certainly, here, we can more easily identify classes of standard, contra-
standard, and variable properties. Standard painterly properties will include that of being 
composed of paint, that of having been painted on canvas, board, or other suitable 
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surface, and that of having been so painted by means of brushing, splattering, dripping, or 
other such painterly conventions. Properties contra-standard to the category of paintings 
will include, for example, that of being kinetic, that of having depth beyond the texturing 
of brushstrokes, and perhaps that of including materials other than that of paint. Variable 
properties will include the work’s colors, its shapes, its representations, its size, and so 
on. Certainly, the category of paintings is intuitively a correct category in which to view 
La Celestina, but it is still rather a broad category. 
 We might, as such, go further and consider La Celestina within the more finely-
grained category of paintings by Picasso.  However, because of the several “periods” that 
make up Picasso’s oeuvre, the standard, contra-standard, and variable properties 
associated with paintings by Picasso will be largely the same as those associated with the 
category of paintings, generally. With this said, we might rather consider La Celestina 
within the category of Picasso’s blue period. The blue period, making up Picasso’s 
painted works from 1901-1904, might reasonably be characterized by the same standard 
properties as those of the paintings category, but additionally by a prevalence of blue and 
green hues, and the depiction of prostitutes, beggars, and other societal outcasts. Leaving 
out peculiar ad hoc categories, generally speaking, it seems, the more fine-grained the 
category, the more precisely identifiable the relevant formal properties, and therefore, the 
aesthetic properties. 
 With this in mind, we might then consider La Celestina within the even more 
restricted category of paintings by Picasso in 1903, which will also include The Old 
Guitarist, The Blind Man’s Meal, The Tragedy, La Vie, Poverty, and his controversial 
portrait of Angel Fernandez de Soto, The Absinthe Drinker. Coming mid-way in the blue 
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period, there are likely to be features standard to Picasso’s 1903 paintings that are not 
standard for, say, his 1900 or 1905 paintings. On Walton’s view, this would seem a good 
candidate for a “correct” category for viewing the work. 
Consider, however, that we might also view La Celestina within the broader 
category of early twentieth-century paintings, a category with seemingly equal claim of 
“correctness”. That is, whether viewed in the category of paintings by Picasso in 1903 or 
in the category of early twentieth-century paintings, La Celestina seems to have roughly 
the same proportion of standard-to-contra-standard properties. As well, it seems 
reasonable to think that Picasso himself could have intended or expected the work to be 
viewed in either, or both, of these categories, and his contemporaries, too, may have done 
so. And the work could, it seems, come off roughly equally well, whether viewed in one 
of these categories or the other. The problem that arises, however, it that viewing La 
Celestina in the category of early twentieth-century paintings, or in the category of 
paintings by Picasso in 1903 give rise to very different—indeed, mutually-exclusive—
aesthetic properties. Considered in the latter category, the image of the blind procuress 
represented in the painting seems indecorous and detached. Considered in the former 
category, however, La Celestina seems vividly personal, and perhaps even dignified. 
With each category seemingly having equal claim as the “correct” category in which to 
perceive the work, each set of properties arising from so viewing the work seems to have 
equal claim to being the properties that the work actually possesses. However, I contend, 
as a work cannot reasonably be thought to be both detached and personal, both 
indecorous and dignified, La Celestina cannot be said to possess all of these qualities.6  
                                               
6 It may be contended that the viewing categories may be fused without general contradiction if the more 
specific one is given priority—that is, where there is a clash between the properties relative to the category 
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As noted above, Walton contends that a given work might be correctly viewed 
relative to a number of categories. Indeed, he claims:  
 
The occurrence of such impasses is by no means something to be 
regretted. Works may be fascinating precisely because of shifts between 
equally permissible ways of perceiving them. And the enormous richness 
of some works is due in part to the variety of permissible, and worthwhile, 
ways of perceiving them.7 
 
However, this somewhat catholic perspective carries the caveat that the aesthetic 
properties should not be mutually exclusive, as seems to be the case with La Celestina. 
Indeed, it carries the possible implication that the object created by Picasso in fact 
embodies more than one work, one of which is detached and indecorous, the other of 
which is vividly personal and dignified. And this much seems deeply unintuitive, for 
whatever Picasso meant to create, it seems unlikely he intended to create two mutually 
exclusive works with the same brushstrokes. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
of early twentieth-century paintings and those relative to the category of paintings by Picasso in 1903, the 
latter will win out. Such a contention does seem to solve our dilemma, but, we might ask, why should the 
more specific category be given priority? As noted above, generally speaking, the more fine-grained the 
category, the more precisely identifiable the relevant formal properties, and therefore, the aesthetic 
properties. However, unlike the distinction between the categories of paintings and early twentieth-century 
paintings, discussed above, the classes of standard, contra-standard, and variable properties relative to the 
categories of early twentieth-century paintings and paintings by Picasso in 1903 are identifiable with 
comparable ease. While identifiability of properties provides a reason for generally prioritizing more 
finely-grained categories over less finely-grained ones, where this heuristic does not provide a means of 
prioritizing categories, it remains unclear why the general rule should continue to hold. 
7 Walton (1970), 362. 
 170 
One Object, Multiple Works 
As Walton discusses, whether a property of a work is standard, contra-standard, or 
variable relative to its correct category can have an enormous effect on that work’s 
aesthetic effect. However, as discussed last chapter, not every property of the physical 
object is a property of the work that it embodies. An example already offered is the font 
in which a work of literature is printed. My copy of Middlemarch is printed in one font, 
and yours in another, but neither is any less a token of the type on this basis. I stated, in 
this and similar cases, that such a property is variable in token instantiations of the type. 
It might be thought, then, that the font in which a novel is printed is a property variable 
relative to the category of literature, in Walton’s terms. However, this does not seem to 
be the case. Rather, standardly, a given work of literature has no font. That is, while a 
font is a property of the physical object, it is not standardly a property of the work of 
literature. And so, at least in standard cases, the font is not a property of the work at all. 
The same will be true for such properties of the physical object as page length and size, 
weight, and so on.  
This is not to say, however, that a font cannot be a property of a work of 
literature—it will simply be so contra-standardly. Mark Z. Danielewski’s novel House of 
Leaves, for example, is printed in a variety of fonts, and uses particular colors to highlight 
particular words in the text.8 Where font and font color are not properties of a standard 
work of literature, there seems ample reason to think that these are properties of House of 
Leaves. Properties of the embodying object, as such, may point to certain properties being 
properties of the embodied work, where they might not standardly be so. 
                                               
8 In fact, House of Leaves is printed in several editions, the most robust featuring differing fonts, colors, 
images, and Braille. Other editions are in two-color or black-and-white printing (with no Braille), 
indicating, I think, that these are different works, as they include different properties. 
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However, determining whether a property of the object is a property of the work 
embodied is not always so simple a task. That a novel is printed in, say, Times New 
Roman font does not itself indicate one way or the other that the font is a property of the 
work. And that a work of literature has been printed with selected words highlighted in 
select colors may, as in the case of House of Leaves, indicate that the color is a property 
of the work, but it also may not. Some editions of the Bible, for example, print the words 
of Christ in red, but it seems strange to say that the color red is in any way a property of 
the Bible (as a literary work), or perhaps even to say that the editions that do so print 
Christ’s words are tokens of a different work than those that do not. 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the creative act centrally involves the selection 
and arrangement of elements to be included in a given work. The author of a work of 
literature may as easily select a particular font as not. If she so selects some font as an 
element of her work (say, Times New Roman), it will be printed in that font. However, if 
she does not select a particular font as an element of the work, it will nevertheless need to 
be printed in some font, and so may be nevertheless printed in Times New Roman. The 
same applies within other art forms, as well. What are we to make of the lime Jell-O 
Thinker example raised in earlier chapters? It seems whether or not the lime Jell-O 
Thinker qualifies as a genuine instance of Rodin’s Thinker will depend on whether 
particular materials (or material constraints) were among those elements selected by 
Rodin to be included in the work. If apparently authentic tokens of The Thinker have 
been made with a variety of materials, this gives some weight to the idea that particular 
materials are not among the properties that comprise the work.9 The same will hold true 
                                               
9 It may reasonably be argued, however, that, first, as Jell-O did not exist at the time Rodin created The 
Thinker, and, second, as such material would regardless have fallen outside the practices and conventions 
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for the properties of other media, such as the fonts associated with particular literary 
works: where multiple tokens can be found that vary across some property of the physical 
object, that property is unlikely a property of the type or its tokens. Conversely, however, 
absent authorial pronouncement or such evidence of property selection as found in House 
of Leaves, determining which properties common to all tokens (and especially where only 
a single token is extant) are in fact properties of the type will prove difficult if not 
impossible.10 
 With this said, where multiple works being embodied in the physical object of 
Picasso’s La Celestina seems problematic, more general cases of the embodiment of 
multiple tokens in a single physical object seem less so. Indeed, in many cases, such a 
conclusion has great explanatory value. In his opus, The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace, Arthur Danto wrestles with the ontological distinction between 
Duchamp’s Fountain and the ordinary urinal of which it is composed: 
 
[T]he question is whether the artwork Fountain is indeed identical with 
that urinal, and hence whether those gleaming surfaces and deep 
reflections [of the urinal] are indeed qualities of the artwork. [… 
C]ertainly the work itself has properties that urinals themselves lack: it is 
daring, impudent, irreverent, witty, and clever. [… T]he properties of the 
object deposited in the artworld it shares with most items of porcelainerie, 
                                                                                                                                            
of the time, a lime Jell-O Thinker simply could not qualify as an instance of The Thinker. For such an 
argument to bear any great weight, however, we would have to assume that rather than failing to select any 
particular material, Rodin in fact selected a range of materials, either consciously or by convention, and 
that Jell-O falls outside this range.  
10 In such cases, I suspect, we should refer to categorial conventions. That is, for example, as it contra-
standard that modern works of literature be printed in particular fonts, where all apparently authentic 
instances of some literary work are printed in the same font, we should nevertheless consider font variable 
across instances of the work. 
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while the properties Fountain possesses as an artwork it shares with the 
Julian Tomb of Michelangelo and the Great Perseus of Cellini.11 
 
Danto and others consider the object of the urinal transfigured in the creative process—
that the object-as-urinal has become the object-as-sculpture through Duchamp’s creative 
act. Surely, however, the story is not so simple. Indeed, such a transfiguration would rob 
Fountain of much of its controversial value and meaning. It is not enough that Fountain 
resembles a urinal, nor that it was once a urinal; rather, it seems integral to Fountain that 
it is a urinal. Fountain, the work, transcends the object’s original utilitarian nature, but 
without that utilitarian nature to anchor it, its meaning as a work is lost. Fountain is at 
one and the same time both a urinal and an artwork. However, as Danto stresses, the 
artwork is not identical with the urinal; the properties of one only overlap with those of 
the other. 
On my view, the properties of the artwork will be those selected by Duchamp, 
while those of the urinal will be those selected by the urinal designer. Where the urinal 
will have a particular context of creation determined by when, where, and by whom it 
was created, as well as, presumably, a context of instantiation, the context of creation of  
the artwork Fountain will be composed of different such properties. The same object will 
embody the artwork and the urinal design without one displacing the other. Much the 
same story seems applicable to the wide variety of objets trouvés and other such works 
using as their materials common utilitarian objects. 
 Moreover, where this is true of utilitarian objects, the same principle seems 
equally applicable to more standard art objects. Consider, for example, an illuminated 
                                               
11 Danto (1981). The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, 93-94. 
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manuscript such as the Book of Kells. Considered as a single, physical object, the book 
embodies multiple work-tokens, including the four Biblical Gospels (a work or works of 
literature), and the illumination itself (arguably separate works of calligraphy and 
illustration). As with Fountain and its embodying urinal, the works of literary and visual 
art embodied in the Book of Kells possess different properties, dependent on their 
respective acts of creation. And where the Gospels will have contexts of creations 
differing from those of the calligraphic and illustrative works, the context of creation of 
the visual works will seemingly coincide with the Gospels’ context of instantiation. That 
is, in creating the calligraphic and illustrative works so singularly associated with the 
Book of Kells, the artist or artist also instantiated the pre-existent literary works.  
 Similarly, a collage artist may use scraps of paper torn from a book in the creation 
of a new work. Where the literary work initially embodied in the physical book from 
which the scraps are torn may possess plots and characters, the collage composed of such 
scraps, even if the collage is composed of all and only scraps from that one book, will 
presumably possess no such literary properties. It might, however, reasonably be thought 
to possess the property of having whatever font and colors the book was printed in, where 
the literary work itself does not. In general, then, where a physical object embodies works 
from different categories, and where these categories have different standard, contra-
standard, and variable properties, it seems all the more likely that the multiple works 
embodied in a physical object will be possess different properties, both from each other 
and from their shared physical object. And, as such, two perceptually indiscernible 
objects (or, indeed, the same physical object) may be correctly viewed in different—
perhaps mutually-exclusive—categories. 
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 Where the creative act centrally involves the selection and arrangement of 
elements to be included in a work, different creators might select different elements from 
perceptually indistinguishable objects, or the same object, and so create different works. 
As the examples of Fountain and the collage illustrate, viewing an item in a new category 
centrally consists in foregrounding or attending to different properties. And, as such, by 
selecting elements from a pre-existing object relative to a different category than that 
which the artifact’s creator intended, an artist can create a new work, distinguishable 
from the original, yet embodied in the same physical object.12 Although the physical 
object remains unchanged, the creative act of selecting particular elements to be included 
in the work certainly amounts to an original act of authorship. 
 There are a number of immediate implications arising from the above discussion 
that are worth briefly considering here. First, let us recall the case of Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. (1991), discussed in Chapter One. Rural brought suit 
against Feist for reproducing large chunks from its laboriously-researched telephone 
directory. The court found for Feist, arguing that there was nothing in Rural’s directory 
that merited copyright protection. The listings themselves were of a strictly factual 
nature, and so outside the realm of copyrightability, while the method of arrangement of 
these listings was simple alphabetization, and so certainly not original to Rural. While the 
court’s finding seems straightforwardly correct, we need not therefore come to the 
conclusion that white-page telephone directories are not copyrightable per se, only that 
                                               
12 Timothy Binkley makes a similar point in “Piece: Contra Aesthetics” (1977), though Binkley reaches this 
conclusion by arguing that works of art are identified intensionally, not extensionally. Binkley contends, 
“[A]lways what separates the readymade artwork from the ‘readymade’ object it was ready-made from is a 
simple act of indexing. […] The Readymade demonstrates the indexical nature of the concept ‘work of art’ 
by showing that whether something is an artwork is not determined by its appearance but by how it is 
regarded in the artworld.” (275)  
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they are not copyrightable per accidens. That is, while some object identifiable as a 
telephone directory may not be copyrightable as a telephone directory, it may be 
copyrightable as something else. We might easily imagine, for instance, an artist who 
chooses to include a telephone directory as the central object in an avant-garde sculpture. 
In doing so, we can further imagine, he has not selected the facts and alphabetical 
arrangement selected by the directory’s original creators—rather, he has selected the 
object because of its particular place in modern society. He has selected its overall visual 
look: its size, shape, and so on. Indeed, he might claim, this particular directory is not 
critical; any similar such item would do as well. Here, the sculptor might have some 
claim of originality in what he has selected, where the object’s original creator (who, we 
might reasonably contend, selected only the facts and their method of arrangement) did 
not. As a sculptural work, the telephone directory might have some claim of 
copyrightability; as a telephone directory it does not. 
 Next, let us recall the photographic works of Sherrie Levine, discussed in Chapter 
Three, and in particular Levine’s Untitled (After Walker Evans) (1979). As earlier 
discussed, Untitled (After Walker Evans) is a photograph of Walker Evans’ own 
photograph, Alabama Tenant Farmer Wife (1936). While it might be argued that Levine 
has created something new, we might ask, what is it about Levine’s photograph, exactly, 
that is new? Seemingly, all that Levine has done is photograph Evans’ work (thereby 
creating a photographic negative) and print a copy of that photograph. What is it that 
Levine has done that someone who publishes a book of Evans’ photographs has not 
done? If, in creating Alabama Tenant Farmer Wife, Evans selected and arranged certain 
properties and elements as a part of the work, and left other properties of the physical 
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objects that instantiate tokens of the work unspecified (such as the work’s size), all that 
Levine has done is instantiate another token of this type. Now, had Levine created a film 
consisting of nothing but frame-after-frame of Evans’ photograph, she might have a 
better claim to having created something new. For instance, she would have introduced as 
a part of the work a particular duration, a property not found in Evans’ photograph. 
Likewise, had she created a particular work of performance art, consisting in dropping a 
copy of Evans’ photograph, she would have created something new, as such a work 
would attach to the physical object some particular movement (or, more probably, a 
range of movement)—again, a property not found in Evans’ photograph. With Untitled 
(After Walker Evans), it seems the best argument Levine would have for having created 
something new would be that her work (as opposed to Evans’) has, say, a particular size, 
as having a particular size is not among the properties of Evans’ work. In making such a 
claim, however, Levine would seemingly have to contend that a reproduction of her work 
at a different size is not, strictly speaking, a copy of the work. Moreover, as such, she will 
have to contend that her photograph possesses properties contra-standard to the category 
of photographs in which her audience would most likely have viewed the work.13 
 
Forgeries and Categories 
Before closing out this chapter, I briefly return to an issue left unfinished at the end of 
last chapter—the issue of forgeries. In a series of papers, Mark Sagoff has sought to 
                                               
13 Levine may alternatively argue that what distinguishes her work from Evans’ is not their relative atomic 
properties, which are identical, but their relative subject matter. That is, while Evans’ photographs depict 
people, Levine’s photographs depict Evans’ photographs. Certainly, this seems to be her reasoning. 
However, to compare the matter with a parallel case in another medium, if I were to retype, say, Moby 
Dick, can I reasonably claim to be representing Melville’s great novel, and not simply copying it? It seems, 
at least intuitively, that I cannot, and this being the case for literature, it is unclear why the opposite result 
should occur with respect to photographs. 
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extend Goodman’s argument that some art kinds, such as paintings, are essentially of a 
singular nature, and so do not admit of multiple instances, and that forgeries, in 
particular, cannot be classified as instances of the works they copy. However, rather than 
resting on Goodman’s notational claims, Sagoff takes up a perspective similar to that of 
Walton. Where Walton contends that the aesthetic properties that a work actually 
possesses are those that are found in it when it is perceived correctly (i.e. in the proper 
category or categories), Sagoff argues that to assess the aesthetic qualities of a forgery 
against the same class as the original is to incorrectly assess it.14  
 Sagoff’s central claim is two-fold: first, that many aesthetic quality predicates are 
two-place relations between an object and a class of objects such that the object is 
implied to belong to that class; and second, that there is no significant such class that 
contains both the original painting and its forgeries. As such, Sagoff argues, “A forgery 
will not have relational aesthetic qualities […] in common with the original no matter 
how closely it resembles it or how difficult it is to tell the two paintings apart.”15  
 Following Goodman in focusing on stylistic predicates, Sagoff notes that to call a 
painting “geometric”, for example, is meaningful only relative to a certain class of works. 
To say that a certain painting by Giotto has the stylistic quality of being geometric is to 
say that it is geometric for a Giotto, for example, or for a fourteenth-century Florentine 
painting, but not, for a Mondrian or for a Neo-Plasticist painting. It is part of the 
meaning, in this context, of “geometric”, that the work is geometric relative to a certain 
class of objects of which that work is a member. The same principle, Sagoff argues, 
applies to a wide variety of aesthetic predicates. For instance, to call Audrey Hepburn 
                                               
14 In particular, see Sagoff (1976, 1978a, 1978b, 1985). 
15 Sagoff, Mark (1976) “The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries” in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
(35:2), 170. 
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“beautiful” implies a reference class other than that implicit in saying the Taj Mahal is 
beautiful. “Beautiful”, as with “geometric”, should always be considered as an ellipsis for 
“beautiful (for such-and-such a class). As such, “geometric (for a Giotto)” and “beautiful 
(for a person)” mean something very different from “geometric (for a Mondrian)” and 
“beautiful (for a mausoleum)”, respectively, and, Sagoff contends, the same holds true for 
at least a wide variety of stylistic predicates. 
 The problem for forgeries, Sagoff holds, arises from the nature of the sortal 
categories in which we class works. Class membership, he argues, is significant for 
critical inquiry “only if it affords interesting aesthetic discriminations among many of its 
members not just in relation to each other but also as a class in relation to classes and 
categories already in use.”16 And this, Sagoff notes, is precisely how our widely-accepted 
conceptual framework for art criticism is organized: along “who-when-where” lines. In 
particular, critical discussion focuses on particular artists, particular periods, particular 
schools, and the like.17 
According to Sagoff, then, some work, x, has a stylistic property, P, only if there 
is some author, school, period, place, S (a who-when-where sortal property), such that P 
is specifically descriptive of the class of objects picked out by S (being those works that 
possess this sortal property), and x belongs to that class. Two paintings, x and y, 
meanwhile, can have the same stylistic property, P, only if there is some who-when-
where property S that picks out some class of objects which includes both x and y. 
However, Sagoff contends, at least the vast majority of cases of forgery involve 
wildly different who-when-where properties, with the forgeries having usually been 
                                               
16 Ibid., 173. 
17 In this, Sagoff seems very much in line with Walton’s story of category development. 
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created in places and times and by persons substantially distant from the creators of the 
original works. Thus, however perceptually indiscernible a forgery is from an original, 
there is no S such that both the original and the forgery possess it.18 To assess a forgery of 
a Giotto as “geometric (for a Giotto)” is to imply that the forgery belongs to the same 
class of works as the original (the class of Giottos, which has the who-when-where 
property S). However, as the forgery does not belong to the class of Giottos (indeed, as 
there is no significant class to which both the forgery and the Giottos belong), to so 
assess the forgery is to incorrectly assess it. That is, to say that the forgery is “geometric 
(for a Giotto)” is akin to saying Audrey Hepburn is “beautiful (for a mausoleum)”. 
 Sagoff largely restricts his discussion to forgeries distant from their originals in 
authorship, time, and place, but concedes that cases may be more complex than this: 
 
If an artist copies his own painting we would not call it a forgery but 
another authentic art work very similar to the first. If someone of the same 
school, period, etc., copies the painting, we might think of it as a learning 
exercise rather than a fake.19 
 
And certainly, this much seems to match with standard practice. As contended by both 
Goodman and Levinson, what seems to mark the difference between cases such as these 
and cases of forgeries is that, one presumes, neither the original artist nor the pupil is 
misrepresenting the work’s history of production. In cases of forgery, however, whether 
(in Levinson’s terms) inventive or referential, the forger does indeed misrepresent the 
                                               
18 Sagoff, Mark (1978a). “Historical Authenticity” in Erkenntnis (12:1), 89-90. 
19 Ibid., 89. 
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item’s history of production by claiming it was painted by the hand of an artist that it in 
fact was not. Recognizing the distinction between inventive forgeries on the one hand and 
referential forgeries on the other is critical to understanding how my view can answer 
Sagoff’s challenge. 
A referential forgery, we will recall, is essentially a copy of a pre-existing work 
by some artist other than the original, where an inventive forgery is a new work in the 
style of some other artist. With inventive forgeries, I believe Sagoff has the story exactly 
right. Put simply, to assess work W against the class (or, in Walton’s terms, category) of 
works by artist A, where in fact W was created by artist B, it to incorrectly assess W. 
Referential forgeries, however, require more explanation. Where we are concerned with a 
“perfect copy” or “forgery,” I contend that such an item should be correctly assessed in 
the same class or category as the work it copies. 
Assuming, as Sagoff does, that we are dealing with indistinguishable objects, one 
copied from the other, then on my view each is an instantiation of the properties and 
elements selected and arranged by the original artist. As such, the referential forgery, O', 
simply is a token of the same type as the original work, O. That is to say, it is the same 
work. The difference between them lies not in when, where, and by whom the work was 
created, but in when, where, and by whom it was instantiated. The forger does 
misrepresent the item’s history of production, but what he misrepresents is the item’s 
context of instantiation, not its context of creation. He says, in essence, that the work was 
created by artist A, and that the paint was physically applied also by artist A. The first part 
is true, the second false. As I have claimed that creation centrally amounts to the 
selection and arrangement of properties and elements by a given individual, the forger 
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tells the truth when he says that the properties and elements that make up O' were 
selected and arranged by A. If the forger has accurately reproduced this selection and 
arrangement of properties and elements, as Sagoff assumes, then he has not added 
anything new to this creation. He has not, in other words, created a new work. Rather, 
what he has done is duplicate or instantiate a pre-existing work.  
While the properties that make up a work’s context of creation (when, where, and 
by whom it was created) certainly seem to be reasonable factors to consider when 
assessing the work, the properties that make up a work’s context of instantiation (when, 
where, and by whom it was instantiated) do not. For example, in artistically or 
aesthetically assessing a standard literary work, it seems very much appropriate to ask 
where the work was written, when, and by whom, as such factors seem to contribute to 
the work’s meaning and aesthetic properties. However, it seems spurious to think that 
when, where, and by whom the work was instantiated have any bearing on such an 
assessment of the work itself. Granted, there are many ways that the duplication of a 
work might obscure that work: a work may be inaccurately duplicated (with typos in a 
literary work, the wrong color used in a print, the wrong material used in a molded 
sculpture), or it may be otherwise accurately duplicated but in a fashion that makes it 
difficult to get at the work (for example, while a literary work may not require any 
particular font, certain fonts can distract the reader). However, it seems clear that to 
assess such factors is not to assess the work itself, but rather to assess the choice of 
physical object used to embody the work, or the act of embodying the work.  
 This is not to say that assessing the physical object that embodies a token of the 
work, or assessing the act of embodying such a work, is not a common or, indeed, 
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legitimate activity. It is simply a different activity than assessing the work per se. 
Consider these questions posed by Levinson in his article, “Zemach on Paintings” (1987): 
 
Is the museum that includes in its collection a particular Van Eyck happy 
to agree that that painting may very well form part of hundreds of other 
collections? Is the private patron who commissions his portrait in oil 
inclined to think the portrait will no longer belong to him alone if he lets 
the photographers in? Is the art critic about to undertake a definitive 
analysis of Caravaggio’s style likely to content himself with a good set of 
slides? Will art lovers who undertake a journey to a small town in France 
to view a tableau of Chardin they believe they have not seen suddenly 
realize they already have, in virtue of an excellent Phaidon book of 
reproductions? Will competent forgers who, having put the finishing 
touches on their efforts, are now preparing to pass them off as the 
paintings they believe they are not, suddenly understand that they needn’t 
bother, that no deceit is involved or called for? And, finally, will earnest 
restorers engaged in saving what they think of as a painting, by careful 
removal of varnishes, partial and conservative replacement of paint losses, 
painstaking filling of cracks with appropriate materials, at last comprehend 
that there’s no point in all that—that a new acrylic effort after good 
catalogue photos will do as well?20 
 
                                               
20 Levinson (1987). “Zemach on Paintings” in British Journal of Aesthetics (27:3), 281. 
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Although Levinson poses these as rhetorical questions, I believe they deserve answers. 
First, as I assume some of the properties that constitute a painting are its size, material 
composition and, perhaps, texture, a photograph or projected slide of a painting certainly 
will not qualify as an instance of that work. At best, it will be (in Sagoff’s analysis) a 
representation of the work—indeed, this is all it will be purported to be.21 Where 
indistinguishable paintings are concerned, however, I contend these do qualify as 
instances of the works in question, the new “forgery” no less than the original. What 
marks the difference between the two is their respective contexts of instantiation. As a 
physical object, the original instance of the work will carry considerable value over and 
above that of the embodied work, as we can imagine would a discovered Hamlet 
manuscript penned by Shakespeare’s own hand. But this value is not a value of the work 
per se, but one of the physical object embodying the work. Just as the museum curator 
possessing one of Shakespeare’s original manuscripts would not trade his prize for a 
Penguin paperback, nor would the owner of a Van Eyck original or a restorer trade his 
prize for a perfect copy. For the value placed on these originals, and the value the forger 
seeks to imitate, is not merely the value of the embodied object, but the value of the 
embodying one. It is the historical value that attaches to when, where, and by whom the 
work was instantiated, not when, where, and by whom it was created. 
What is implicit in the above discussion is that the referential forger has copied a 
pre-existing work, where the inventive forger, strictly speaking, has not. Rather, the 
inventive forger has attempted to create a new work in the style of another artist. While 
the work of the inventive forger and that of the referential forger each possess a historical 
link to one or more earlier works, the kinds of historical links at issue are different. The 
                                               
21 See Sagoff (1976), 176. 
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work of the inventive forger, I contend, possesses a weak historical link to some body of 
work created by the other artist. The work of the referential forger, conversely, possesses 
a strong historical link to some particular work.22 Although the actions of the forgers in 
each case are deceptive, I would contend that only one constitutes potential infringement. 
 This brings me to my central argument. In the next chapter, based on the atomic, 
causal, abstract, and categorial dimensions of authored works I have outlined, I will 
present my case for the conditions under which we should consider an authored work 
copyrightable, and the conditions under which that copyright will be infringed.  
 
                                               
22 Here, I might point out a kind of case that straddles the clear-cut classes of inventive and referential 
forgeries—that of the pastiche forger. With pastiche forgery, the forger paints a new work, combining 
elements of existing paintings by another artist. As such, the new work is not, strictly, a referential forgery, 
for it “refers” to multiple works; nor is it comfortably an inventive forgery, for the forger is inventing very 
little. I would simply contend that the forged work possesses strong historical links to more than one work. 
For a particularly good example of pastiche forgery, see plates 35 and 36 of Arnau, Frank (1961) The Art of 
the Faker: 3,000 Years of Deception (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Obtaining and Infringing Copyright 
 
Introduction 
In the preceding four chapters investigating, respectively, the atomic, causal, abstract, and 
categorial dimensions of authored works, I have sought to lay the groundwork for the 
aims of this chapter: establishing the conditions for the copyrightability of authored 
works, for the infringement of those copyrights, and for the creation of derivative works. 
As such, I will regularly refer to material from these earlier chapters in outlining these 
conditions. Toward the end of this chapter, I will consider a number of outcomes of these 
conditions, and a handful of cases selected to investigate the conditions in a real-world 
setting. 
To begin, copyright is a proprietary claim, and as such is conceptually similar to 
standard property claims. How it is like, and how it differs from, standard property claims 
will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. For now, however, I shall take it that 
copyright is a right over the products of one’s creativity as realized in an authored work. 
More specifically, it is the right to determine when such a work (or parts thereof) may be 
copied. 
 
The Objects of Copyright 
As a right stemming from the products of one’s creativity as realized in an authored 
work, copyright is limited to what an author has in fact created. As a form of expression, 
viz. the manifestation or embodiment of an idea or ideas in a perceptible form, an 
authored work is to be first distinguished from the idea or ideas themselves. As discussed 
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in Chapter Two, ideas and their respective expressions are of ontologically distinct sorts, 
and ideas cannot at any point become expressions. Rather, they are one of the kinds of 
things that are expressed.1 Expressions such as authored works give us access to ideas, 
but should not thereby be confused with them: the sorts of properties possessed by the 
former are not the sorts of properties possessed by the latter. 
 As a right to the products of one’s creativity, copyright extends to an entity only 
insofar as that entity was in fact created by the author. As such, simply put, if some 
element of a work was not created by the work’s author, the author holds no copyright 
over that element. Many elements of authored works, of course, were created by no one. 
Colors, shapes, tones, and other such atomic simples seem to exist sempiternally, and 
owe their origin to no human author. They are, as such, uncopyrightable. Other elements 
of authored works were created by man, but perhaps not by the author using them. For 
example, although I claim a copyright in what I am currently writing, I do not claim to 
have created any of the particular words I am using. Likewise, the composer of a sonata 
does not claim to have created any of the particular notes he employs, nor the sculptor the 
marble, stone, wood, or any of the other materials integral to his work. And where a 
musician might produce a sound never before heard by human ears, he at best claims to 
have discovered the sound.2 With aesthetic simples and such base entities disqualified 
from copyright protection, we might ask, what is it that the copyright owner owns? 
                                               
1 Along with facts. 
2 I think it is worth briefly noting arguable exceptions to certain kinds of entities discussed as falling 
outside the realm of copyrightability. First, words are entities that conventionally associate certain letter 
symbols and/or sounds with certain meanings, and new words are invented all the time. About 4,000 new 
words are annually added to the Oxford English Dictionary, and these have to come from somewhere—or, 
more precisely, from some person or persons. Words, of course, are a paradigm case of the type/token 
distinction—of created abstract entities capable of multiple instantiation. Owing their origin to particular 
individuals, new words as used in authored works certainly seem open to ownership claims. Although 
specifically excluded from copyright protection by the Code of Federal Regulations (37 C.F.R. §202.1), 
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 While I cannot lay claim to having created the particular words I am using, I can 
claim to have created their particular selection and arrangement. Indeed, as I have 
contended, this is precisely what creation amounts to: the selection and arrangement of 
pre-existing elements. The same will hold true for the musician, who selects and arranges 
notes and sounds, for the sculptor who combines certain materials with certain shapes, for 
the painter who selects particular colors of paint in particular arrangements, and so on in 
other media. Selecting and arranging pre-existing elements thus gives rise to new entities: 
sentences, characters, plots, and so on, in works of literature; musical phrases and 
melodies; architectural rooms, buildings, and cathedrals; and uncountable others. 
 That said, copyright does not thus extend to sentences, melodies, and cathedrals 
per se, but to such sentences, melodies, and cathedrals as created by some particular 
author or authors. For while I may lay claim to having created this sentence, the very 
same words that make up the sentence may have been selected and arranged in the very 
same order by some other author, and I cannot thereby lay claim to his creation, nor he to 
mine: his sentence, after all, was created by him, and mine by me, however 
indistinguishable the two might seem. To make sense of this, we must turn to talk of 
types and tokens, and to the conditions for the copyrightability of a work. 
                                                                                                                                            
there seems no clear and obvious reason why new words should not on their face be afforded copyright 
protection. 
The notes that make up musical works are similarly conventional. In musical notation, a given 
note represents a pitched sound with particular duration. Over time, the pitches or fundamental frequencies 
of notes have become more or less standardized. For instance, the note A above middle C (A4) in 
“standard” or “concert” pitch is measured at 440 Hz (the result of centuries of standardization). With A4 as 
the “central note”, all other notes in the ordinary 12-note scale are mathematically derivable based on 
standardized intervals between notes. (Although 440 Hz is the mathematical baseline for notes, in practice, 
it should be noted, performances tend to vary substantially in their precision.) That said, as a convention, 
there seems no reason one could not invent a new system of musical notation, representing the same, or 
different, sounds. Although such an author could not own the sounds represented by his new notation, nor 
the system per se (with a system as a conceptual framework most likely qualifying as an idea, and not an 




The Conditions of Copyrightability 
A claim to copyright in an authored work arises from a claim to have created that work—
to being responsible for the selection and arrangement of entities that compose it. As 
such, necessary for establishing a copyright in an authored work is establishing that no 
one else can make such a claim—that is, that no one else created it. For a new work to be 
copyrightable, it must be of a new type. 
As established in Chapter Four, authored works are ontologically of a type/token 
sort, and, as such, unlike universals (at least of the Platonic sort), can be created and 
destroyed. And being the sort of entity that is created, any given type thus has a context of 
creation, determined by when, where, and by whom it was so created. 
As tokens are tokens-of-a-type only insofar as they instantiate the properties of 
the type, the context of creation adheres primarily to the type, and only secondarily to the 
token. When a type is instantiated in tokens, these tokens carry (or have associated with 
them) the same context of creation as the type itself. That is, as a token is a token only 
inasmuch as it is a token-of-a-type, it does not represent a new creation (i.e. a new 
selection and arrangement of entities), but rather a mere instantiation of the created type. 
Thus, as the author of the work holds the copyright in the type, and as the type is 
instantiated in its respective tokens, the author thus holds copyrights in the tokens 
inasmuch as they are tokens of a type. The instantiation of the token therefore does not 
supplant the work’s context of creation, but rather adds a context of instantiation, a 
property of the token, and not of the type. 
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One cannot trump or displace a pre-established copyright. Where an individual 
molds, paints, or writes an item that merely instantiates a type, the individual has no 
claim to having created a new work. Rather, all he can claim is that he instantiated a 
token of a preexisting type. He is responsible for a context of instantiation, but not a new 
context of creation, for what he has instantiated is some particular selection-and-
arrangement as created by some other author. This new token of the type will not qualify 
for a new copyright, as it will already be copyrighted by the author of the type of which it 
is a token. As such, in order to obtain a copyright in a work, it is necessary that the work 
be of a new type, and not merely a token of a pre-existing type. 
As the type is distinguished from its tokens, the claim of ownership over an 
authored work should also be distinguished from the ownership of the physical object 
that embodies the work. Although an individual might rightfully lay claim to having 
created a certain physical object, the physical object is not coextensive with the work 
itself, and as the object is to be distinguished from the work, ownership of one does not 
thereby extend to ownership of the other. An author might sell or give away the physical 
object without thereby selling or giving away his copyright in the authored work. 
Conversely, an author might sell, give away, or abandon his copyright in the authored 
work, and yet retain possession of the physical object. Again, ownership of one does not 
thereby entail ownership of the other.  
Having thus outlined the necessary condition for copyrightability—that the work 
must be of a new type—let us turn now to the sufficient conditions of same. As discussed 
in Chapter Four, for some item to qualify as a token of a particular type, it must (i) 
possess the same atomic properties as the type, and (ii) possess a strong historical link 
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operating over all of the atomic properties of both the token and the type. If the item fails 
either of these conditions with regard to all pre-existing types, it will not be a token of 
any pre-existing type, but may thus constitute the first token of a new type. As such, to 
qualify as a new type, it is sufficient either that the work (i) possess atomic properties that 
differ from those of any pre-existing work, or (ii) fail to possess strong historical links to 
any pre-existing work. Let us consider these in turn. 
First, for a work to possess atomic properties that differ from those of any pre-
existing work is sufficient for the new work (of which the token in question is an 
initiator) to constitute a new type. Although atomic similarity is not sufficient to establish 
that two tokens are of the same type (see below), atomic dissimilarity is sufficient to 
establish that two tokens are not of the same type. In speaking of atomic dissimilarity, 
here, it should be noted, I mean any atomic dissimilarity, for tokens of a type, insofar as 
they are tokens of that type, are atomically identical. A difference among the properties 
chosen by the author will, of necessity, result in a different work, however otherwise 
similar the works might be. 
The difficulty, here, lies in separating the essential properties of the work from the 
accidental properties of the physical objects that embody its respective tokens. For 
instance, to return to an example from Chapter Four, your copy of Middlemarch is easily 
distinguishable from my own. My copy is larger than yours, has a different cover and 
binding, is printed in a different font, and so on. None of these properties, however, are 
properties of the work (either the type or the token), but rather are the properties of the 
physical object in which the work is instantiated. Presumably, neither the size, cover, 
binding, nor font of a printing of Middlemarch was selected by Eliot as a property of her 
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work. And, as such, no such property is a property of the work per se. Putting aside such 
properties of the physical object, we can consider instead the atomic properties of the 
work itself: its sentences, characters, scenes, plot, and so forth. Insofar as such properties 
are concerned, the properties of my copy of Middlemarch will be identical to the 
properties of your copy. A copy with different words, however, will fail to be atomically 
identical.3 And so, such copies would constitute tokens of different types.4 For two tokens 
to differ in their atomic properties simply is for them to be tokens of different types.5 And 
so, where a work is atomically dissimilar to any previously-existing work or works, it 
will qualify for copyright protection, for it will constitute a new type.  
Second, for a work to fail to possess strong historical links to any pre-existing 
work is sufficient for the new work to constitute a new type. This is not to say, however, 
that the work need fail to have any connection to earlier works, for no work of art exists 
in an influential vacuum. For art to develop, new works must grow out of what came 
before them, and most such chains of development are not difficult to trace. For example, 
the roots of Jackson Pollock’s drip paintings are typically traced to surrealism, with its 
emphasis on spontaneous or subconscious creation. Art critic Clement Greenberg, more 
concerned with formalism, traces the genealogy of Pollock’s work to Cubism and, before 
that, to the works of Cézanne and Monet, with Pollock’s paintings emerging at the end of 
                                               
3 Presumably, as I have stated earlier, for two works to differ with regard to their characters, scenes, or 
plots, they would have to also differ with regard to their composite words. Borges’ “Pierre Menard”, 
however, gives us some reason to think this may not necessarily be the case. 
4 In point of fact, your copy of Middlemarch may indeed differ from my own in this way, as there are three 
different versions of Middlemarch written by Eliot. These would, as such, constitute different (though 
certainly closely related) works. See my “When Is a Work of Art Finished” (2008), and the section on 
derivative works, below. 
5 Note that some kinds of properties may complicate, but not override, this issue. For instance, the author of 
a literary work might select among the properties of the work that it be always be printed in a serif font. As 
such, one copy might be printed in Times New Roman, and another in Garamond, but each will 
nevertheless be atomically identical insofar as they are tokens of a type. Similarly, a sculptor might select a 
certain range of size for his work, say, from 16 to 60 inches in height. An item falling outside this range 
will fail to qualify as atomically identical to those that fall within the range. 
 193 
this chain as the purest and most essential form of art.6 There is probably some truth to 
both sides. Each of these preceding schools, likewise, finds its birth in artistic traditions 
that came before it, whether expanding on its predecessors, or otherwise reacting to them. 
This is to say that new works are influenced by their predecessors. And it is this sort of 
influence relation that I have dubbed one of weak historical links. Typically, a given work 
will have weak historical links to a body of pre-existing works, such that the new work 
does not depend in any historical way on any particular work from that body. Certainly, 
weak historical links are very common. In the realm of art, especially, when a given work 
possesses no such apparent links, we tend to be at a loss for how to treat the work (as in 
some cases of “outsider art” or “Art Brut”).7 
 However, where weak historical links are exceedingly common, strong historical 
links are much less so. To recall from Chapter Three, where there is a strong historical 
link, some property or properties of a new work depend directly on some property or 
properties of some particular pre-existing work, such that had the earlier work been 
different, so too would be the new work. Stated thus, a strong historical link may be 
manifest in a number of ways: a new work might copy a pre-existing work, or it might 
otherwise respond or react to the earlier work. In the former, there will be at least some 
atomic similarity between the works; in the latter, there may be none. However, where 
there is no strong historical link operating between works, the new work cannot rightly 
be considered a copy or instance of the pre-existing work—i.e. a token of the same 
type—however similar the two might be, atomically speaking. Consider again the cases 
                                               
6 Greenberg, Clement (1961) “The Crisis of the Easel Picture” in Art and Culture Critical Essays, 154-157. 
7 Indeed, under Levinson’s historical definition, such works may not even qualify as art. See Chapter 
Three. Where we are dealing with functionally-oriented objects, however, such as bathtubs and boat hulls, 
this may be less of an issue. 
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of the identical haikus and photographs of the Grand Canyon, discussed in earlier 
chapters. In each case, the new work is indistinguishable from the old, with the properties 
selected by the new author being identical to those selected by the old author. But a 
change to either earlier work would have, presumably, no impact upon the latter. That is, 
some difference in the selection made by the first author would not thus result in some 
difference in the selection made by the second. 
Where a work possesses no strong historical link to any earlier work, regardless of 
how atomically similar the two might be, the new work will qualify for copyright 
protection, for it will be the product of its author’s creativity, and not that of any other 
agent. That is, the work will have its own context of creation, and thus qualify as a new 
type. The test for copyrightability is essentially a test for originality, and where a work 
does not owe its origin to any earlier work or author, it is thus be original to its author.  
 
The Conditions of Copyright Infringement 
Where a work is copyrightable, it thus risks infringement. To have infringed a copyright 
is for some new work, or parts thereof, to depend in a special way on some pre-existing, 
copyrighted work. Put another way, if work B infringes the copyright of work A, then the 
author of A has some claim over B, or some part or parts thereof. Copyright ownership is 
based on a claim of having created some work (or some part thereof), and where an 
individual cannot claim to have selected and arranged pre-existing elements to create 
some new thing, he cannot therefore claim a copyright in it. Further, however, where 
another individual can claim a copyright in that thing (be it an entire work, or a part 
thereof), and so retains the right to reproduce it, another individual who reproduces it 
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without the consent of the copyright holder infringes that copyright. Establishing 
copyright infringement is a different matter than establishing the copyrightability of a 
work, though it rests on the same ontological principles. Where establishing 
copyrightability depends necessarily on establishing that a work is of a new type and 
sufficiently on establishing atomic dissimilarity or an absence of strong historical links, 
to pre-existing works, establishing copyright infringement is a matter of a necessary and 
sufficient condition in two parts, each being necessary, and together being sufficient. 
Establishing infringement requires (i) atomic similarity between the new and old work, 
and (ii) a strong historical link operating over the property or properties held in common 
between the two works.  
 Before turning to this composite condition, let us first consider whether either (i) 
or (ii) alone might be sufficient to constitute copyright infringement. As discussed in 
Chapter One, U.S. courts have devised tests for “substantial similarity” such that, if some 
new work is found to be substantially similar to some pre-existing, copyrighted work, the 
new work is assumed to have copied the earlier work. The examples of the identical 
haikus, and the identical snapshots of the Grand Canyon, however, show how 
problematic this notion is. In the former case, because of the limitations on the haiku 
form, it seems not altogether unlikely that two poets might independently select and 
arrange precisely the same words in precisely the same order. In the latter case, given the 
sheer number of photographs taken from any particular vantage point overlooking the 
Grand Canyon, it seems entirely likely that two or more photographs would appear 
indistinguishable. Yet in neither case do we want to claim that the newer of the works in 
any way depends on the older, however atomically similar they might be. 
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In discussing substantial similarity in Chapter One, I further raised the case of Piet 
Mondrian and Theo van Doesburg, each a member of the De Stijl art movement in the 
Netherlands in the 1920s. In particular, let us consider Mondrian’s Composition with 
Large Blue Plane, Red, Black, Yellow, and Gray (1921) and van Doesburg’s Counter-
Composition V (1924). Each painting is composed of squares and rectangles colored in 
black, light grey, blue, red, and yellow, and each is dominated by one large, colored 
square (red in Mondrian’s work; blue in van Doesburg’s). Although van Doesburg’s 
quadrangles are on a 45-degree angle relative to those of Mondrian’s, and although van 
Doesburg’s composition lacks the grid pattern found on Mondrian’s, the two paintings 
are unquestionably “substantially similar”. However, a claim of infringement in this case 
would be very likely unsubstantiated. Rather than copying Mondrian’s piece, van 
Doesburg was much more likely influenced by it and by several others of Mondrian’s 
works. That is, van Doesburg’s work likely holds weak historical links to a great number 
of preexisting works. Were any of these pre-existing works to be different, it is unlikely 
that any element of Counter-Composition V would likewise be altered. Moreover, as both 
painters were working within the same school of art, they were working from the same 
“first principles”, in this case the search for ultimate simplicity and abstraction, 
employing only straight lines and rectilinear shapes, the primary colors (red, blue, and 
yellow), and the primary values (black, white, and grey). Had the two artists failed to 
have produced substantially similar works that would be much more surprising than the 
fact that their works were in fact so similar. The same issue threatens to arise for artists 
working in any particular school. As such, we are not surprised to find substantial 
similarity between Georges Braque’s Viaduct at L’Estaque (1908) and Pablo Picasso’s 
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Maisons sur la Colline (Horta de Ebro) (1909), nor, for that matter, between Cimabue’s 
Madonna Enthroned (c. 1280-1290) and Giotto’s Madonna Enthroned (c. 1310). Nor are 
we surprised to find substantial similarity in works of other media where artists (writers, 
composers, cinematographers, and so on) are working in the same tradition, and from the 
same guiding principles, though the visceral effect of similarity is going to be more 
apparent in some media than in others. 
Establishing atomic similarity is not always a simple matter. Some cases of 
atomic similarity will be straightforward and obvious: a photograph of a painting (or, in 
the case of a photorealistic painting, a painting of a photograph), a word-for-word 
correspondence of two literary works, or a note-for-note correspondence of two musical 
works. Comparing such basic entities that make up works is usually a relatively trivial 
matter; comparing higher-order entities such as characters, melodies, and plots, however, 
can be a challenge. For comparing higher-order entities requires abstraction and 
sensitivity, a non-trivial matter, and similarity at such a level is thus unlikely to be as 
apparent as it is at lower levels. 
Turning now from atomic similarity to strong historical links, the existence of a 
strong historical link between some new work, B, and some pre-existing work, A, seems a 
reasonable basis for the author of A to claim that, had it not been for his creating A, B 
would be different. As such, an author might reasonably claim that where there is a 
strong historical link between some new work and his own pre-existing work, even where 
there is no substantial similarity between them, the new work depends upon his own as it 
is it tied through the causal effect of a strong historical link to the pre-existing work. 
What he cannot reasonably claim on this basis alone, however, is that he created any part 
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of the new work, and this is what is required for a claim of infringement to hold any 
weight. 
To illustrate, let us imagine a simple case. Taking a simple musical composition, 
say, Mozart’s Andante in C, I assign each note a color value. Then, in a simple grid of 
squares, I fill in each square in sequence with the color corresponding to each note in the 
sequence of Mozart’s composition. What we will be left with is a sort of visual 
representation of Andante in C, with each colored square possessing a strong historical 
link to a note in Mozart’s piece such that, had Mozart used a different note in any 
particular place, the corresponding square in my painting would be a different color. 
However, one would be hard-pressed to find any atomic similarity between Mozart’s 
piece and my own. The basic entities that make up each work are of fundamentally 
different kinds, as are any properties that arise from these entities. While one might claim 
my work depends in a very strong way on Mozart’s, there is no reasonable claim that 
Mozart himself created any aspect of my painting.8 
 Strong historical links arise also in other ways so as to connect distinct works 
without one thereby infringing the other. For example, let us consider three Hollywood 
films: Weird Science, My Science Project, and Real Genius. Weird Science involves a 
pair of teenage technophiles who, through various technological machinations, create 
something of a genie, who grants them all their pubescent wishes, and, in the process, 
                                               
8 Although the method used in my painting is fairly arbitrary, and the example itself rather fanciful, the 
potential connections between musical composition and abstract painting have been explored by the likes 
of Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky, and more complex and interesting such experiments are not difficult 
to imagine. See Duchting, Hajo (1997) Paul Klee: Painting Music; Kandinsky, Wassily (1919). “On Stage 
Composition”. Where I have merely linked notes and sequences to colors in my imagined work, a more 
complex piece hoping to connect the visual with the musical may represent not only notes but also 
harmonies, melodies, and other such higher-level entities. This will further complicate matters, as discussed 
below. For more musical/visual possibilities, see Jerrold Levinson’s “Nonexistent Artforms and the Case of 
Visual Music” in Levinson, Jerrold (2006). Contemplating Art. For more on Klee, see Case 3, toward the 
end of this chapter.  
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teaches them valuable life lessons about being technophiles. My Science Project focuses 
on a pair of teenage grease-monkeys who discover a strange device that opens time 
portals, and, with the help of some teenage technophiles, manage to save their high 
school from becoming the hub of a space-time cataclysm. In the process, the grease-
monkeys learn a valuable life lesson about teenage technophiles. Real Genius is the story 
of a prodigy (read: teenage technophile) who attends MIT, and, with the help of the 
resident prodigy (who embodies something best described as “geek chic”), averts a gross 
misuse of science, and learns a valuable lesson about teenage technophiles. All three 
films opened in theaters within a week of each other in the summer of 1985, and each 
might be described as an expression of the basic plot idea: technophile(s) are 
disenfranchised; using their knowledge of science, technophile(s) do something amazing; 
technophile(s) become the subject of a valuable life lesson. Certainly, while there exist 
cases of amazing coincidences in similarity between popular works, this particular case 
seems to stretch the bounds of coincidence. It seems difficult to doubt there had been 
some idea-appropriation at work in the months leading to the summer of 1985.9 
Nevertheless, one would be hard-pressed to find any similarity between any of the three 
works. Certainly, there is similarity between the ideas expressed, and most likely there is 
a strong historical link between these ideas, but as ideas are outside the domain of 
copyright protection, such idea-appropriation does not constitute copyright infringement. 
Where the test for copyrightability is essentially a test for originality, the test for 
                                               
9 Given the amount of time it takes to produce a feature film, especially films such as these with (at the 
time) generous special effects needs, any idea-appropriation would have had to have occurred long before 
the summer of 1985. 
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infringement is essentially a test for copying, though what has been copied can make the 
difference between infringement and non-infringement.10 
Just as there are difficulties in establishing atomic similarity between works, so 
too are there difficulties in establishing strong historical links. Problematically, just as a 
weak historical link may come about unconsciously (a work of art may be the result of an 
influence of which the artist herself is unaware), so too is it conceivable that a strong 
historical link may come about unconsciously. Recalling an example from Chapter Three, 
we can easily imagine a musician who, lost in some activity, has a tune pop into her head, 
seemingly from nowhere. Unable to exorcise the tune, the musician decides to 
incorporate it into a song. Unbeknownst to her, however, the tune did not just pop into 
her head from nowhere, but from an unconscious memory of a song she heard in the 
distant past. Catchy tunes, after all, have a way of sticking in one’s memory. Although 
she would be unaware of it, the tune, thus incorporated into a new song, would not be her 
own creation, but that of another. That is, unbeknownst to her, it would possess not only 
atomic similarity, but also a strong historical link, to the pre-existing work. Indeed, this 
very issue has been at the center of several actual copyright cases, and has certainly 
contributed to the continued enforcement of the “substantial similarity” rule, discussed 
above.11  
                                               
10 We might further imagine a case where some new work has not only a strong historical link to, but also 
atomic similarity with, some pre-existing work, and yet fail to infringe upon the earlier work. All that is 
required for this to be the case is that the elements over which there operates a strong historical link are not 
the elements that are atomically similar in the two works. 
11 See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983), contending George 
Harrison’s song “My Sweet Lord” (1969) infringes the copyright on “He’s So Fine” (1963), written by 
Ronald Mack and recorded by the Chiffons; Three Boys Music Corp. v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th 
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.W. 1126 (2001), contending Michael Bolton’s song, “Love is a Wonderful 
Thing” (1990) infringes the copyright on the Isley Brothers’ “Love is a Wonderful Thing” (1964); and Selle 
v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984), contending the Bee Gees’ “How Deep is Your Love” (1977) infringes 
the copyright on Ronald Selle’s “Let it End” (1975). 
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Now, while neither atomic similarity, nor a strong historical link, is alone 
sufficient to grounding a claim of copyright infringement, each is necessary, and the two 
conditions, when operating over the same properties, constitute a sufficient condition for 
infringement. To expand, let us suppose some work, B, contains some element, e. For the 
sake of simplicity, let us say that the element at issue is a character, though the same 
principle would apply to any product of creativity as realized in an authored work. Let us 
further suppose that some pre-existing work, A, contains a character, d, which is 
atomically identical to e. And finally, let us suppose that there is a strong historical link 
operating between e and d. In such a case, I believe we can reasonably say that the author 
of B did not create e, for he is not responsible for the selection and arrangement of pre-
existing elements to form e. Rather, as e is not only atomically identical to d, but also 
possesses a strong historical link operating between its properties and those of d, such 
that, had d been different in some way, so too would have been e, we can say that e is a 
copy of d. Or, to put the matter another way, e and d are tokens of a type, which has a 
particular context of creation, to which the author of A, but not the author of B, 
contributes. As the author of B is not responsible for creating the character, but only for 
instantiating it in B (and so contributing only to its context of instantiation), he can claim 
no copyright on it. As the author of A, however, can claim such a copyright, the author of 
B infringes this copyright by reproducing the character. 
To further explicate the nature of infringement, let us suppose an addendum to the 
above case: that of work C, which contains a character, f, which in turn bears the same 
relationship to e that e bears to d. Because the author of B can claim no copyright in e, C 
does not, on this basis, infringe any copyright in B. Rather, because the author of A 
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created d, which is atomically identical to f, and f possesses a strong historical link to d 
(albeit via e), C infringes the copyright of A, just as B does. Where atomic similarity is a 
transitive (and symmetric) property, and a strong historical link is likewise transitive 
(though not symmetric), copyright infringement, which requires both atomic similarity 
and a strong historical link, is not transitive (nor symmetric). 
Though the above case deals specifically with copying a character, a claim of 
infringement can be made on the basis that the whole of a work has been copied, or on 
the basis that a part of a work has been copied. Where the whole of a work has been 
copied, every element of the copy will be atomically similar to, and possess a strong 
historical link operating over, corresponding elements in the original.12 In such a case, the 
copy will simply constitute a token of the same type as that copied. Where something less 
than the whole of the work has been copied, however, copying can occur at essentially 
any level of the work, from the basic atomic complexes that make up the work to such 
higher-level elements as characters, plots, melodies, and harmonies. And where copying 
a sentence or a musical motif requires copying its composite words or notes, a melody 
may be copied without copying a single note, and a character may be copied without 
copying a single word. Because some such higher-order elements do not reduce to their 
composite elements, the copyright of the work in which they originally appear can be 
infringed in either the same media (as in literary translations), or across media boundaries 
(as in adaptations).13 
  
                                               
12 Keeping in mind , as per the above, that “every element of the copy” refers to the essential elements of 
the work per se, and not to the accidental features of the physical object in which the work is embodied.  
13 It should be noted that copyright infringement per se should not be confused with violation of the 
copyright holder’s rights. This topic will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 203 
Some Immediate Consequences 
Before moving on, I think it worth pointing out a few apparent but, I suspect, non-
obvious consequences of the foregoing analysis. First, it seems, one can neither copyright 
nor therefore infringe a style, per se. Style is a slippery concept, but whether we are 
concerned with that of a particular artist, or that of a school or period, a style consists in 
certain features characteristic of the works of an individual or group by which such 
individuals or groups can often be identified.14 As such, unlike lower-order elements such 
as sentences and fields of color, or higher-order elements like plots and melodies, a style 
is not an aspect of some particular work, but rather of a body of work. Copyright, 
however, is work-specific. And although a style might be exemplified in a particular line, 
string of sounds, or syntax, such a line, string of sounds, or syntax is not constitutive of 
the style. While an individual might imitate a style by copying some particular work, so 
too might one imitate a style without copying any aspect of any particular work, but by 
drawing on the stylistic gestalt of an artist’s or school’s body of work.15 In the latter sort 
of cases, the elements of a new work will almost certainly possess weak historical links to 
a body of work in a given style, but need not possess any of the strong historical links 
required for a charge of infringement. 
A second notable consequence is that, on the arguments provided, some notations, 
like musical notations, would not qualify as infringements of their respective musical 
                                               
14 As such, we might consider styles as major categories under the categorial analysis of Chapter Five. 
Beyond the rough sketch at a definition provided, the particulars of style are the subject of ongoing debate. 
To begin, see Arnheim, Rudolf (1981) “Style as a Gestalt Problem” in Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism (39:3); Goodman, Nelson (1984) “The Status of Style” in Ways of Worldmaking; Robinson, 
Jenefer M. (1985) “Style and Personality in the Literary Work” in Philosophical Review (94:2); Walton 
(1979); Wollheim, Richard (1987) Painting as an Art; Carney, James D. (1991) “Individual Style” in 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (49:1). 
15 Where the former is the basis of referential forgeries, discussed in Chapter Four, the latter is typically the 
basis of inventive forgeries. 
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works, or vice versa. Where the sounds played in a musical performance may centrally 
depend on the notes of a musical notation (and thus have a strong historical link between 
them), sounds have no atomic similarity whatsoever to little black marks on a page.16 
Although creating a musical score by carefully observing a performance would not thus 
infringe a copyright in the performance,17 employing such a notation to create a new 
performance, however, would infringe the original work, as the performance would both 
possess the requisite strong historical link, and (unlike the notation) atomic similarity 
between the elements over which there is such a link.18 
The same basic issue arises in the digitization of visual or auditory works. At 
base, a computer file consists in a series of zeros and ones which, when processed by the 
correct program, can be used to fairly faithfully reproduce the original work. However, 
where a painting has color and a song has sounds, a series of zeros and ones has neither. 
Granted, the string of zeros and ones will possess a strong historical link to the original 
work, but it will possess no atomic similarity. Creating such a file will not, thus, infringe 
the work so digitized, though, as with musical notation, the use of a program to reproduce 
the work from the digital file will infringe, for the image or sound produced will indeed 
possess atomic similarity to the original work, and, via the digital file, a strong historical 
link operating over these atomically similar elements.19 
                                               
16 This said, the case might be made that a performance does infringe on the basis of melodies, harmonies, 
or some other higher-order entites that may be expressed both visually and sonically. However, I suspect 
such a case would require a great deal more explanation than I can give room to here.  
17 See Chapter One, footnote 21, regarding the case of Murphy and Taffy. 
18 This, of course, assumes that the musical performance was not itself based on musical notation. 
19 The digitization of a literary work poses different issues. Converting standard written English (or another 
language) to computer code likewise results in a string of zeros and ones which, given sufficient skill, could 
be read. Although the zeros and ones will possess no atomic similarity to the original literary work, as a 
readable language, a sufficiently skilled reader could get at the story represented, and so to the plot, 
characters, and the like, which do not reduce to a particular language. As such, it might reasonably be 
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 Finally, recall that, on Margolis’ account as discussed in Chapter Four, a type can 
be destroyed when all of its tokens, and all means of producing new tokens, have been 
destroyed. This is a contentious matter.20 However, this much seems clear: having 
destroyed all tokens and all means of producing new tokens (whether by notation or by 
memory), any copyright worries regarding the respective type likewise disappear, for if 
new tokens cannot be instantiated, any copyright remaining in the work cannot be 
infringed. Assuming there is no means of accessing the earlier type, in whole or in part, 
whether by tokens (including partial entokening in another work), by notation, or by 
memory, there can be no new work that possesses any strong historical link to the earlier 
work. As such, any new work that appears following the destruction of the old type, even 
if atomically indistinguishable from it, will nevertheless constitute a new type, with a 
new context of creation. And, as such, the new work will not infringe any copyright of 
the earlier work, even assuming that such a work still exists. 
 
Derivative Works 
The observant reader will notice in the above a peculiar asymmetry between the 
conditions for copyrightability, and those for copyright infringement: where the 
conditions for copyrightability require that the new work be of a new type, the conditions 
for copyright infringement do not require that the infringing work be a token of the same 
type as the infringed, only that the infringing element of the work be of the same type as 
                                                                                                                                            
contended that the plot, characters, and other such higher-order elements have been infringed, possessing 
both strong historical links and atomic similarity between those elements so linked. 
20 The contentiousness tends to depend upon one’s ontological assumptions regarding art, whether works of 
art are of a type/token or universal/particular sort, whether certain art kinds are inherently singular, and so 
forth, as discussed in earlier chapters. To begin, see Young, James O. (1989) “Destroying Works of Art” in 
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (47:4), pp. 367-373. 
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the infringed element. Indeed, it seems, a new work might infringe an old work (or any 
number of old works) and yet qualify for copyright protection of its own. In fact, this is 
very much the case, and opens the door for an unusual sort of authored work: the 
derivative work. 
Each of Jacques-Louis David’s Oath of the Horatii (1784), Igor Stravinsky’s 
Histoire du Soldat (1918), and Nashville’s Schermerhorn Symphony Center are 
“derivative” in the ordinary sense of drawing on themes, motifs, and styles of works in 
the classical canons of their respective media. Despite being derivative, as such, these 
neoclassicist works are rightly highly regarded. Less highly regarded, but equally 
derivative in the ordinary sense, are the countless works that draw on the oeuvre of a 
particular genre or tradition, and yet contribute nothing of note of their own. Here, the 
term “derivative” is used derogatorily. Still, whether highly regarded or not, these 
ordinarily derivative works possess weak historical links to a body of traditional works, 
but, at least in these cases, no strong historical links to any particular works in those 
bodies.21 As such, they do not qualify as infringements of works on which they draw, and 
thus provide no particular worries for the domain of copyright. In the domain of 
copyright, however, “derivative” means something more precise. 
As discussed in Chapter One, the 1976 Copyright Act defines a “derivative work” 
as: 
 
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, 
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture 
                                               
21 Though the libretto of L’histoire du soldat, written by C.F. Ramuz, does possess a strong historical link 
to a particular Russian folk tale, but which, as it may not constitute any single work, may not itself be 
copyrightable. 
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version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or 
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A 
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other 
modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work or authorship, 
is a “derivative work”.22 
 
Perhaps the most common sort of derivative work, so defined, is today found in the 
cinema. Film adaptations of literary works have been common since the days of silent 
film (Frankenstein (1910); The Phantom of the Opera (1925); Metropolis (1927)).  Films 
today, however, are also regularly based on graphic novels (V for Vendetta (2006)), video 
games (Resident Evil (2002)), stage plays (Rent (2005)), and even such unexpected 
sources as magazine articles (Live Free or Die Hard (2007)) and trading cards (Mars 
Attacks! (1996)). Films are also more and more frequently based on earlier films.  
 Regardless of how faithful an adaptation may be, however, it will not qualify as a 
token of the same type as its source. Even Gus Van Sant’s 1998 remake of Hitchcock’s 
classic Psycho (1960), purportedly an attempt to recreate the original, shot-for-shot 
(including reproducing unintentional errors), falls well short of so qualifying. Where two 
works differ atomically, they will not be tokens of the same type. However, where one 
work represents an attempt to recast, transform, or adapt another, a special sort of 
relationship seems to hold between the two. In Chapter Four, I characterized this 
relationship as a dominant/subordinate one, where the higher-order elements of the new 
work are the same as (or, at least, approximate), and possess a strong historical link to, 
those of the pre-existing work. So characterized, I co-opted Margolis’ term megatype to 
                                               
22 Copyright Act of 1976, §101, reproduced in Cohen et al. (2006b), 5. 
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categorize this relationship between a derivative work and that upon which it draws. As 
such, a derivative work represents a special sort of infringement, and further includes 
translations, cover songs, different “editions” or “versions” of a work, and many others.  
 Such megatype-derivative works, however, fall within a larger category, which I 
shall refer to as derivative works, generally, which involve what I termed in Chapter One 
“elemental appropriation”.23 Falling between tokens of a type and entirely non-infringing 
works, derivative works infringe, and yet are themselves copyrightable. Such works are 
distinguishable from the works that they infringe, for they include elements newly 
created by their authors and/or lack elements created by the authors of the works that they 
infringe. This will be the case for each of the megatype-derivative works discussed 
above, but also for a host of other works, in a variety of ways, including: Roy 
Lichtenstein’s Takka Takka (1962), a painting based on an anonymous comic-book panel; 
Richard Hamilton’s  Just what is it that makes today's homes so different, so appealing? 
(1956), a collage made using images clipped from a number of sources; Duchamp’s 
L.H.O.O.Q. (1919), consisting of a moustache and title penciled onto a color reproduction 
of Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa; and Bob Thomson’s Crucifixion (1963-4), a modern symbolist 
restyling of Lucas Cranach the Elder’s Crucifixion (1503). In each case, the author 
clearly infringes upon the earlier work, but at the same time adds something new, and, 
more importantly for this discussion, something copyrightable. However, this copyright 
extends only to those elements of the work created by its author. 
                                               
23 Megatype-derivative works fall within this larger category because the pertinent issues pertaining to 
megatype-derivative works apply also to other works in the larger category, and there appear to be no 
further issues pertinent to the megatype-derivative works that, for the purpose of this study at least, serve to 
distinguish it from the other works in the more general category. 
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 Let us consider the case, outlined earlier in this chapter, of works A, B, and C. 
Recall that B copies a character from A, and C copies the same character from B. If only a 
character has been copied, work B is surely a derivative work (for certainly a work cannot 
consist solely of a character). Where work C copies the same character from B that B 
copies from A, however, C does not infringe B, but rather infringes A. That is, because 
the author of B did not create the character, the author of B does not hold a copyright in 
the character. The same will be true of each of the derivative works discussed above, as 
regards those elements infringed from other works. 
 
Cases 
Having thus outlined the conditions for copyrightability and copyright infringement, and 
the peculiar category of derivative works, let us consider a handful of real-world cases 
selected to illustrate these issues. These cases are drawn from two sources: from the 
parade of cases discussed in depth in Chapter One, there used to illustrate the central 
concepts of copyright law; and from Paisley Livingston’s “Nested Art” (2003), a 
fascinating study of what it means for one numerically distinct work of art to be “nested” 
in, or form a part of, another.24 It should be noted that a number of the works to be 
discussed are not (and, in many cases, have never been) protected by legal copyright, 
either because legal copyright did not exist at the time of the works’ creation, or because 
their copyrights have since expired and the works have fallen into the public domain. The 
duration of copyright is a topic I shall investigate in the next chapter, but for the moment 
                                               
24 Livingston, Paisley (2003). “Nested Art” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (61:3), pp. 233-245. 
Livingston’s article is certainly worthy of greater analysis, and while I have chosen these cases because 
Livingston’s subject matter and my own intersect at various points, such points of intersection are 
incidental to our respective programs.  
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I am concerned simply with the copyrightability of works, and infringement of such, on 
the basis of the conditions outlined in this chapter. 
 
Case 1 The Johannes Vermeer painting usually called A Lady Seated at the 
Virginal (ca. 1675) depicts a painting hanging on the wall behind the 
main subject. The model for this picture-within-the-picture was Dirck 
van Baburen’s The Procuress (1622).25 
 
Unfortunately for Vermeer, A Lady Seated at the Virginal serves as a rather 
straightforward case of infringement as I have outlined it. While Vermeer’s 
representation of The Procuress is not an entirely accurate one—it does not include the 
extreme top or right of the image created by van Baburen, and is rendered in a more 
simplified style—the overall figures, their shapes, positions, expressions, and so forth, are 
for the most part the same as those found in van Baburen’s original. The strong historical 
links seem clear. With this said, however, as Vermeer’s reproduction of the painting 
serves only as a background element to his larger work (albeit a predominant one), and is 
rendered in a more simplified style than the original, A Lady Seated at the Virginal is 
clearly a derivative work in the sense I outlined above. As such, while Vermeer’s work 
infringes on van Baburen’s, these elements aside, Vermeer’s painting is itself 
copyrightable. 
 
Case 2 Alva Studios created a small-scale reproduction of Auguste Rodin’s 
Hand of God. Robert Winninger later made similar reproductions, 
                                               
25 Livingston’s Case #3. See Livingston (2003), pp. 233-234. 
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purportedly from the Rodin original possessed by the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art. Alva contended that Winninger infringed its 
copyright.26 
 
Rodin’s Hand of God is a 37” tall marble sculpture with probably four instances 
produced by him and his studio. Alva’s reproductions are, conversely, 7” in height, and 
composed of marble resin. Unlike other works created by Rodin, there is little reason to 
think that Rodin failed to select either a particular material or a particular scale for Hand 
of God. As such, Alva’s reproductions are most likely derivative works, infringing the 
overall form of Rodin’s original, but introducing new material and scale.27 
 Given this, a reproduction of Alva’s reproduction could infringe Alva’s copyright 
only if the new work is of the same scale and/or material as Alva’s. If it reproduces only 
the overall form, it will not infringe Alva’s copyright (for Alva has no claim to the form), 
but will nevertheless infringe Rodin’s copyright. If, however, an individual makes a 
reproduction based on Rodin’s original alone (i.e. without reference to Alva’s), as 
Winninger claims to have done, even if the resulting work is of the same scale and 
material as Alva’s, Alva has no claim of copyright infringement. For while the new work 
will have atomic similarity to Alva’s, with regard to scale and material, it will have no 
strong historical link operating between the works. That is, Alva will not possess a 
copyright over that form in that scale and size, per se, but only over that form in that 
scale and size as created by Alva.  
                                               
26 Discussed in Chapter One (Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (SDNY 1959)). 
27 Note that, even had Rodin failed to select a particular scale and particular material as elements of Hand 
of God (as seems to have been the case with The Thinker, discussed in earlier chapters), it may nevertheless 
be the case that Alva had selected a particular scale and particular material. In such a case, Alva would still 
have created a derivative work. 
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Case 3 Paul Klee’s painting, Die Zwitschermachine (1922), has been the 
subject of at least three musical compositions by twentieth-century 
composers: Gunther Schuller’s “The Twittering Machine,” from his 
Seven Studies on Themes of Paul Klee (1959); Giselher Klebe’s Die 
Zwitschermachine (1950); and Peter Maxwell Davies’s “The 
Twittering Machine” from his Five Klee Pictures (1959-1962).28 
 
Klee’s painting, almost childlike in its whimsical, simple style, depicts four stick-figure 
birds,29 perched upon the warped axle of a crank, all suspended over what appears to be a 
stage. Each bird’s mouth emits a strange tongue or, perhaps, song, depending on how one 
chooses to interpret Klee’s doodle, helping to individuate the creatures. 
In her article, “A Concert of Paintings: ‘Musical Ekphrasis’ in the Twentieth 
Century” (2001), Siglind Bruhn provides an interesting analysis of Klee’s painting and of 
the compositions by Schuller, Klebe, and Davies.30 As Bruhn describes them, the 
compositions of Schuller and Davies each proceed through various rhythmic twitterings, 
characteristic of bird calls, as if produced through the acceleration and deceleration of the 
turning of Klee’s crank. However, this seems to be the extent to which the respective 
compositions are connected to Klee’s painting: in neither case does there seem to be any 
atomic similarity, nor any strong historical links, operating between any particular 
                                               
28 Livingston’s Case #11. See Livingston (2003), p. 234. 
29 H.W. Janson describes them as “sham birds [that] look like fishermen’s lures, as if they might entrap real 
birds.” See Janson, H.W. (1969) History of Art, Revised Edition, p. 532 
30 Bruhn, Siglind (2001). “A Concert of Paintings: 'Musical Ekphrasis' in the Twentieth Century” in Poetics 
Today (22:3), pp. 551-605. 
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properties of composition and painting. Klebe’s Die Zwitschermaschine, however, does 
present an interesting case. 
Where Klebe distinguishes himself is in focusing on the individuality of the birds, 
as they are rotated on the axle to musical effect.31 Bruhn describes Klebe’s composition 
as a “four-part character sketch,”32 with each of four symphonic movements portraying 
the voices of Klee’s birds, from left to right on the axle. Where the first bird stands erect 
with a tongue/song resembling an exclamation mark, the first movement is “assertive and 
self-assured.”33 Where the second bird from the left is the only one looking down, the 
second movement of Klebe’s composition “portrays the dejected, literally crestfallen 
posture of the second bird.”34 According to Bruhn, the third movement reflects the 
eeriness and madness of the third bird, and the fourth “raw aggression” in a compressed 
section, mirroring the barbed tongue/song and stature of the final bird.35 
Given this analysis, it might foreseeably be argued that the fourth movement in 
Klebe’s composition is short, just as the fourth bird in Klee’s painting is short, and 
moreover, that the former is short because the latter is short—thus establishing the atomic 
similarity and strong historical links required of my account of infringment. Likewise, it 
may be argued that Klebe’s first movement is assertive and self-assured because Klee’s 
first bird is assertive and self-assured, and so on down the line. However, it seems 
abundantly clear that the shortness of Klebe’s movement is a shortness of duration, where 
the shortness of Klee’s bird is one of stature. Although analogous, such properties are 
clearly not the same property held in common between the works, and this is what my 
                                               
31 Ibid., 593-597. 
32 Ibid., 597. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 598. 
35 Ibid. 
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account of infringement requires. That said, the properties of Klebe’s first movement and 
Klee’s first bird presents more of a challenge, as assertiveness and self-assuredness are 
not so easily analyzed as shortness. However what seems immediately apparent is that 
Klebe’s movement and Klee’s bird are not assertive and self-assured in the same way. I 
can imagine an argument contending that assertiveness and self-assuredness are higher-
order aesthetic properties not to be identified with the lower-order properties giving rise 
to them and, as such, the assertiveness and self-assuredness of the birds on the one hand, 
and the movement on the other, are in fact the same aesthetic property. However, given 
the complexity of argument required to settle the issue, I will do no more here than state 
that I believe such an argument could be made, but for the sake of this project continue to 
remain agnostic towards such properties. 
 
Case 4 Kansas-based Rural Telephone Service Co. publishes local residential 
telephone directories. In 1983, Feist Publications (now owned by 
Yellow Book USA) produced a series of larger area-wide directories, 
in which were included a large number of listings from the Rural 
directories. When Rural filed suit against Feist, Feist conceded having 
copied the listings from Rural’s directories, but contested their 
copyrightability.36  
 
Feist’s claim was that Rural’s directories consisted entirely of facts and a method of 
organization that Rural could not claim to have created (alphabetization). As facts do not 
                                               
36 Discussed in Chapter One (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 
(1991)). 
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owe their origin to authors, nor does alphabetization, the court found in the case of Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. (1991) that Rural’s publications were 
not protected under copyright: if a work expresses no creativity on the part of its author, 
then that work is unprotected by copyright. Without copyright, there is nothing to 
infringe. This much is reflected in my own approach to the matter. However, what goes 
largely undiscussed in the legal literature surrounding this case is that, in addition to the 
factual entries copied, Feist also reproduced four fictitious entries meant to ferret out 
infringers.37 
 Although a fictitious listing of name, street address, and telephone number may 
not, as such, constitute a character to be copyrighted, a fictitious name, address, and 
telephone number seem together to represent the requisite creative selection and 
arrangement needed for a copyright in an otherwise non-copyrightable work.38 As Feist 
included such listings in their area-wide directories, their doing so does in fact appear to 
constitute infringement. 
 
Case 5 In 1962, author A.A. Hoehling published Who Destroyed the 
Hindenburg?, a novelized account of the zeppelin’s destruction at the 
hands of saboteur Eric Spehl. In 1972, Michael MacDonald Mooney 
published The Hindenburg, a more literary work explicating the same 
                                               
37 Such fictitious entries are known as Mountweazels, named for Lillian Virginia Mountweazel, the subject 
of a fictitious entry found in the New Columbia Encyclopedia (1975 edition). 
38 Note that, like individual words, discussed in footnote 2 above, while names are specifically excluded 
from U.S. copyright protection by the Code of Federal Regulations (37 C.F.R. §202.1), there seems no 
clear, non-ad hoc reason why this should be the case. 
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sabotage theory. Mooney’s book served as the basis of the screenplay 
to the Universal film, The Hindenburg (1975).39 
 
The court found in A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studies, Inc. (1980) that, although 
Hoehling’s work was sufficiently creative to qualify for copyright protection, what 
Mooney and Universal had copied were either facts, or otherwise non-copyrightable 
elements.  
 Certainly, as in Case 4, the facts expressed in an otherwise copyrightable work are 
themselves unprotectable. What is protectable, however, is what one does with the 
facts—that is, how the facts are represented or expressed. The presiding judge noted that, 
had Mooney or Universal reproduced any part of Hoehling’s account verbatim, they 
would have infringed Hoehling’s work. Without doing so, however, the court found they 
were blameless. What the court overlooks, however, is that the arrangement of particular 
words in a particular order is not all that a novelized account adds to the facts presented. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, a literary work (even a novelized account of purported 
facts) contains not only scenes and events and their chronology, but also a plot, which 
reduces to none of these. That is, where scenes, events, and chronologies are factual 
matters, a plot is not. A plot consists in how the scenes, events, and their chronology are 
represented or expressed in the work: how the storytelling rearranges events of the 
chronology; which events are included, and which left out; how scenes are structured and 
arranged to connect with others; and how scenes or events are lengthened or protracted to 
                                               
39 Discussed in Chapter One (A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980)). 
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bring about rhythm, tension, and other effects. As such, had Mooney or Universal copied 
the plot (or elements thereof), they would have likewise infringed Hoehling’s copyright. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Right of Copyright 
 
Introduction 
As I stated in Chapter One, the goal of this project has been to develop a comprehensive, 
coherent, and consistent account of the ontology of authored works—the objects of 
copyright—upon which could be built an ethical account of the right of copyright. In the 
preceding chapters, I have outlined the atomic, causal, abstract, and categorial 
dimensions of authored works, and, on their basis, provided accounts of the 
copyrightability of works and the infringement of these copyrights. 
 In this chapter, I will first consider the dominant theories of the right of copyright, 
and show why these approaches falter, for reasons both internal and external to those 
theories. Having shown what the right to copyright cannot be, I will then sketch a theory 
of the right of copyright that accords with the nature of authored works and their creation, 
and further overcomes the impediments that face the leading theories. Finally, I will 
consider two limitations to current U.S. copyright law—“fair use” and the expiration of 
copyright—to determine if, and to what degree, these limitations will apply also to my 
theory of copyright. 
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What Kind of a Right is Copyright? 
Approaches to grounding the “right” of copyright come in a variety of forms, but the two 
most prominent contenders, both historically and theoretically, have been the framing of 
copyright as a natural right, and the framing of it as a positive instrumental right.1 
 
Copyright as a Natural Right: Locke’s Theory of Acquisition 
Outlined in his Second Treatise on Government (1698), Locke’s natural-rights approach 
to property—called by some his theory of acquisition or theory of appropriation—is a 
familiar one: essentially, given that one owns oneself, one has a right to one’s property 
insofar as it is the product of one’s labor: 
 
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet 
every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right 
to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we 
may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State 
that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, 
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed 
it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the 
common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable 
                                               
1 A distant third is the position that intellectual property rights in general, and copyrights in particular, arise 
from the author’s personality. This model of framing intellectual property rights finds its genesis in the 
work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, particularly Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1822). As the 
position is something of an outlier, however, given space restrictions, I shall put the Hegelian view to the 
side. For interesting reading on the personality justification of copyright, however, see Hughes, Justin 
(1988). “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property” 77 Georgetown Law Journal 287; and DeLong, James V. 
(2002). “Defending Intellectual Property” in Copy Fights: The Future of Intellectual Property in the 
Information Age (Adam Thierer and Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., eds.) (Washington, DC: Cato Institute). 
 220 
Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is 
one joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common 
for others.2 
 
Locke’s challenge is to provide an account of how something unowned can in effect 
become private property. According to Locke, one has a sole right to (and property in) 
one’s own person. The commons—the Earth and its inferior creatures—are owned by no 
particular person. However, by altering some element of the commons through labor (by 
“mixing one’s labor” with it), one lays claim to the result, and so gains a right in it—a 
claim against all others. This is provided that the laborer has not, in so doing, exhausted 
the commons of this resource. 
 Locke’s natural right in property might thus be considered a desert. That is, where 
one has no natural right to the commons, as such, but rather only the liberty to exploit it, 
one deserves a right to the fruits of his labor by virtue of having earned that property. The 
resultant property is thus removed from the commons, and placed outside the reach of 
others’ liberty, just as the man himself is outside the reach of others.  
 Thus, for example, as a settler in a new land, unowned by anyone, I pick a plot 
and stake it out, marking it as my own. On Locke’s theory, I do not as yet have a natural 
right to the land, for I have done nothing to it—it remains in its natural state, and thus 
belongs to the commons. However, upon tilling the land and sowing the fields with seed, 
I have “mixed my labor” with what was once common to all, and so have claimed a right 
in it. Moreover, in chopping down trees to build my house, I now own the wood; and in 
building my home upon the plot of land, it seems, I now own the land it occupies. 
                                               
2 Locke, John (1698). Two Treatises of Government, §27. 
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Locke’s theory, however, leaves us with a number of unanswered questions when 
considering particular cases. In the example just discussed, having tilled the fields and 
built upon the land, how far does my ownership stretch? It seems clear, on Locke’s view, 
that I own the wood that makes up my house, and the soil I have tilled, but do I likewise 
own the minerals to be found a meter or a mile beneath my homestead? Do I own the 
water in the creek that runs through my farm? What if I have changed its course? If, as it 
enters my farm, I add fluoride to the water in the creek, do I own the water as it emerges 
from my farm (and perhaps as it enters a neighboring farm)? When my fluoridated water 
enters the sea, do I own that, too? 
Robert Nozick raises a similar issue in his acclaimed work, Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia (1974): 
 
If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules 
(made radioactive, so I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, 
do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato 
juice? Perhaps the idea, instead, is that laboring on something improves it 
and makes it more valuable; and anyone is entitled to own a thing whose 
value he has created.3 
 
As Nozick points out, however, value-added theories of property face issues of their own. 
In particular, why should one’s ownership extend to the whole object and not just the 
                                               
3 Nozick, Robert (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 175. Wendy J. Gordon argues that Nozick’s 
tomato-juice example does not result in ownership of the ocean because such would violate the “scarcity” 
proviso, discussed below. See Gordon, Wendy J. (1993). “A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality 
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property” 102 Yale Law Journal 1533, p. 1565. 
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value-added aspects? We might further ask, value for whom? Nozick contends that spray-
painting a piece of driftwood pink will make it less valuable, but presumably this isn’t 
true for the one who painted it. Chopping down a cluster of trees to build a home will 
surely make the material more valuable to the homeowner, but not to the nature lover. A 
value-added theory of property, it seems, will have to account, at least, for differing 
values, and so will require some sort of value metric, an intimidating project, to be sure. 
 Even if such a metric might be systematized, however, it seems such an approach 
will still lead to unpalatable (or, at least, counterintuitive) results. For example, if our 
intrepid pioneer, limited in his knowledge of farming, tills soil incapable of producing 
anything but weeds, do we want to say that this valueless land is not (indeed, never was) 
his? If he builds his house of the wrong sort of wood, which warps, making the house 
uninhabitable, or collapsing it into a pile of useless rubble, do we want to say that he no 
longer owns it? I think we do not.4  
 A better result might be found not in a value-added approach, but rather in a 
“transformative” or “artifactual” approach along the following lines: some item, which 
was previously unowned, comes to be the property of an individual when that individual, 
through his labor, transforms that item into something it was not before—an artifact. By 
tilling the field, the pioneer transforms it into a farm. By chopping down trees, and 
                                               
4 Locke himself may have disagreed with this conclusion. He notes, “[H]e who gathered as much of the 
wild Fruit […] by placing any of his Labour on them, did thereby acquire a Propriety in them: But if they 
perished, in his Possession, without their due use […] he offended against the common Law of Nature, and 
was liable to be punished[. T]he same measures governed the Possession of Land too: [… I]f either the 
Grass of his Inclosure rotted on the Ground or the Fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and 
laying up, this part of the Earth, notwithstanding his Inclosure, was still to be looked on as Waste, and 
might be the Possession of any other.” (Locke (1698), §37-8.) (See also Waldron, Jeremy (1990). “From 
Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property” 68 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 841, 856, p. 161). It is uncertain, however, exactly why the “Waste” proviso should eliminate 
ownership, where such “Waste” has not been abandoned. Like the “scarcity” proviso, discussed below, this 
proviso does not seem to arise from Locke’s central theory of acquisition, but is either added by Locke as a 
limitation to the theory, motivated by outside considerations, or arises from the scarcity proviso—i.e., that 
waste needlessly reduces the available commons. 
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sawing the wood into planks, the pioneer transforms the trees into lumber, and, later, this 
lumber into a house. Even if the farm fails to produce crops, or the house collapses into 
useless rubble, it is nevertheless the product of the pioneer’s transformative labor, and so 
belongs to him. However, when Robert Nozick spills his can of tomato juice into the sea, 
he has not transformed the sea into something new, for the sea can survive such small-
scale changes. It is still simply the sea. Certainly such an approach would have to account 
for thresholds of transformation (once the sea is composed of half-water and half-tomato 
juice, I think we can consider it something new), and for the metaphysics of vagueness 
(what is the sea, anyway?), but at least as a skeleton, I believe this approach has merit.5 
 However, regardless of whether we take a value-added, transformative, or other 
approach to the matter, Locke’s theory of acquisition faces another challenge, noted by 
Locke in the closing clause of the passage quoted above: “at least where there is enough, 
and as good left in common for others.” In citing this restriction, which has come to be 
known as the “scarcity” proviso, Locke recognizes an inherent limit to his theory. As 
Nozick interprets the theory, “an object’s coming under one person’s ownership changes 
the situation of all others. Whereas previously they were at liberty […] to use the object, 
they now no longer are.”6 In most cases, the change of situation to most people will be 
essentially a null issue. If I gain ownership in a deposit of oil by mining it, or a deposit of 
                                               
5 And, for the aesthetician, it has some particular merit as applied to the realm of art. At least one of the 
ways that aestheticians have dealt with works such as Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) and Man Ray’s 
Gift (1921) is to note that Fountain is not, strictly speaking, a urinal, nor is Gift an iron and a bunch of 
nails. Rather, each has been transformed into a work of art. This approach, beginning with Arthur Danto’s 
The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (1981), and broadened in the various iterations of George 
Dickie’s Institutional Theory of Art, gives us a means to distinguish perceptually identical objects, and to 
distinguish artifacts from the materials of which they are composed, even where a new artifact is composed 
of nothing but a pre-existing artifact. However, while Fountain seems—at least to the aesthetician—the 
product of transformation, it seems a stretch to think of this transformation as being the result of labor, at 
least as Locke was thinking of it. 
6 Nozick (1974), p. 175. 
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water by building a well, there will still be, in most cases, oil or water available for others 
to find and use. There is, in Locke’s terms, “enough, and as good” left for others. 
Likewise, our pioneer, by obtaining property in his land by his labor has not negated 
others doing likewise, though, notably, he has restricted the liberty of others to encroach 
on his land. As Nozick interprets the matter, “Locke’s proviso […] is meant to ensure 
that the situation of others is not worsened.”7 
 Laying claim to a minute percentage of the available water in an area does restrict 
the liberty of others in a minute way, but it does not (at least noticeably) worsen their 
situation, for while water is always, strictly speaking, in limited supply, it is in most cases 
not so limited that there is not enough for everyone. Where it does become a problem, 
however, is when there is short supply—either not enough, or just enough, to go around. 
On a desert island with only one source of water, the appropriation of this well by a 
single individual would, indeed, worsen the situation of any others inhabiting the island. 
And, as such, according to the proviso, such an appropriation would be impermissible. 
The same will be true for our pioneer if he appropriates the only land in the region 
capable of supporting crops, or chops down the only trees from which dwellings might be 
built. The scarcity proviso, as such, is not a problem for Locke’s theory, as some have 
claimed, but is rather an admitted limitation to it—a limitation that does not arise from 
the theory itself (as it does not follow from his basic premises), but from overriding 
considerations.8 
The same problems that arise for our pioneer also arise when something like 
Locke’s theory of acquisition is applied to the objects of copyright. But the arena of 
                                               
7 Ibid. 
8 Most likely it directly conflicts with Locke’s law of nature that no harm shall be done to other persons. 
 225 
copyright provides problems of its own, over and above those that a transformative 
approach to a theory of acquisition might hope to alleviate. First, taken at face value, a 
system of copyright grounded on a labor-based theory of property seems to protect only 
the physical object molded by the artisan, for this is the product of his labor, as we 
normally understand it. Tom W. Bell notes in “Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and 
Patent Law” (2002): 
 
The labor-desert justification of property gives a creator clear title only to 
the particular tangible item in which he fixes his creativity—not to some 
intangible wisp of the metaphysical realm. It speaks only to the ownership 
of atoms, not to the ownership of bits. Locke himself did not try to justify 
intangible property.9 
 
Though Locke does not specifically discuss abstract objects, we might attempt to extend 
the notion of labor to include mental labor, as some have done.10 However, such an 
addendum only shifts the problem. For it seems that, if labor is what we value, so long as 
a copyist spends the labor needed to fabricate an object (mixing his labor—whether 
mental or physical—with the commons), there is little reason that he should not be free to 
do so, even if the result is simply a copy of that which is owned by another individual. 
After all, on a labor-based theory of acquisition, we would not find fault with the 
pioneer’s neighbor, who builds a farm and homestead identical with that of the pioneer, 
                                               
9 Bell, Tom W. (2002). “Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law” in Copy Fights: The Future 
of Intellectual Property in the Information Age (Adam Thierer and Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., eds.) 
(Washington, DC: Cato Institute), 3. 
10 For example, see discussion of Wheaton v. Peters (1834), below. 
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provided he has not removed, nor trespassed upon, any property of the pioneer. As 
discussed at length in Chapter Three, the properties of abstract objects differ substantially 
from those of physical objects, and a labor-desert justification of property seems ill-
equipped to deal with their ownership. 
 Further, if labor is what we value, we might imagine that, on a labor-based 
justification of property, the strength of one’s ownership is proportionate to the amount of 
labor spent: the greater the labor, the stronger the ownership.11 The reasons for this are 
not difficult to imagine. As a variation on the running case of our intrepid pioneer, 
consider a case where three brothers set about building a farm (tilling the field, 
constructing a house, etc.). Two of the brothers work hard from sun-up to sundown; the 
third putters about, doing a little work, but accomplishing little. When the brothers are 
finished building the farm, a neighbor offers to buy it from them. If the brothers accept 
the offer, it seems reasonable that the lazy brother should not receive a share of the 
payment equal to that of his brothers, for his labor paled in comparison to theirs. That is, 
his ownership is less than that of his brothers.12 But if ownership is, indeed, proportionate 
to labor spent, then in at least some circumstances, a labor-based theory of property 
would seem to extend greater protection to the copyist than to the original artist. In cases 
where what is copied makes up only a small element in some new work—a “derivative 
work” as discussed last chapter—the labor spent by the copyist will often be greater than 
that spent by the original artist, at least as regards that element copied. The same may 
                                               
11 See, for example, Hughes, Justin (1988), p. 326. 
12 Here, as a mirror to Nozick’s proposed value-added approach to Locke’s theory of acquisition, we might 
look to a labor theory of value such as that of Adam Smith, who writes, “The real price of every thing, what 
every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What 
every thing is really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for 
something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other 
people.” (Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter V.) 
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also be true, however, for more straightforward cases of copying. For example, Jackson 
Pollock’s paintings are the result of the seemingly random dripping, tossing, and 
splashing of paint. While these paintings certainly took Pollock time and effort, the 
copyist who hopes to create a perfect duplicate of Pollock’s Blue Poles (1952) will have 
to spend a greater amount of labor (perhaps physical and mental) than did Pollock 
himself, just as the forger of a signature must spend more labor than the original signator 
in creating the same signature. 
The final (and, I believe, deepest) problem with a labor-based justification for the 
intellectual property of copyright is that such a justification does not, in fact, seem to 
align with what we value in the objects of copyright, and why we tend to think they 
deserve protection. In valuing an authored work—be it painting, a film, a poem, or a 
boat-hull design—it is not the labor (or at least not solely or even predominantly the 
labor) that went into creating the work that we tend to foreground in our valuation. As 
Levinson notes in The Pleasures of Aesthetics (1996), “When all is said and done, in art 
we primarily appreciate the product, viewed in its context of production; we don’t 
primarily appreciate the activity of production, as readable from the product.”13 I suspect 
the same is true for categories of authored works that fall outside the ordinary realm of 
“art,” as well. Certainly, we might be impressed with the amount of labor that went into 
making a work, given the sheer scale of some works, but we might be equally impressed 
when the amount of labor was minimal, as in a sketch dashed off by Da Vinci or Picasso, 
                                               
13 Levinson, Jerrold (1996). The Pleasures of Aesthetics, p. 141. In its original context, Levinson uses this 
reasoning to rebuff the claims of action-type theorists such as Currie and R.G. Collingwood (for details, see 
Chapter Four: The Abstract Dimension of Authored Works). Although the action-type theorists might in 
fact value the labor in fabricating an authored work more than the final product, I believe even they would 
not forefront labor, strictly speaking, over and above other aspects that make up the “action” of creating a 
work. 
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or one of the chalk drawings illegally (and thus speedily) drawn by pop artist Keith 
Haring in the New York subway system. More than labor, we tend to appreciate 
ingenuity, vision, sensitivity, and, if we are formalists, unity, intensity, and complexity. 
Even if we wish to consider mental labor, we tend to be as impressed with (and value as 
much) a work stemming from a vision that appeared fully-formed in the mind of its 
creator as that which took months or years of mental wrestling to create. In short, what 
we tend to value in works is creativity. A theory which bases the value of works, and the 
reason for protecting them, on the labor they involve seems to miss the point. In “The 
Philosophy of Intellectual Property” (1988), Justin Hughes notes, “The labor theory of 
property does not work if one subscribes to a pure ‘eureka’ theory of idea.”14 But, of 
course, whether the idea expressed in a work appeared in a ‘eureka’ moment, or required 
years of mental effort to crystallize, it is not the idea that copyright is meant to protect, 
but the author’s expression of that idea. And, while we tend to appreciate a good idea, in 
an authored work I believe we primarily value how that idea has been ‘brought to life’ in 
the work, be it a painting, a dance, a sonnet, or a bicycle rack design. And this, I believe, 
may be why we value the efforts of copyists less than that of original creators, even where 
their labor outstrips that of such creators. 
Natural-rights bases to copyright have traditionally tended to hold sway in 
Europe, and so it should not be entirely surprising that in the early days of American 
copyright, and even occasionally today, arguments invoking the Lockean approach find 
                                               
14 Hughes, Justin (1988), p. 300. Hughes goes on to argue that, regardless of the mental effort required to 
come up with the idea expressed in the work, the expression of that work requires labor. I see no reason to 
challenge him on this insight, though, again, I feel it misses the point of why we tend to value the objects of 
copyright. 
 229 
their way into legal decisions.15 In the case of Jeweler’s Circular Publishing Co. v. 
Keystone Publishing Co. (1922) (alleging infringement by the defendant of elements of 
the plaintiff’s professional index of jewelry trade-marks), Justice Rogers argues: 
 
The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its 
preparation does not depend upon whether the materials which he has 
collected consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or whether such 
materials show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in language, 
or anything more than industrious collection. The man who goes through 
the streets of a town and puts down the names of each of the inhabitants, 
with their occupations and their street number, acquires material of which 
he is the author.16 
 
Rogers’ claim reflects the view of Justice Thomson in the earlier, ground-breaking case 
of Wheaton v. Peters (1834). The details of the case involve Richard Peters and Henry 
Wheaton, both reporters for the United States Supreme Court, the former having replaced 
the latter. Peters sought to publish a series of “Condensed Reports” of decisions of the 
Supreme Court, including condensed versions of reports earlier published by his 
predecessor, Wheaton. Though Wheaton’s legal copyright had expired, he sought to 
establish a “common law” claim that he owned a copyright in the works infringed as a 
matter of natural law. Justice Thomson states: 
                                               
15 There is also a recognizable contingent of legal thinkers who advocate a Lockean or neo-Lockean 
approach to copyright and other intellectual property. In particular, see Gordon, Wendy J. (1993); 
Damstedt, Benjamin G. (2003). “Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine” 
112 Yale Law Journal 1179. 
16 Jeweler’s Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922). 
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The great principle on which the author’s rights rests, is, that it is the fruit 
or production of his own labour, and which may, by the labour of the 
faculties of the mind, establish a right of property, as well as by the 
faculties of the body; and it is difficult to perceive any well founded 
objection to such a claim of right. It is founded upon the soundest 
principles of justice, equity and public policy.17 
 
Unfortunately for Thomson, his argument forms the dissent to the court decision, wherein 
the majority found that a broad “common law” copyright based on a claim of natural 
rights would result in an undesirable sort of monopoly. As such, Thomson’s dissent 
serves as the elegy to a natural-rights basis to American copyright law. Wheaton v. Peters 
established, at least as far as U.S. courts are concerned, the basic principle of American 
copyright law that ownership of copyright is the result of statute, and not of any natural 
right.18 In particular, copyright arises in American law as a statutory right based on 
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which establishes copyright as an 
instrumental right, a means of achieving an optimal distribution of interests.19 
                                               
17 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834), Justice Thomson dissenting. 
18 Justice Rogers’ decision in Jeweler’s Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co. contradicted 
this principle, but established a competing principle that would come to be known as the “sweat of the 
brow” doctrine or the principle of “industrious collection”. Although enjoying a surprisingly healthy 
longevity, the “sweat of the brow” doctrine would eventually be soundly declared to contradict the 
Copyright Act by Justice O’Connor in his decision in the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co 499 U.W. 340 (1991)—see Chapter One for further discussion on this case.  
19 It should be noted that with its joining the international Berne Convention, the U.S. was forced to 
recognize certain “moral rights” of authors in its copyright law. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention 
provides: “Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the 
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or 
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to 
his honor or reputation.” These rights, however, are treated in U.S. law as detached from the basis of 
copyright itself, and are further recognized only with regard to works of “visual art,” defined by the Visual 
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Copyright as an Instrumental Right: The U.S. Constitution 
As outlined in Chapter One, the right of copyright officially arises in U.S. law from the 
passage of the U.S. Constitution that has come to be known as the “intellectual property 
clause” or the “copyright clause”: 
 
The Congress shall have power . . . to Promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 
 
There has been, in the history of interpreting this passage, much quibbling over the 
precise language used by James Madison, who introduced the clause into the 
Constitution. In particular, it has been generally noted that “useful Arts” refers not to 
painting, literature, and the like, but to more technologically-oriented endeavors—in 
other words, to science. Conversely, “Science” in this passage is regularly taken to refer 
to our more contemporary notion of the arts. That is, we associate “Inventors” in this 
passage with “Discoveries” and the “useful Arts”, and “Authors” with “Writings”20 and 
“Science”. The domain of the former became the basis of U.S. patent law, and latter of 
U.S. copyright law. However, it should be noted, even given the peculiarities of 
eighteenth-century English, “Science” has never referred to the arts in particular—indeed, 
                                                                                                                                            
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (encoded in the Copyright Act as §106A with definitions in §101) as including 
paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and photographs, existing in a single copy or a limited edition of 
200 signed and numbered copies or fewer, and of these, protecting only works of “recognized stature.” 
20 The term “Writings” has been given very liberal breadth in the history of U.S. copyright law. Originally, 
it included only protection for books, maps, and charts (even then stretching the notion of “Writings”). 
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even then “science” was contrasted with “art”.21 The term “science”, of course, had 
nearly as many meanings two centuries ago as it has today. It seems most likely that what 
Madison meant by “Science” was a body of knowledge.22 That is, Constitutionally 
speaking, the right of copyright possessed by authors exists to promote the progress of 
mankind’s body of knowledge—or, to put the matter a slightly different way, ‘to expand 
the marketplace of ideas.’23 
 As thus described, a claim over one’s authored works does not arise from a 
natural right in the work, but is rather a gift that the government bestows on its authors as 
an incentive to promote society’s pool of knowledge. This thinking behind intellectual 
property as a socially-mandated, instrumental right is reflected in the writings of Thomas 
Jefferson. Although Jefferson is writing specifically about patent, his pattern of thought 
reflects also the traditional thinking behind U.S. copyright: 
 
Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the progress 
of society. […] Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising 
from [inventions], as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may 
produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the will and 
convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from anybody.24 
 
                                               
21 The Oxford English Dictionary provides this etymological example from 1796: “Kirwan Elem. Min. (ed. 
2) I. Pref ii. Previous to the year 1780, mineralogy, though tolerably understood by many as an art, could 
scarce be deemed a Science.” 
22 Again from the OED: “Cowper Conversation 14. As alphabets in ivory employ, Hour after hour, the yet 
unletter’d boy, Sorting and puzzling with a deal of glee Those seeds of science called his A B C.” (1781) 
23 This particular turn of phrase is used by Donald L. Diefenbach in “The Constitutional and Moral 
Justifications for Copyright” Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 1994), pp. 225-235. 
24 Letter by Thomas Jefferson to Isaac MacPherson, August 13, 1813, reprinted in Jefferson, Thomas 
(1984). Writings, p. 1286. 
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We want authors to pursue ideas because ideas are themselves, valuable, perhaps both 
instrumentally and intrinsically (Jefferson focuses on the former), not merely to the 
author but to society at large. Fewer authors implies fewer ideas. By offering protection 
to authors as a reward for their work, the state encourages the growth of the marketplace 
of ideas, thus achieving an optimal distribution of interests. 
In his seminal work, Code: and other laws of cyberspace (1999), Lawrence 
Lessig puts the standard view succinctly: “[E]ven if some authors write for free, it is still 
the case that the law needs some intellectual property rights. If the law did not protect the 
author at all, there would be fewer authors.”25 And, with fewer authors, one can assume, 
fewer ideas being contributed to the marketplace. Granted, in principle, existing as they 
do in the commons, ideas are always available to all, but expressing ideas has an 
exponential-growth tendency. The creation of some new work makes available not only 
the ideas of that author, but opens up the possibilities of new ideas stemming from those. 
In this way providing incentive to create the new work seems clearly in society’s best 
interests. 
Clearly, however, not all works protected by copyright expand the marketplace of 
ideas. Without a requirement of novelty, copyright provides protection for many works 
that may, in fact, contribute little-to-nothing to the pool of knowledge or ideas available 
to mankind. That is, not all authored works contribute to this desirable end. Indeed, as 
stated in the Constitution, copyright is granted to promote the “Progress of Science” by 
securing the exclusive right to authors, that is, not merely to authors whose works do in 
fact promote such progress. Granting such rights only to those who in fact will expand 
the marketplace of ideas would require not only unusual sensitivity to the nature of 
                                               
25 Lessig, Lawrence (1999). Code: and other laws of cyberspace, p. 133. 
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authored works (and extensive knowledge of their history), but also an impossible 
predictive power. This latter, of course, is a regular thorn in the side of act-
consequentialist reasoning. Rather, the thinking behind copyright seems to be that, by 
protecting the sort of product that tends to bring about this good, the government serves 
society’s best interests. 
 But, we might ask, is offering protection to the author necessary to promote this 
activity? That is, without recognition of copyright, would the proliferation of works, and 
so the growing pool of knowledge and ideas, slow down and eventually dry up? David G. 
Post argues in “His Napster’s Voice” (2002) that the Internet serves as a telling case 
study of what a copyright-free world would look like: 
 
We know how much creative activity we’d get if there were little or no 
copyright protection in cyberspace, because there has been, in effect, little 
or no copyright protection in cyberspace. As the recording industry itself 
keeps reminding us, copyrights are routinely flouted on the global 
network, copyright “piracy” is rampant Over There; nobody in his right 
mind would voluntarily make information available on the global network 
in the expectation that copyright law will protect that information (and any 
lawyer who has been advising clients otherwise is probably guilty of 
malpractice). 
 So a “copyright-free” cyberspace would look much like what 
cyberspace looks like today. 
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And what does it look like? It looks to me like the greatest 
outpouring of creative activity in a short span of time that the world has 
ever seen.26 
 
Putting aside the fact that Post mistakes a case of rampant crime as one of no crime, his 
overall point stands: with full knowledge that anything they put on the Internet, if 
worthwhile, is likely to be copied, plagiarized, and otherwise infringed, people continue 
to post essays, photographs, art, movies, and countless other works to their websites and 
those of others. And somehow, without any expectation of protection, this outpouring of 
works onto the World Wide Web only continues to increase. And while infringement is 
rampant, one would be hard-pressed to claim that here has been any decrease in the rate 
at which works are added to the body of works available to mankind, and thereby ideas to 
the marketplace. 
 Of course, the Internet is not a copyright-free zone, however much infringers 
might treat it like one. That said, we can easily look back not so far to the time before 
works were protected by copyright law. Long before the state offered protection for 
authored works, such works flourished. Certainly, Chaucer and his contemporaries were 
not protected by copyright,27 and neither were the works of Shakespeare,28 Bach, or 
                                               
26 Post, David G. (2002). “His Napster’s Voice” in Copy Fights: The Future of Intellectual Property in the 
Information Age (Adam Thierer and Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., eds.) (Washington, DC: Cato Institute), p. 
115. Post is certainly correct in saying that a lawyer who advised his client that the information he put on 
the Internet would be protected by copyright would be guilty of malpractice, but for more reasons that he 
states: Post and many of his Libertarian compatriots spin their arguments by referring to copyright as a 
protection for “information” or “ideas”. As we know, of course, it is no such thing. 
27 Britain’s Stationer’s Company’s printing monopoly—the predecessor to the 1709 Statute of Anne—did 
not come into effect until 1557, and would not have protected Chaucer, anyway, but only his publisher. 
28 The Stationer’s Company monopoly and the Statute of Anne protected only published works, not 
performed ones. 
 236 
Monteverdi.29 Indeed, musical recordings were not protected in the United States until 
1972, but a lack of such protection did not prevent the birth and rise of Rock and Roll in 
the 1950s and ’60s, nor any of its musical successors, despite the dependence on the 
recording industry, and the availability of reel-to-reel and, later, more inexpensive 
cassette tape recorders, that allowed for easy copying of vinyl albums.30 
Arguing that a Lockean view is commensurable with the view that copyright is an 
instrumental right, Justin Hughes notes, “In an understanding of labor based on the notion 
of ‘avoidance,’ labor is defined as an unpleasant activity not desirable in and of itself and 
even painful to some degree. [… T]he instrumental argument […] proposes that the 
unpleasantness of labor should be rewarded with property because people must be 
motivated to perform labor.”31 That is, because works require labor to create, and labor is 
something we wish to avoid if we can, if authors were not motivated by the promise of 
‘rights,’ society as a whole would be deprived of new works, and thus to the ideas 
contained therein. However, this is again clearly not the case, as both pre-copyright 
history and the growing proliferation of works disseminated on the Internet indicate. 
 So it seems questionable that granting the right of copyright is necessary to 
promote the creation of new works, and thus to expand the marketplace of ideas. Though 
perhaps unnecessary, it may nevertheless be sufficient for such ends. However, even this 
much seems suspect. Tom G. Palmer notes that copyright protection may, at least in some 
cases, actually decrease innovation, rather than increase it. In particular, Palmer cites 
                                               
29 Continental copyright arises during the period of the French Revolution, prior to which existed 
monopolies similar to that of the Stationer’s Company in England, again covering only printed books and 
the like. Certainly, musical and operatic works were not protected. 
30 Reel-to-reel tape recorders had been commercially available since the 1940s. Phillips introduced the 
“compact cassette” in 1963. 
31 Hughes, Justin (1988), p. 303. Locke himself refers to labor synonymously with “Pains.” See, for 
example, §34 of Two Treatises, Book II.  
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Shakespeare’s rewriting of Thomas Kyd’s play, The Spanish Tragedy, thus giving us 
Hamlet.32 Had the modern form of U.S. copyright applied to Kyd’s play, Shakespeare 
may have been (legally) prevented from writing what is generally considered to be one of 
the greatest works of English literature. Indeed, while copyright protection likely bears 
some relation to the growth of the man’s pool of ideas, this relationship is clearly not as 
simple as a case of necessary and/or sufficient conditions. 
Like the Lockean justification for copyright, the view of copyright as an 
instrumental right (as formulated in U.S. law) seems to neglect recognition for any value 
of the works themselves. Indeed, it seems reasonable to conjecture, the instrumental right 
that adheres to authored works does so because of their instrumental value. On such a 
basis, however, it seems unclear why equal protection should not be offered for the 
authors of speeches, improvised jazz performances, and, indeed, ordinary conversation, 
which would equally tend to enrich the marketplace of ideas.33 What tends to distinguish 
the class of authored works from other means of conveying information such as ordinary 
conversation, is that in the former cases, we value the works not only for the ideas they 
contain or information they provide, but (perhaps primarily) for the ways that they do so. 
That is, to value an authored work is centrally to value it as an expression. New York 
Times contributor Mark Helprin makes the point, “Mozart and Neil Diamond may have 
                                               
32 Palmer, Tom G. (2002). “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?” in Copy Fights: The Future of 
Intellectual Property in the Information Age (Adam Thierer and Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., eds.) 
(Washington, DC: Cato Institute), p. 68; ff.127. Although there are certainly substantial differences 
between Hamlet and The Spanish Tragedy, the similarities are probably substantial enough that Hamlet 
would have failed Judge Learned Hand’s “pattern” test, discussed in Chapters One and Two. 
33 As noted in earlier chapters, we do often attribute ownership (or at least origin) to the ideas, whether 
publicized through published papers or simply open conversation. However, the distinction to be made here 
is between the idea and its expression. Claims over ideas are particularly recognized in issues of plagiarism 
which, while often related to issues of copyright, do not fall within a legal domain. Nevertheless, this 
central distinction is often blurred to rhetorical effect in the arguments of copyright libertarians discussed 
throughout this chapter. 
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begun with the same idea, but that a work of art is more than an idea is confirmed by the 
difference between the ‘Soave sia il vento’ and ‘Kentucky Woman.’”34 
 Responding to views like that of Jefferson, above, Ayn Rand contends, “The 
government does not ‘grant’ a patent or copyright, in the sense of a gift, privilege, or 
favor; the government merely secures it.”35 Rand professes some strange and often 
untenable views on intellectual property,36 but her point here seems correct, and indeed 
reflects the language used in the Constitution. Although its reasoning for doing so may 
not be sound, we do not question that the government secures property rights through the 
law, be they rights to physical property, or rights to authored works. Siva Vaidhyanathan 
echoes Rand’s view, “[T]he public understanding of property is more fundamental, more 
exclusive, more natural, and precedes specific policy choices the state may make about 
its regulation and dispensation.”37 The government’s securing such property rights does 
not indicate that such rights did not already exist to be secured by the law; rather, the 
contrary. The views of copyright as a natural right and of copyright as an instrumental 
right are not in principle mutually exclusive. In general, advocates of the Lockean 
position tend not to argue that copyright has no instrumental value. And conversely, 
advocates of the instrumental argument tend not to attack the natural-rights view directly, 
but instead point to the advantages of the Constitutional approach, particularly the 
                                               
34 Helprin, Mark. “A Great Idea Lives Forever. Shouldn’t Its Copyright?”  The New York Times (New 
York) 20 May 2007. In the world of newspaper publishing, headlines and article titles tend to be written by 
editors rather than the writers of the articles themselves, thus perhaps explaining the apparent disconnect 
between this article’s title and the material quoted. 
35 Rand, Ayn (1966). “Patents and Copyrights” in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, p. 126. 
36 Strange in that Rand contends intellectual property is the sine qua non of property rights generally (Ibid., 
125); untenable in that Rand contends copyright protection is protection over ideas (Ibid.).  
37 Vaidhyanathan, Siva (2003). Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it 
Threatens Creativity, p. 253. 
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“balance” struck between authors and the public.38 Indeed, the two views seem largely 
complementary.39 Unfortunately, however, neither seems capable of making up for the 
shortcomings of the other. In particular, neither the Lockean nor the Constitutional 
approach seems to base the right of copyright in what it is we value in the works. Indeed, 
each view on copyright seems at best incidental to the nature of its objects, their creation, 
and their creators. 
 
Copyright as a Creative Right: A Variation on Locke 
What is missing from both of the views discussed above is a basic reflection of what it is 
we value in the works we are protecting. What we primarily value is not the labor 
expended by authors, nor the ideas they communicate, but the means by which they 
communicate them: the choices of words, colors, shapes, sounds, and their arrangement 
in the works.40  As an author, intuitively, what an individual gains a right to is not the 
product of his labor, but rather the product of his creativity.  
Similar to the “transformative” or “artifactual” approach to Lockean natural rights 
I proposed earlier this chapter, the rights of the author seem to arise because the work 
created by the author did not exist prior to his authorial activity. Granted, the basic 
atomic elements used to construct the work—colors, shapes, sounds, words—existed 
prior to the work’s creation, but what did not exist was the particular selection and 
                                               
38 This balance is further sought in the fair use doctrine and limited term of copyright, both of which will be 
discussed below. 
39 This is a view argued for at length by Justin Hughes, discussed above.  
40 This is not to say that we do not value the ideas or labor expended by authors, but that such value is not 
the primary value of the work per se. In the case of two works communicating identical ideas, generally we 
will consider more valuable the work that does a better job of communicating the idea. This will perhaps be 
clearest where we have on hand two translations of some work. The “better” translation would seem to be 
the one that better brings across the author’s ideas (which is not necessarily to say that it does so with more 
clarity).  
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arrangement of such elements as made by that author. The work created by the author—
be it a painting, a symphony, a novel, or an architectural design—will always be 
composed of unownable elements, but these elements, by the author’s creative activity, 
have been arranged into something new. What the author has a right to are not the atomic 
elements used to construct the work, nor necessarily the physical object or objects that 
embody the work, but the result of that creative construction: his arrangement and 
selection. 
On this basis, let us sketch a variation on the Lockean position appropriate for the 
objects of copyright: As with the Lockean view, I contend that one has a sole right to, and 
property in, one’s own person. However, unlike that considered by Locke, the common 
that concerns us here includes such unowned and/or unownable things as shapes and 
colors, sounds and words, and also facts and ideas. As with the physical commons, these 
items are not owned by anyone; rather, they are free for use by anyone who so chooses, 
and inherently undepletable. By selecting and arranging these unownable elements (the 
creative act), one lays claim to the result (the authored work), and so gains a right in it—
a claim against all others. 
On this basis, the object that the author has a right to is not the physical object that 
embodies the work, but the abstract object so embodied. Where rights-claims to physical 
property bar certain uses and not others, the same is true of rights-claims to the objects of 
copyright. The difference in what uses are prohibited arises from differences in the nature 
of the respective objects. A pioneer’s right to physical property such as his farmstead 
does not preclude others from taking aesthetic pleasure in it or studying it from a 
distance, although both certainly constitute uses of his property. Rather, the pioneer’s 
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right is found in the duty that others not trespass upon it, or generally interfere with his 
exclusive right to exploit it as physical property—to occupy it and to work or develop it. 
The central right to an authored work, thus, is parallel, but different: the author’s right is 
found in the duty that others not interfere with his exclusive right to exploit it as an 
abstract object. Abstract objects, unlike physical objects, are multiply instantiable. 
Unlike physical property, intellectual property is not something one can trespass upon. 
Rather, one exploits an abstract object by instantiating it, in short, by making a token of 
the type.  
Just as taking aesthetic pleasure in, or studying, another individual’s physical 
property does not interfere with his exclusive right to occupy it, reading a book or 
watching a film does not interfere with the copyright owner’s exclusive right to 
instantiate his creation. And so such activities should not be forbidden (nor, in most 
cases, would a copyright-owner want them to be). However, several other activities do 
interfere with the copyright owner’s exclusive right to instantiate his creation, including: 
• Outright copying of the work, regardless of the method of doing so: by 
photocopying or retyping a literary work; by photographing and printing a 
copy of a pre-existing photograph; by duplicating a videotape, CD, or 
DVD; or by recreating a painting or sculpture from scratch. 
• In cases of dramatic or musical works, performing, or broadcasting a 
performance of, the work. 
• Creating a derivative work that instantiates elements of the original work, 
such as its plot, characters, melodies, or other such higher-order elements 
that arise from the selection and arrangement of the author, and are not 
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reducible to the unownable elements of the commons. This includes such 
works as film adaptations and novelizations, translations, and sequels to 
narrative works. 
Each of these activities constitutes infringement, as outlined last chapter. That is, in each 
case, the resultant item possesses both (i) atomic similarity to the copyrighted work, and 
(ii) a strong historical link operating over the property or properties held in common 
between the two works.41 
Natural rights theorists diverge with regard to which human attributes they 
contend give rise to rights, though most commonly these include rationality, free will, 
and autonomy—attributes commonly associated with moral personhood. The nature of 
creativity is a much-discussed topic, but in this sketch of a theory, I want only to say that 
the right to the products of one’s creativity, as realized in an authored work, likely arises 
from man’s rational, autonomous capacity to reform the world around him, and so to 
create new objects (both physical and abstract). And it is the same capacity that enables 
man to infringe upon these same rights in others. The same capacity, I suspect, is at play 
in Locke’s own theory, and so the fact that my approach formally parallels his should not 
be surprising. The primary difference lies in what sorts of objects this capacity is directed 
towards, and so to how each right is defined. As my view of copyright as a creative right 
formally parallels that of the Lockean position, however, it seems in danger of collapsing 
under the weight of the same problems. As such, let us consider the problems discussed 
above in turn. 
                                               
41 Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act lays out six exclusive rights that arise in copyright ownership (see 
Cohen et al. (2006b), pp. 17-18). The rights I directly derive here from copyright as a creative right cover 
four of those specified in the Act. The other two rights specified in the Act pertain to sale and rental, and 
public display, of copyrighted works. As these are rights over the physical objects, and not the work itself, I 
would not make the claim that such rights arise directly from my basis of copyright. 
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First, the standard Lockean position, on face value, seems only able to justify 
rights in a physical object. While a right based on creativity would seem to grant rights to 
certain physical objects, such a right would in fact not be a right to the physical objects, 
but to the abstract objects that those physical objects embody. That is, by slathering paint 
onto a canvas, or chiseling a shape from a block of stone, one creates two things: a new 
physical object and a new abstract object. This is provided the painting or sculpture 
represents the first token of a new type. The right of copyright covers only that which is 
embodied. If a Lockean natural rights claim can be justified, however, it may cover the 
physical object (the painting or the sculpture) that is also created. Creating the abstract 
object centrally involves creativity; creating the physical object centrally involves labor. 
The two should not be confused.42 However, if the Lockean position is sound, then the 
artist has distinct rights claims over each. 
Now, where we are concerned not with the original author, but with a copyist, an 
interesting result arises: by copying some pre-existing work, the copyist infringes the 
right of the author. Since he cannot lay claim to having created the abstract object—the 
type—he cannot claim a right to it. However, as he spent the labor required to copy the 
work (whether by using a photocopier, retyping a literary work, repainting a pre-existing 
painting from scratch, or otherwise), he can perhaps (at least on Lockean principles) 
make a property claim in the physical object embodying the abstract one. The copyist 
may indeed have a right to the product of his labor (the manuscript, painting, or other 
work that is the result of his labor), but not to the work that it embodies. And so, even if 
                                               
42 Granted, in most cases, one will create the abstract object by creating the physical object, or at the same 
time as creating the physical object. However, this does not mean that the creation of one is the creation of 
the other. The difference becomes apparent when we consider the second instantiation of the abstract 
object, which, while involving labor requires no creativity as we have been considering it. 
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the Lockean argument for natural rights in physical property is sound, the right to the 
products of one’s creativity does not displace the right to the products of one’s labor. 
Given the differences in their nature, the abstract, embodied object and the physical, 
embodying object have different bases to ownership claims, and a right to claim 
ownership in one does not therefore bring about a right to claim ownership in the other. 
The second problem for the standard Lockean position is that it seems to indicate 
that, so long as a copyist spends the labor needed to fabricate a new object, there is little 
reason that he should not be free to do so. Since we are dealing now with a right based on 
creativity, and not labor, the parallel would seem to be: so long as one exhibits the 
creativity needed to bring into existence a new type, there is little reason that he should 
not be free to do so. This much seems absolutely correct. My notion of creativity in no 
way precludes two or more individuals from selecting the same elements from the 
commons and putting them in the same arrangement (as in my examples of the identical 
haikus and photographs of the Grand Canyon). All that my view disallows is copying the 
pre-existing work, for doing so does not result in the creation of a new type, but rather in 
the entokening of a pre-existing type, which is already subject to copyright ownership. 
Bringing into existence a new physical object is enough to distinguish it from pre-
existing physical objects; but the same does not necessarily distinguish any abstract 
objects embodied in the new physical object from those embodied elsewhere.  
Finally, on the standard Lockean position, as I stated, it would be reasonable to 
contend that the strength of one’s ownership claims is proportional to the labor spent on 
that object. As discussed, this is an undesirable and counterintuitive basis for copyright. 
Where this is a problem for the Lockean position, however, its parallel seems an entirely 
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welcome upshot for my own. The parallel claim for my view would be that the strength 
of one’s ownership claim over an authored work is proportional to the creativity 
exhibited by the author.43 Where an individual copies an entire work, his creative 
contribution is nil, for nothing in the work is the result of his independent selection and 
arrangement of elements from the commons.44 Where he copies and modifies the work, 
however, he can reasonably claim ownership over those aspects that result from his 
modifications—those elements he selected and arranged. Such is the case with derivative 
works. When a filmmaker adapts a literary work for the screen, he cannot lay claim to 
having created the story present in the original source, but he can claim ownership of 
what he introduced into the work—how the story would be brought visually to the screen, 
any modifications made to the story, the adjoining of certain musical selections to certain 
parts of the story, and so on. The rights the filmmaker has are to these elements alone, as 
these are the elements that result from his selection and arrangement. The rest belong to 
the original copyright-owners, and so they will retain a certain degree of copyright in the 
film adaptation. The same will be true for the academic who publishes an annotated 
edition of someone else’s work, the literary enthusiast who translates another’s German 
text into English, and similarly for other derivative works. 
With these problems thus allayed—indeed, in some cases turned from problems 
into assets for my view—let us turn to what is by many considered to be the most serious 
problem for the Lockean justification for physical property rights, and see if we can do 
                                               
43 Creativity, here, should not be taken as equivalent to novelty, or to be aesthetically value-laden. Rather, 
the creativity exhibited by the author should be taken to be selection and arrangement of properties and/or 
entities to form some new entity. 
44 It might be argued that this individual has at least selected something, viz. the work created by the 
original author. However, unlike the original author, the copyist is not as such selecting unownable 
elements for the commons, but something already owned by the original author. 
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likewise. The problem I speak of is the one that Locke attempts to allay with his 
“scarcity” proviso: that the acquisition of property by individuals always serves to deplete 
the commons. The physical commons is, by its very nature, rivalrous. Even if the loss to 
others is often imperceptible, one’s annexing of property always restricts the liberty of 
others: where they were previously free to walk upon some portion of land, with 
another’s annexing of that land, they are now restricted from doing so. Locke introduces 
his proviso as a restriction to the scope of his theory: that, so long as an individual’s 
annexing such property does not harm others, such a property claim is justified. But, of 
course, it might be reasonably argued that, at least in some minute way, property 
acquisition always harms others. It does so by restricting their liberty—by restricting 
some freedom they previously enjoyed. 
 Some have attempted to argue that copyright and other intellectual property rights 
do very much the same thing: 
 
Because it […] gags our voices, ties our hands, and demolishes our 
presses, the law of copyrights and patents violates the very rights that 
Locke defended.45 
* * * 
[P]roperty rights in patents and copyright make possible the creation of a 
scarcity of the products appropriated which could not otherwise be 
maintained.46 
* * * 
                                               
45 Bell (2002), p. 4. 
46 Plant, Arnold (1974). “The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions” in Selected Economic 
Essays and Addresses, p.56. 
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[P]atent and copyright monopolies interfere with the freedom of others to 
use their own bodies or their own justly acquired property in certain ways. 
[… A] copyright over a musical composition means that others cannot use 
their mouths to blow air in certain sequences and in certain ways into 
musical instruments they own without obtaining the permission of the 
copyright holder.47 
 
Unlike the annexing of property from the commons, while the creation and copyrighting 
of an authored work draws from the public commons, it in no way depletes it. There is 
always “enough, and as good left in common for others.” Benjamin G. Damstedt makes 
the point: 
 
The most important difference between the common of intangible goods 
and the common of tangible goods is the nonrivalrous nature of the 
undeveloped intangible materials in the former. Nonrivalry means that 
there is infinite allocative capacity of materials contained in the common 
of intangible goods.48 
 
Moreover, following the approach I have sketched, and given our understanding of what 
an authored work is, the public at large has no fewer freedoms following the copyrighting 
of some work than they had prior to that copyrighting. Put another way, such creations do 
                                               
47 Palmer (2002), pp. 72, 77. In his article, Palmer distinguishes between the restriction of “liberty” and the 
restriction of “action”, focusing here on how copyright and patent do the latter. For our general 
understanding of liberty, however, I believe it would include freedom to act in certain ways. 
48 Damstedt, Benjamin G. (2003), p. 1191. 
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not make members of the public worse off than they were beforehand. They remain free 
to pillage the commons as much as they were before; they remain free to write precisely 
the same words in precisely the same order as in the copyrighted work. All that they are 
restricted from doing is copying the work—which they could not have done before the 
work existed (and so was copyrighted) in the first place. Indeed, the public gains the 
freedom to use the new work in ways not restricted by the right of copyright, such as the 
freedom to read or view the published work.49 
 There are, undoubtedly, a host of commonplace cases in which some may feel 
they are permitted to infringe copyright as I have described it, without doing anything 
wrong. Before moving on, let us consider a couple of these possible exceptions to my 
theory, so sketched. First, let us consider the case of an individual who has legitimately 
purchased a copy of another’s copyrighted work—a CD, for instance. Wishing to have a 
copy for his home and a copy to play in his car, he duplicates the CD. It may be argued 
that the copyist who duplicates a copy of a work already in his possession, and does not 
sell or give away the duplicate to another individual (who might otherwise purchase a 
sanctioned copy), does no harm to the copyright owner, and so does nothing wrong. At 
first glance, this seems a reasonable basis to a claim that the copyist is blameless in his 
actions.  
 It may, however, be argued that the illicit copy represents a copy that could have 
been purchased by the copyist, and so the copyist has harmed the copyright owner by 
infringing the copyright rather than purchasing a copy. On such thinking, the money not 
                                               
49 Notably, other objects of intellectual property—particularly those of patent—do seem to substantially 
restrict the freedom of the public in ways that copyright does not. I will return to this issue below, in 
discussing the expiration of copyright. 
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paid to the copyright owner is, indeed, a harm, for it is a harm of omission.50 However, I 
would contend that copyright (both in current U.S. law, and as I have reconstructed it) is 
not, at base, a financially-charged right. Granted, the exclusive right to copyright held by 
the author may be exploited for financial gain, but this is not the purpose of copyright per 
se, and so claiming the copyist has done anything wrong by depriving the copyright-
owner of funds will be incidental to the claim of a wrong done in infringing the copyright 
itself.  
 Normally, where the actions of one individual harm another, he is expected to pay 
restitution to “right the wrong.” However, we still do not want to allow others to 
harmfully use our property even if they pay for all the damages caused. That is, it seems 
wrong for another to infringe our property rights, even provided he pays restitution for, 
and thus negates, all the damages caused to the property. The wrong of infringement 
seems to be over and above any damages caused.  
Let us consider a parallel case in the realm of physical property. Where an 
individual owns some property, say, a house, and so enjoys the exclusive right to exploit 
it, I believe we want to say that a trespasser who, having been given permission to do so 
on one occasion, thereafter sneaks into the house each night through an unlocked window 
and sleeps on the floor, departing each morning before the property-owner is aware, 
infringes the property owner’s right, even if the trespassing causes him no perceptible 
harm. The wrong perpetrated by the trespasser is not, at base, a harm to the property of 
the homeowner; rather, I contend, it is a wrong insofar as such action violates his 
                                               
50 Here, it might also be contended that in some cases publishers have built into the price of their products 
an expectation that users will illicitly share it with others. As well, many countries have built into the price 
of CDs, cassette tapes, and other copy-ready products a “private copying levy” or “blank media tax” which 
is then disseminated to those publishers of copyrighted material most commonly infringed using those 
products. Such levies range from $0.21 per CD-R/RW disk in Canada to up to $0.76 per disk in Finland. 
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exclusive rights. If it constitutes a “harm,” it is one such that it restricts his exclusive 
privileges to exploit his property. The same, I contend, would be true for the copyist who 
violates the copyright-owner’s exclusive right to exploit his intellectual property by 
making a copy of the work where such an action itself seems to cause no damage to the 
work or to its owner. Possession of a single copy of a work, or even having been given 
permission to copy the work a single time, does not thereby invest one with the right or 
privilege to make multiple copies.51 
 Our copyist may respond, “But there is no reason I should pay for another copy 
when I can just make it on my own.” The reply is clear: “While you are making a copy or 
instantiating the work on your own, and so can perhaps lay claim to the product of your 
labor, such labor does not give you any right over the work being copied.” As discussed 
above, the copyist may, indeed, lay claim to the physical property he produces (whether a 
CD, a handwritten copy of a manuscript, or other), for without his labor, the physical 
object would not exist. What he cannot lay claim to, however, is the abstract object that it 
embodies, for he is responsible for none of the creativity that brought it into existence.  
 A second familiar claim to permissive infringement is put deftly by New York 
Times columnist Randy Cohen: 
 
Although copying an entire work is seldom legal, it is sometimes ethical—
for example, if the work is unavailable for purchase (most books ever 
published are now out of print); if it is available only in an archaic format 
                                               
51 My contention here is nothing new. In the groundbreaking British copyright case of Donaldson v. Beckett 
(2 Brown's Parl. Cases 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837; 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774)), counsel for the 
defense argued, “It was absurd to imagine, that either a sale, a loan, or a gift of a book, carried with it an 
implied right of multiplying copies.” (Cobbett, William (1813). The Parliamentary History of England 
from the Earliest Period 1066 to the Year 1803, Vol. XVII (London: T.C. Hansard), p. 965) 
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(a 78-r.p.m. recording, a Betamax tape, a clay tablet); if you already own a 
copy and want another in a more usable format (less scratchy, fewer 
coffee stains).52 
 
On its face, Cohen’s claim seems appealing. On more than one occasion, I have tried to 
find a copy of a film for purchase and have been dismayed to learn that the film has not 
been released in a modern format. Many albums originally released on vinyl, too, are 
unavailable for sale as CDs or other digital format. Many books go out of print shortly 
after their release, and can thereafter only be purchased by hunting down a tattered, used 
copy. And, of course, given limited supply, such out-of-print films, recordings, and books 
tend to be very highly priced. Given the possibility of doing so, many, like Cohen, feel 
that making usable copies where such are not otherwise readily available is an obviously 
permissible act. But, we might ask, should this be considered the case? 
If I create a song, and feel that it is important to the work that it should only ever 
be available in an obsolete format (8-track cassette, for instance), why should this not be 
my right? Though unwanted by many, other music enthusiasts prefer the audible hiss, 
“clicks,” and “pops” that accompany play of vinyl records to the “slick” and “clean” 
sound of digital audio. And so it is not surprising that some musicians recorded their 
works with such limitations to the recording media in mind. Indeed, this principle seems 
in part to have inspired the “lo-fi” movement in contemporary music. To copy such a 
work into another format seems to directly defy the artist’s design for the work, and 
certainly his exclusive right to instantiate the work. Similarly, as a writer, I may desire 
that my work only be published in some particular periodical (if it is an article) or binding 
                                               
52 Cohen, Randy. “The Ethicist” The New York Times Magazine (New York) 8 October 2006. 
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(if it is a longer work), feeling that the context in which the work is read is integral to the 
experience of the work,53 or in some predetermined limited printing.  Where such is the 
case, to copy the work into another format, or even in the same format, against my 
wishes, certainly seems to disrespect me and my work. And it also certainly infringes my 
copyright (both as laid out in current U.S. law, and in my own theory). Contrary to 
Cohen’s claims, I would thus contend that copying an entire work without the permission 
of the copyright owner, even in the sorts of cases Cohen considers, is unethical. Where an 
out-of-print work is still protected by copyright, the copyright owner has the option to re-
release it. Where he does not do so, such is his choice, whatever his reasons. In the 
modern consumer age, we all desire easy access to works. However, such a desire does 
not reasonably trump the rights of the copyright owner over when, where, and under what 
conditions his work should be instantiated.54 
The foregoing two cases, while infringing copyright as I have described it, may 
nevertheless avoid being labeled “infringements” under current U.S. copyright law, 
through being deemed instead “fair uses” of the copyrighted works. Fair use is one of the 
two most prominent limitations to current legal copyright in the United States, the other 
being the expiration of copyright. In the following two sections, I will take a close look at 
the fair use doctrine and the expiration of copyright to determine if and to what degree 
they should apply to my reformulating of copyright theory.  
                                               
53 We might find parallels in the media of sculpture and architecture. In sculpture, many artists turned to 
installations, whether interior or exterior, toward the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, creating works 
for specific locales. In architecture, too, many works are specifically intended to be placed in certain 
settings to reflect, enhance, or otherwise interact with the space around them (the works of Frank Lloyd 
Wright provide many such examples). 
54 These two cases are, of course, admittedly likely to be rare. It may be that the author of some work would 
very much like to release it in more or newer formats, and that it is perhaps either practically or financially 
infeasible for him to do so. Of course, there is nothing to restrict the author himself from giving the public 




On the copyright page (usually the reverse of the title page) of almost any book published 
in the United States, one will find some variation on the following statement: 
 
All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of 
this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written 
permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical 
articles and reviews. 
 
As we learn from the “fair use” doctrine, however, such a statement well oversteps the 
bounds of legal copyright. While the Copyright Act allows for quotations in critical 
articles and reviews (at least in some situations), it also allows for copying in a wide 
range of other circumstances. In case law, fair use protects copying in a wide variety of 
contexts, including copying of entire works for archival purposes, quotation of passages 
(both short and long) for purposes of criticism and commentary, and substantial copying 
for the purposes of parody. 
Arising directly from an 1841 court case,55 the fair use doctrine establishes within 
the 1976 Copyright Act particular guidelines according to which certain copying without 
permission of a copyrighted work does not constitute infringement. Fair use is perhaps 
the most discussed and least understood aspect of U.S. copyright law, in each case 
because the fair use guidelines are notoriously loose, leaving wide range for 
interpretation on the part of the author, the public, and the judiciary. This has led at least 
                                               
55 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 
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one court to call the fair use doctrine “the most troublesome in the whole of copyright.”56 
Titled “Limitations on exclusive rights: fair use,” section 107 of the Copyright Act reads: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A [which outline 
the rights included under copyright ownership], the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified in that section, for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement 
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in a 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair 
use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.57 
 
                                               
56 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
57 Copyright Act of 1976, §107, reproduced in Cohen et al. (2006b), pp. 19-20. 
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To begin, it should be noted, the fair use doctrine does not exclusively restrict the domain 
of fair use to criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. 
Rather, any use that falls within the vague boundaries of the doctrine will be considered 
“fair”. The boundaries of the doctrine are frustratingly vague, however. Nothing in the 
doctrine, so defined, specifies whether all four factors outlined enjoy equal weight in 
consideration,58 nor whether they are conceptually exclusive of one another as considered 
in any particular case. Moreover, the wording of each factor, particularly the second, is 
itself in places extremely obtuse, with none of such intuitively important terms as 
“purpose,” “character,” and “nature” having been defined in the Copyright Act. The 
terms themselves give us (the authors, the general public, and the judiciary) at best a very 
rough idea of the meaning and intent of these factors.59 Amazingly, this seems to have 
been Congress’ intent, reflecting the thinking in legislative history: 
 
Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine 
over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. 
Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally 
applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must 
be decided on its own facts.60 
 
                                               
58 Though in at least one case, the fourth factor is taken to be “undoubtedly the single most important 
element of fair use.” Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
59 United States District Judge Pierre N. Leval notes, “Our statute and our judge-made law talk around the 
subject [of fair use]. They mention factors, but give no standard. And those factors are stated in an opaque 
and uninformative way. We are told for example to look at the purpose and character of the secondary use 
and at the nature of the copyrighted work. ‘What about them?,’ you may ask. We are not told. We are told 
to look at the amount of the taking and the effect on the market. ‘How much is too much?’ We are not 
told.” (from “Fair Use or Foul? The Nineteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture,” 36 J. Copyright 
Society, pp. 167-8 (1989).) 
60 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679. 
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As such, individual courts have tended to fall back on a variety of normative theories to 
determine the outcome of particular cases.61 
 The overall intent of the fair use doctrine seems to be to further the instrumental 
purpose of copyright as rooted in the history of U.S. copyright law, and, as the above 
passage indicates, to achieve reasonable equity between authors and the public as regards 
copyrighted works. Cohen et al. (2006a) state,  
 
Copyright law attempts to strike the optimal balance between providing 
authors with incentives to create and encouraging dissemination of works 
and information to the public. To achieve this goal, it also attempts to 
balance the needs of existing authors for protection with the needs of 
future authors to use the ideas and other raw materials needed to create.62  
 
The rationale behind fair use seems to be this: although copyright in U.S. law is meant to 
expand the marketplace of ideas, certain situations of protecting this copyright would in 
fact circumvent its desired consequence. Justice Blackmun in his dissent to Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studies (1984) states, 
 
The monopoly created by copyright […] rewards the individual author in 
order to benefit the public. […] There are situations, nevertheless, in 
which strict enforcement of this monopoly would inhibit the very 
                                               
61 Cohen et al. (2006a), Copyright in a Global Information Economy, Second Edition, p. 526. 
62 Ibid., p. 561. 
 257 
‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ that copyright is intended to 
promote.63 
 
It is in such situations that the courts turn to the fair use doctrine. And so, where 
copyright as a whole seems to have been developed in U.S. law as a rule-consequentialist 
principle, the doctrine of fair-use supersedes the principle, and, as it requires a case-by-
case analysis, functions as an act-consequentialist doctrine. Indeed, as fair use can 
override any or all of the rights of the author under the provisions of the Copyright Act, 
the right of copyright itself thus operates according to an act-consequentialist principle. 
That is, as codified in U.S. law, one possesses a right over one’s work only insofar as 
such a right is instrumental to expanding the marketplace of ideas. Where an 
infringement of the author’s right itself serves to expand the marketplace of ideas (and 
presumably where enforcement of the right would not), such an act is in fact not an 
infringement; rather, it is a “fair use.”64 
Although the reasoning behind the fair use seems admirable, the doctrine itself 
gives rise to several problems, the first being that, as laid out in the Copyright Act, the 
fair use doctrine does not seem particularly well-suited to achieving its end. That is, as a 
cobbling together of guidelines, one immediately wonders whether (or, for that matter, 
why) the doctrine so supports the expansion of the marketplace of ideas. A particularly 
troublesome sort of work in this regard is parody. The purpose of parody is to lampoon 
                                               
63 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., Supreme Court of the United States, 1984. 
464 U.S. 417, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting). 
64 Notably, copyright is not the only intellectual property right with such limitations. Patent, too, is subject 
to restrictions conceptually similar to fair use. A judicially-created exception rule states that a patent holder 
has no right against someone whose otherwise infringing use “is for experiments for the sole purpose of 
gratifying a philosophical taste or curiosity or for instruction and amusement.” (Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 
(10 How.) 477, 497 (1850)) 
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an existing work by playing off that very work.65 It can be, as such, a biting form of 
criticism. As the author of the work being parodied is very unlikely to give permission to 
mock his efforts, it seems, parody is the paradigm case that fair use was designed to 
protect. However, taken at face value, the factors themselves seem to weigh against such 
a use. Where a parody is commercial in nature (being sold in a book, on an album, or 
otherwise), this will seem to weigh heavily against the parody being “fair”, given the first 
factor. Whether or not the parody is commercial, however, parody is often employed as a 
form of criticism, and, when done well, can be an especially biting one. Not infrequently, 
its very purpose is to negatively impact the potential market for or perceived value of the 
copyrighted work. Thus, the fourth factor, too, seems to frequently weigh against parody 
being a fair use (and all the more so, apparently, the more effective the parody is). The 
third factor further weighs against parody qualifying as fair use, for the nature of parody 
requires substantial copying to conjure up the work being parodied in the audience’s 
mind. As such, though parody seems very much in line with the purpose of expanding the 
marketplace of ideas, the fair use doctrine seems to have great potential to stifle such 
works. 
The second problem that arises for fair use is that, given its inherent vagueness, 
the fair use doctrine provides us with very little direction in making ethical or legal 
decisions. That is, since the doctrine, as written, is open to such wide interpretation, the 
outcome of any legal battle that turns on the doctrine will almost always be in doubt. 
Although the doctrine itself does not tell us whether the four factors are to be weighed 
                                               
65 It is important that we distinguish “parody” from “satire”. A parody of work W pokes fun at W, and so 
often requires copying aspects of W to do so. A satire, however, may copy aspects of some work as a way 
of poking fun at something else, or may take as its target something other than pre-existing works, such as a 
social practice. In other words, where a satirical (but non-parodic) work copies from some pre-existing 
work, it is not directed at the work being copied, but is rather using that work to other ends. 
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equally, and independently, one might assume that where the majority of factors weigh 
against some use, that use will not qualify as fair. However, this has not always been the 
case. 
Let us return to the issue of parody. In the case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music 
(1994),66 the court found that rap group 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, 
Pretty Woman” was fair, despite its seeming to fail three (if not all four) of the four 
factors. Its reasoning in this case is a good illustration of the court’s breadth of room to 
interpret the fair use doctrine. Despite the parody’s commercial nature, the court found 
that the parody’s purpose (as parody) weighed the first factor in its favor. Next, the court 
argued that since Orbison’s work is largely expressive (rather than informational) in 
nature, the second factor weighed against the parody. The court essentially neutralized 
the third factor, arguing that since parody requires such substantial copying, that 2 Live 
Crew’s parody does so should not count against it. And, finally, as regards the fourth 
factor, the court found that “the new work will not affect the market for the original in a 
way cognizable under this factor, that is, by acting as a substitute for it.”67 That is, in the 
court’s interpretation of the factor as it applies to this case, parody that suppresses sales 
of the original is allowable, whereas works that, by copying, usurp the original in sales 
infringe and thus are impermissible. 
Being familiar with the doctrine, prior to the hearing of the case, the plaintiff most 
likely felt on secure ground. After all, with the four factors taken at face value, 
independently, and of equal weight, it seems the facts are very much against the 2 Live 
Crew parody. Although the purpose of 2 Live Crew’s work is certainly parodic, it is also 
                                               
66 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) 
67 Ibid. 
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commercial. It seems as regards the first factor, there is a draw. At face value, the second 
factor tells us little. If we take the court’s interpretation of its meaning, weighing against 
copying where the original is “expressive”, the second factor weighs against the parody. 
Taken independently, the third factor also weighs against the parody, for it borrows 
liberally from the original. Finally, even given the court’s distinction between works that 
usurp and those that suppress, the fourth factor, too, weighs against the parody given its 
intent to devalue the original. If such an apparenly straightforward case of “unfair” use 
(at least by the letter of the doctrine) could be so turned on its head by the court, the 
doctrine itself seems ill-defined at best, and empty at worst. 
Granted, the court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music seems to dissolve 
my earlier complaint that the fair use doctrine does not seem particularly well-suited to 
achieving its end. But we are left to ask: was it because the doctrine was well-suited to 
expanding the marketplace of ideas that 2 Live Crew won the case, or because the courts 
were able to so freely interpret and thus circumvent the doctrine that the parody 
prevailed? It seems the latter: that is, the parody was deemed “fair” despite, not because 
of, the fair use doctrine. Here, it may most certainly be argued that, in its decision, the 
court was adhering not to the letter of the doctrine, but to its spirit. As such, however, we 
can ask: if we are more interested in the spirit of the doctrine than the letter of it, to what 
end do we need the doctrine itself?  
 Finally, as discussed above, the fair use doctrine turns copyright in U.S. law from 
a principle of rule-consequentialism to one of act-consequentialism: though the Copyright 
Act as a whole sets out rules of conduct, the fair use doctrine can be used in any 
particular case to override these rules. However, as set out in the 1976 Act, the doctrine 
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does not itself provide clear guidelines for action, and so each act must be considered on 
its own merits. The overriding problem with this arrangement is that, as discussed in the 
last section, there is little reason to think that copyright itself is necessary or sufficient to 
expanding the marketplace of ideas. Adding a limitation to a right that itself seems 
unnecessary and insufficient to achieving its instrumental purpose is like patching a hole 
on an already-sunken vessel. Where granting authors copyright appears unnecessary to 
expanding the marketplace of ideas, it seems that almost any use of the work should be 
deemed “fair”—for though such a use may not itself expand the marketplace, neither will 
it restrict the original work or author from doing so, for the original work will already be 




As mentioned above, the fair use doctrine is perhaps the most widely discussed aspect of 
U.S. copyright law. In some areas of this literature, there has developed a notion that 
arising from the fair use doctrine is a class of users’ rights. Professors L. Ray Patterson 
and Stanley W. Lindberg argue in The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users’ Rights 
(1991): 
 
[U]sers have rights that are just as important as those of authors and 
publishers—and these rights are grounded in the law of copyright. To 
employ the fair-use provisions of the copyright act is not to abuse the 
rights of the authors or copyright owner; indeed, the very purpose of 
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copyright is to advance knowledge and thus benefit the public welfare, 
which is exactly what fair use—properly employed—does.68 
 
In particular, Patterson and Lindberg contend, “The constitutional purpose of copyright—
the promotion of learning—requires the right-of-access principle.”69 According to 
Patterson and Lindberg, “[I]ndividuals have a right to use copyrighted materials. Such 
use is necessary to learning.”70 That is, as the instrumental purpose of copyright is to 
promote learning, for an author to act in such a way that restricts users from doing so is to 
infringe the users’ rights. Particularly irksome for Patterson and Lindberg, then, are 
copy-protection measures taken by some copyright owners to prevent any and all copying 
(including copying that would fall under “fair use”). Such copy-protection as software 
that prevents CDs and DVDs from being copied or even decrypted (called a “trusted 
system”) is recognized by 1998’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),71 which 
makes it a crime to circumvent such copy-protection measures. Discussing the DMCA, 
David Bollier echoes the claims of Patterson and Lindberg above: 
 
By allowing content owners to “lock up” digital text and assert “perfect 
control” over its uses, the DMCA effectively empowers companies to 
eliminate the public’s fair use rights in digital works.72 
 
                                               
68 Patterson, L. Ray and Stanley W. Lindberg (1991). The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users’ Rights, p. 
11. 
69 Ibid., p. 69. 
70 Ibid, p. 52. 
71 Introduced as Chapter 12 to the 1976 Copyright Act. 
72 Bollier, David (2002). “Why the Public Domain Matters: The Endangered Wellspring of Creativity, 
Commerce and Democracy” (Washington, DC: New America Foundation & Public Knowledge), p. 14 
(emphasis added). 
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In his magnum opus, Code, Lawrence Lessig, too, condemns such copy-protection 
measures: 
 
[W]hen intellectual property is protected by code [… n]othing requires the 
owner to grant the right of fair use. She might, just as a bookstore allows 
individuals to browse for free, but she might not. Whether she grants this 
right depends on whether it profits her. Fair use becomes subject to private 
gain. 
 As privatized law, trusted systems regulate in the same domain 
where copyright law regulates, but unlike copyright law, they do not 
guarantee the same public use protection.73 
 
Lessig famously goes on to propose a radical restructuring of the copyright system. 
Others who champion users’ rights tend to propose more moderate action, such as the 
elimination of the DMCA from the Copyright Act. Whether moderate or revisionary, 
however, what these thinkers hold in common is the belief that, just as copyright owners 
possess certain rights with regard to their works, so too do the users and potential users of 
these works. 
There are, however, several key problems with these arguments for users’ rights. 
First is a problem with Patterson and Lindberg’s claim in particular: the stated purpose of 
copyright in the U.S. Constitution is the “Progress of Science”—that is, the expansion of 
the marketplace of ideas. It is not, as such, the acquisition of knowledge by particular 
individuals that copyright is meant to promote, but the building of knowledge, generally. 
                                               
73 Lessig (1999), p. 135 (emphasis added). 
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Nor does there being a body of knowledge and ideas thereby seem to give rise to rights in 
particular individuals to access that body of knowledge and ideas. 
 However, even putting aside this misreading of the Constitution, the argument for 
“right-of-access” and similar models of users’ rights leads to absurd conclusions. Users’ 
rights, many contend, are the flip-side to authors’ rights in the balance that copyright is 
designed to afford in U.S. law. Patterson and Lindberg state, “[T]he law of users’ rights is 
by and large an unwritten law, being a by-product of the limitations on the rights of the 
author and the publisher as copyright owners.”74 The general argument for users’ rights, 
as such, seems to run something like this: 
 
(P1) Where copyright owners have rights to restrict copying of work W 
under all circumstances except a, b, and c, users have the right to 
access and copy work W in circumstances a, b, and c. 
(P2) By restricting the ability of users to access and/or copy work W in 
circumstances a, b, or c, copyright owners thus infringe the rights 
of users. 
(C1) Therefore, copy-protection, which so restricts the ability of users to 
copy work W, infringes the rights of users. 
 
Certainly, (P1)-(C1) is a valid argument: (P2) follows directly from (P1), and (C1) is 
merely a specific case of that discussed in (P2). However, on reflection, another specific 
case of that discussed in (P2) would seem to be (C2): 
 
                                               
74 Patterson and Lindberg (1991), p. 5. 
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 (C2) By not publishing work W, the copyright owner restricts the ability 
of users to access and/or copy work W, and therefore infringes the 
rights of (potential) users. 
 
Clearly, however, (C2) is an absurd conclusion. We do not want to say that by writing, 
painting, or otherwise creating a work in my home, and deciding not to publish it, I have 
thereby infringed anybody’s rights. However, if this conclusion is absurd, and the 
argument is valid, the problem must lie in the truth of one of the premises. Since (P2), 
(C1), and (C2) all appear to follow directly from (P1), (P1) seems to be our culprit.   
 It might be argued that (P1) should be prefaced with “If work W has been 
published, then…” Initially, such an adjustment would seem much more agreeable. That 
is, where the author offers the work up for public consumption, both he and the public 
thus gain rights regarding the work. Several problems, however, threaten this happy 
conclusion. First, there is the issue of what it means to publish some work, the confusion 
over which, as discussed in Chapter One, was one of the major impetuses for revising the 
Copyright Act. In the particular case, say, of copy-protected CDs and DVDs, while the 
music or film that may be played from the disk is published, it is not the music or film 
that trusted systems are designed to protect—rather, it is the computer coding on the disk 
that remains locked away from public consumption. And if such coding is not accessible 
to the public, how are we to call it “published”? Second, we can ask, why should the act 
of publishing the work serve to (1) give the author rights in the works; and (2) give the 
public a body of rights pertaining to the work as detailed under the title of fair use? That 
is, while a story can be told about why the act of creating a work is ethically relevant and 
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can give rise to rights—this is, after all, the story I have been telling—it is unclear why 
the act of publishing a work should be equally ethically relevant, giving rise to rights for 
either the author or the public. 
Moreover, with or without such a preface to (P1), it is difficult to understand how 
granting one group (authors) a right thus gives parallel rights to another group (users). 
Putting aside, for the sake of argument, the problems for the fair use doctrine outlined 
above, the exclusive right of copyright burdens users of the work with a duty not to copy 
the work except in those circumstances permitted under the auspices of fair use. 
However, it seems a conceptual misstep from users having a duty to not copy a 
copyrighted work under all circumstances except a, b, and c, to their thereby having a 
right to copy the copyrighted work in a, b, and c circumstances. Intuitively, following 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s conceptual scheme of rights, the users’ “right” is not a 
claim-right at all, but a mere liberty or privilege. In Hohfeld’s scheme, a given user, A, 
might be said to have a privilege relative to the copyright owner, B, with respect to the 
work, W, under a, b, and c circumstances. As such, A is at liberty relative to B with 
respect to W in a, b, and c circumstances: that is, he is free to choose to copy or not to 
copy the work. But A’s liberty does not thus entail any duty on B’s part (or that of anyone 
else) not to interfere with A’s actions with respect to W in a, b, or c circumstances.75 As 
Frances Kamm puts the matter, “I may be at liberty to look at you, but you have no duty 
to let me look at you if you may permissibly put up a screen in front of you.”76 While 
limitations on the rights of authors may give rise to certain privileges or liberties on the 
part of users, it is a far cry from giving them rights. As such, it seems, if one wants to 
                                               
75 See Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb (1923). Fundamental Legal Conceptions. 
76 Kamm, F.M. (2002). “Rights” in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law, p. 479. 
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argue that users have a “right-of-access” and that the copyright holder’s copy-protection 
systems are thus impermissible, one will have to make the argument on grounds 
independent from the copyright-owner’s having limitations to his exclusive rights. And, 
of course, even if one is able to make such an argument, one will still have to contend 
with the absurd consequence (C2). 
 
The Value of Ideas and a Limit to Copyright 
Although I contend that copyright is a right, and a natural right at that, I do not thus 
contend that it may never be overridden—that it is an absolute right. Far from it. 
Certainly, if the only way to save a life is to infringe a copyright, that copyright should be 
infringed. But such an act is nevertheless an infringement of the copyright-holder’s 
rights, as I have defined infringement—it is simply a permissible infringement. Here, I 
wish to adopt a conceptual schema provided by Judith Jarvis Thomson in “Some 
Ruminations on Rights” (1977): 
 
Suppose that someone has a right that such and such shall not be the case. 
I shall say that we infringe a right of his if and only if we bring about that 
it is the case. I shall say that we violate a right of his if and only if both we 
bring about that it is the case and we act wrongly in doing so.77 
 
As such, we may infringe someone’s right without necessarily wronging him. It is only in 
violating a right (something over and above infringement) that we wrong him. 
                                               
77 Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1977). “Some Ruminations on Rights” in 19 Arizona Law Review 45, p. 47 
(emphasis added). 
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 Granted, life-and-death scenarios such as that mentioned above are unlikely to 
commonly arise in copyright cases. However, the list of rights and interests that may 
conflict with that of copyright is surely a long one. The issue that concerns us is which of 
these rights and interests is ethically prior to that of copyright, where an action in service 
of such a right or interest, while infringing copyright, does not amount to a wrongful 
violation of copyright. Here, I wish to consider one such interest in particular. 
It seems incontestable that ideas, generally, are valuable, whether such ideas have 
functional use, are simply informative, or are merely fanciful. And while it may be 
contended that some idea is more or less valuable than another (for some ideas, it may be 
said, are simply bad ideas), it seems also true that expanding the overall sphere of ideas is 
itself inherently valuable. The greater the marketplace of ideas, the greater our freedom to 
compare them, and to choose among them, and bringing new ideas into the marketplace 
requires expression of those ideas. Such seems to have been the reasoning behind the 
constitutional basis of copyright in U.S. law. However, as we have seen, the interest we 
have in the expression of new ideas cannot reasonably serve as the driving force, ethical 
grounding, or purpose of copyright. This said, I do believe our interest in the expression 
of new ideas (so as to expand the marketplace of ideas) can reasonably serve to bind 
copyright. It is on such ideas that authors draw in creating authored works. And while an 
author might truthfully claim to be expressing his own, original idea in his work, such an 
idea is undoubtedly built upon other, underlying ideas of which he is not the originator. 
The expansion of the marketplace of ideas is like the growth of a tree: as each new idea 
becomes available, so too does the possibility of other ideas stemming from it. As the 
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authors of new works draw from, or build upon, the available pool of ideas, the growth of 
this pool is even more in their interests than it is for the general public.  
 Given our general interest in the expansion of the marketplace of ideas, and the 
particular interest in such held by the class of authors, I contend that where an action will 
serve to directly expand the marketplace of ideas, to the extent that infringing a copyright 
is necessary to do so, such an act of infringement should be considered permissible. That 
is, to employ Thomson’s terminology, while such an act will infringe the copyright of the 
author, it will not thus violate his right. Notice here, however, that the expansion of the 
marketplace of ideas will come about not with some novel expression of some old idea, 
for such does not add to the available pool of ideas, but with the expression of new ideas, 
which does.  
I cannot imagine any case where simply making copies of an existing, available 
work will serve to expand the pool of ideas, for no new ideas will directly arise from such 
an action that could not have arisen without the act of infringement. And while copying a 
work onto the Internet without permission might invite the expression of new ideas, it 
does not itself expand the pool of available ideas. On my theory, such an act will always 
violate the author’s copyright. Other cases of infringement that are necessary to expand 
the pool of available ideas, however, are not difficult to imagine. In particular, cases of 
parody and other criticism, which do not fare well under the fair use doctrine (taken at 
face value), will be quite permissible under my view. Granting that the criticism of some 
work adds to the marketplace of ideas, where such criticism requires infringing a 
copyright to properly express the idea contained in the criticism, this infringement will be 
permissible. That is, quoting from a copyrighted work may be necessary to criticize it. 
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Where it is necessary, such an act will be permissible. However, where quoting from an 
existing text is unnecessary, and is used, for example, simply to enliven the criticism, 
such an act will be impermissible. As such, where paraphrasing will do as well as direct 
quotation, the critic should paraphrase. This principle becomes particularly relevant in 
cases of parody, though here the line between what is necessary and what is unnecessary 
infringement will be more difficult to draw. 
 Outside of the realms of criticism and parody, cases of non-violating infringement 
will likely be rarer. However, we might consider a case such as Vermeer’s A Lady Seated 
at the Virginal (ca. 1675), discussed at the end of last chapter. As the scene of the 
painting includes a depiction of Dirck van Baburen’s painting, The Procuress, Vermeer 
has, on my view, committed an act of infringement. However, it may be argued that 
depicting The Procuress in Vermeer’s painting was necessary to expressing the idea that 
Vermeer wished to express—for instance, that, although Vermeer is not commenting on 
The Procuress directly, its presence in the scene is necessary to set the mood of A Lady 
Seated at the Virginal, and that no other work existing at the time would do. It may be 
argued that the scene of Vermeer’s painting is meant to depict a direct inverse to that in 
The Procuress, and that the arising conflict is not possible to depict without depicting the 
painting. Certainly, any of these approaches would require further argument, but I believe 
that in some such way the infringement may be so justified. Some cases of unauthorized 
derivative works (such as sequels) may be justified similarly, but again, only where the 
infringement is necessary to expressing the new idea. Where the same could be done 
without infringement, the infringement will represent a violation of the copyright holder’s 
exclusive rights. 
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 Whether some given act of infringement will qualify as permissible will depend 
on the details of the case. The preceding chapters are filled with cases that fall under my 
definition of infringement, and which may or may not also qualify as violations of 
copyright. While fair use doctrine also requires case-by-case analysis, it offers no 
reasonable means by which one might predict the outcome of any particular case. 
Conversely, my approach offers a straightforward rule for determining whether some act 
is permissible. And while it requires detailed case analysis, I believe my approach offers 
the potential infringer (and infringee) a clear and intuitive guide to determining the 
permissibility of infringing acts. 
 Before moving on, it might be contended that, arising as it does from the creative 
act, and operating over the product of this act, the right I describe would also prima facie 
seem to extend to ownership of ideas, which, as I have stated numerous times, standardly 
fall outside the domain of copyright. Indeed, I suspect something very much like the 
position I sketch could also ground something like a right to ideas. Such would seem to 
provide an explanatory foundation to our intuitions regarding plagiarism, for instance. 
However, given the difference in their objects, the implications of a right over ideas, and 
the limitations to such a right, are very likely to diverge in kind from a right over their 
particular expressions, authored works.  Given the nature of ideas and their instantiation, 
I suspect a right to ideas faces far more conflicting rights and interests than does a right to 
their particular expression in authored works. Moreover, where authored works seem best 
understood within the type/token framework, there seems a much stronger claim to ideas 
being of the universal/particular sort, and as such not the sorts of entities that any 
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individual can state a claim to having created, and so to having a right over, at least a 
right based on creativity. 
 
The Duration and Expiration of Copyright 
The clause of the U.S. Constitution from which the law of copyright arises specifies that 
the exclusive right to copyrighted works should be “for limited Times.” Precisely what 
this means, however, has been the subject of regular debate, as copyright terms have been 
expanded with each successive iteration of the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act of 1790 
gave authors their exclusive right for a term of 14 years from the date of publication, with 
the option to renew for an additional 14 years, should the author still be alive. After the 
expiration of the final term, the work entered the “public domain” and the public was free 
to copy, alter, and create derivative works based upon it. The Copyright Act of 1909 
doubled the duration of copyright to 28 years, likewise from the date of publication, 
renewable for a second term of 28 years. The creation of the 1976 Act, however, 
substantially changed the rules. Rather than following the two-term model employed by 
earlier versions of the Copyright Act, the 1976 Act gave authors the exclusive right over 
their works for the duration of their lives, plus 50 years. This was the term lobbied for by 
Mark Twain in 1906 (though he preferred a perpetual copyright), and considered, but 
rejected, for the 1909 Act.78 Rather than Twain’s appeals, the primary influencing factor 
in Congress’ decision to adopt the life-plus-50-years term for the 1976 Act seems to have 
been that this was the minimum term required by the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works (1886), the dominant international copyright treaty at the 
                                               
78 See Vaidhyanathan (2003), p. 79. 
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time.79 Although the United States would not become a signator of the Berne Convention 
until 1988, it seems Congress wanted to at least allow for the possibility in drafting the 
1976 Act. In 1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act 
(pejoratively, the “Mickey Mouse Protection Act”), which extended the term of copyright 
by 20 years to life plus 70 years, following a similar extension adopted by members of 
the European Union in 1993.80 
 The new extension of copyright duration gave rise to heated debate, with fears 
among pundits that the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act was simply a furtive step 
toward perpetual copyright, something explicitly disallowed by the Constitution. The 
issue came to the fore in the case of Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003), where the constitutionality 
of the move was directly challenged.81 Ultimately, the court found that retroactive 
extension of the copyright term still satisfied the “limited Times” provision provided that 
the term, so extended, was not perpetual.  
Putting aside the constitutional provision, we might ask, in what way does a 
limited (as opposed to perpetual) copyright serve the stated goals of copyright in U.S. 
law? In “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property” (1988), Justin Hughes contends that, 
“[A]s long as those new ideas [expressed in protected works] become freely available, 
idea-based progress would continue.”82 Hughes is discussing intellectual property in 
general, and not copyright in particular, but his statement reflects a commonly-held 
                                               
79 See Halpern, Sheldon W. et al. (1992). Copyright Cases and Materials, p. 562. 
80 Rules differ for works “made-for-hire” and other categories where an author is not individually 
identifiable. Where a work is corporately-owned, or anonymously or pseudonymously created, the 
copyright owner enjoyed exclusive copyright on the work for 75 years from its creation under the 1976 
Act, extended to 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation, with the passing of the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998. 
81 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.W. 186 (2003). Interestingly, lead counsel for the plaintiff in the case was 
Lawrence Lessig, whose work is discussed throughout this chapter. 
82 Hughes, Justin (1988), p. 324. 
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position on copyright’s public domain: that the free availability of ideas will lead to more 
ideas (the stated goal of U.S. copyright), and that putting works into the public domain 
after a limited time frees the ideas expressed therein for all to use. Journalist Robert S. 
Boynton echoes this view in “The Tyranny of Copyright?” (2004): 
 
Thinkers like Lessig and Zittrain promote a vision of a world in which 
copyright law gives individual creators the exclusive right to profit from 
their intellectual property for a brief, limited period—thus providing an 
incentive to create while still allowing successive generations of creators 
to draw freely on earlier ideas.83 
 
Even with Hughes’ and Boynton’s claims in mind, we might still ask, how does limiting 
the duration of copyright so serve “idea-based progress” or the expansion of the 
marketplace of ideas? After all, copyright does not protect ideas. The public is free to 
discuss, draw from, and express the ideas contained in a protected work, only provided 
they do not reproduce the work in doing so. The public, in other words, is free to 
paraphrase at will. Undoubtedly, the free availability of ideas does lead to more ideas, but 
it is not in any way clear why cutting off the exclusive right to an expression should 
better engender such ideas, given that the ideas contained in the expression are already 
free for all to enjoy. 
 Vaidhyanathan contends that, as copyright is meant to serve the public good, and 
making works available cheaply to the public (by allowing for inexpensive or free 
reproductions) serves the public good, it is common sense that copyrights should expire. 
                                               
83 Boynton, Robert S. “The Tyranny of Copyright?” in The New York Times (New York) 25 January 2004. 
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This seems a reasonable position, but it is not the stated purpose of U.S. copyright, nor is 
it clear why the good gained by cheaply-available works (as opposed to freely-available 
ideas) serves the public interest in a way that should trump the author’s ownership rights. 
If it did, it seems reasonable that it should always do so, and not merely after 70 years 
following the author’s demise. Moreover, as a trip to the local bookstore will show, that a 
work is in the public domain rarely means it will be “cheaply” available, as publication 
costs tend to be made up primarily of printing costs, and not of payments to authors. 
 Another standard argument for the expiration of intellectual property rights, on 
the constitutional model, is that we want to reward authors for their contributions, but not 
so much that the reward becomes a detriment to the public at large. As Patterson and 
Lindberg argue,  
 
Copyright, of course, is itself an encroachment on the public domain, in 
that it gives the author a limited proprietary control over his or her 
writings composed of ideas and words—materials taken from the public 
domain. The encroachment permitted, however, requires a quid pro quo 
and is limited in both scope and time: to be protected, the author must 
create a new work, and that work is protected for a limited time only. The 
first requirement means that copyright cannot be used to claim ideas or 
writings already in the public domain; the second means that the work 
which the author produces eventually goes into the public domain. The 
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copyright policy thus serves not only to preserve but also to enrich the 
public domain.84 
 
So, the argument runs, the reward we offer authors is limited in part because the reward 
itself restricts the general public’s use of the public domain. We only grant the reward 
because what we are rewarding eventually helps to build the public domain. To not limit 
the duration of copyright, it might be said, then, harms the public at large. 
 Here, let us consider an argument made by Nozick. In particular, let us return 
briefly to Nozick’s analysis of Locke’s proviso, discussed above. While Nozick does not 
here discuss copyright, he does discuss patent, and his reasoning for limiting patent will 
prove particularly relevant to our discussion of the duration of copyright. Although 
stemming from the same clause in the Constitution, U.S. patent law operates in several 
important ways that differentiate it from copyright law. First, unlike copyright, the 
objects of patent are functionally defined. An object is differentiated by other objects 
insofar as it does a different thing than other patented objects and/or does so in a different 
way. In other words, if your invention does what mine does in the same way that mine 
does it, your invention is the same as my invention, regardless of whether you invented it 
completely independently. Second, following from this, to obtain a patent in an invention 
or discovery, one must establish not only originality, but also novelty—that is, the object 
one wishes to patent must not now, nor have ever been, protected by patent. If there 
exists (or has existed) another patented object, which does the same thing in the same 
way as one’s own invention, one is barred from patenting it. Finally, where U.S. 
copyright currently extends several decades after the death of the author, patent extends 
                                               
84 Patterson and Lindberg (1991), p. 50. 
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only 20 years from the filing of the patent with the Patent Office. With this in mind, let us 
now turn to Nozick: 
 
An inventor’s patent does not deprive others of an object which would not 
exist if not for the inventor. Yet patents would have this effect on others 
who independently invent the object. Therefore, these independent 
inventors, upon whom the burden of proving independent discovery may 
rest, should not be excluded from utilizing their own invention as they 
wish (including selling it to others). […] Yet we may assume that in the 
absence of the original invention, sometime later someone else would 
have come up with it. This suggests placing a time limit on patents, as a 
rough rule of thumb to approximate how long it would have taken, in the 
absence of knowledge of the invention, for independent discovery.85 
 
Nozick’s reasoning seems well-grounded. Indefinitely barring others from independently 
inventing or discovering the same object as one’s own invention or discovery seems to 
place an unreasonable limit on their liberty. That is, with the object having been invented 
and patented by another, they are no longer free to do what they would previously have 
been able to do. As such, while giving an exclusive patent to the inventor or discoverer 
who first brings a new object to the public seems justifiable, so does placing a protracted 
time limit on the extent of that patent protection. 
 As with the earlier discussion of Nozick, however, given the nature of the objects 
of copyright, the justifiable concerns regarding patent do not carry over to its cousin, 
                                               
85 Nozick (1974), p. 182. 
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copyright, especially given my account of it. As discussed in earlier chapters, since one is 
not barred from independently creating (and so copyrighting) a work atomically identical 
to some previously-copyrighted work, and one has access to all of the uncopyrightable 
bits that are brought together in a copyrighted work, one has no less liberty than one had 
before the copyrighted work was created. Indeed, as one now has opportunities to access, 
discuss, and comment on the copyrighted work, one’s liberty is expanded by the work 
that copyright protects. 
 While there may be an argument to be made that a natural right of copyright 
should end at the original author’s death, there seems ample reason to think that such a 
right should survive this event. As I have argued, the author’s right to the object of 
copyright arises because of his creative activity, which in turn arises as an exercise of his 
capacities of autonomy, liberty, rationality, and the like. This said, it might be asked, why 
should we think that his exercise of these capacities might give rise to anyone else 
(including his descendents) having such a right. In other words, why should the author be 
allowed to transfer his rights to the object? 
 Certainly, I suspect, we do not want to say that an author who loses any or all of 
these capacities and yet remains alive should thus lose the rights to the objects that came 
about when he still had those capacities. While sustaining a right to life, for example, 
may depend upon sustaining certain capacities (probably those same capacities listed 
above), it is not these capacities that gave rise to the life so protected. Rather, it is in part 
the life that gave rise to the capacities. In the case of the objects of copyright, however, if 
my claim has any weight, it is as a result of such capacities that the object and the right to 
it came about. And so where it may be contended that sustaining certain capacities is 
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requisite for sustaining a right to life, the same does not seem obviously true in the case 
of the right to copyright. The capacities have already done their job.  
Returning to the issue of transferability, I have argued that the sort of property to 
which copyright pertains differs in important ways from that of standard, physical 
property, and that, as such, so too do the ethics pertaining to it. However, despite these 
differences, copyright is a property right, and so it would not be unexpected that it 
operate in some ways similar to standard property rights. In particular, as standard 
property rights are generally regarded as transferable, so too would I expect copyright to 
be transferable (as, indeed, it is in its current legal applications). The full package of 
standard property rights usually includes the right to voluntarily waive or renounce one’s 
rights in one’s property, and to voluntarily transfer this package of rights to another person or 
persons.  
As with rights to physical property, transfer of rights to intellectual property might 
occur as the result of a contractual agreement (as between author and publisher), as 
bequeathed in a will (or when the rights-holder dies intestate), or otherwise. It may be that 
property rights in intellectual property are non-transferable, whether through sale or 
otherwise, though I have not encountered any arguments to this effect. However, it seems 
that were this the case, so too would it be the case for standard property rights—that is, 
unless it can be shown why the difference in the objects of standard and intellectual 
property rights should give rise to a difference in their transferability. Absent, then, any 
reasonable argument for why property rights in general, or, if the above-hypothesized 
argument could be produced, copyright in particular, should not be transferable, I will 
contend that they can be passed from individual to individual, and from generation to 
generation, ad infinitum. Moreover, where it seems reasonable that standard property rights 
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might be suspended, overridden, or revoked under circumstances where available property 
suffers from scarcity, the same problem does not seem to arise for property in authored 
works, for the creation and copyrighting of authored works in no way depletes the intellectual 
commons. 
While I can perhaps imagine an argument that natural property rights should not be 
transferable, and so dissolve with the property-owner’s demise, what I cannot imagine is any 
reasonable argument that claims copyright should expire at any given point between the 
author’s death and never, for to do so would seem to be to pick an arbitrary point on this 
timeline. Why should copyright expire at a point 50, 60, or 70 years after the author’s death, 
and not at any other? The House Committee Report explains the reasoning behind the 
original life-plus-50-years term of the 1976 Act: 
 
The present 56 year term is not long enough to insure an author and his 
dependents the fair economic benefits from the works. Life expectancy has 
increased substantially, and more and more authors are seeing their works fall 
into the public domain during their lifetimes, forcing later works to compete 
with their own earlier works in which copyright has expired. […] Although 
limitations on the term of copyright are obviously necessary, too short a term 
harms the author without giving any substantial benefit to the public.86 
 
Standard arguments that, at some given point, the author and his descendents should have 
been amply and fairly rewarded for their efforts seem, first, unjustified. Some work may 
cease to produce profits in its initial run of publication, while another may continue to viably 
                                               
86 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679. On 
what basis limitations on the term of copyright are “obviously necessary” is something of a mystery. 
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produce profits for centuries. How is it we can say that in both cases the authors and their 
descendents have been fully rewarded at any one common point in time relative to each 
work’s time of creation? As professors of law, Halpern et al., state, “Obviously the length of 
time a work is protected has a significant bearing on the total earnings that will flow to the 
author and copyright owner of the work, but this cannot be quantified accurately for any 
particular work until after the fact.”87 Second, such arguments seem merely incidental to 
copyright. As noted earlier in this chapter, there is nothing about copyright as I have 
described it that is in essence financially-motivated. That an author might so exploit his 
copyright to make a profit does not imply that copyright is itself at base a financial right. As 
such, to cut off a copyright on economic grounds is to miss the point of copyright. 
Aside from cases where the copyright-holder renounces his rights, the sole reason 
I can see for limiting the duration of copyright is found in cases where either (i) the last 
person the copyright has been passed to (either the last in the copyright owner’s line of 
descendents, or the last person the copyright has been transferred to, who himself has no 
heirs) has died, or (ii) where the copyright owner is unidentifiable. In such cases, there is 
no person who might be reasonably identified as the rights-holder, either by himself or by 
the members of the public. That is, there is no individual who might grant, or refuse to 
grant, permission to copy the relevant work. In all other cases, however, absent any 
argument that no natural rights should be transferable (and so all should dissolve at the 
death of the rights-holder), or that there is some difference between standard property 
rights and copyright such that the latter should be extinguished on death and the former 
not, I contend that the right of copyright exists in perpetuitiy. 
                                               




Centrally, I have been concerned throughout this project with providing a stable, 
consistent, and coherent ontological foundation to ground the central program of 
copyright, including the right of copyright, the conditions of copyrightability, and the 
conditions of infringement. In the Foreword that began this project, I raised three cases: 
that of Richard Prince, who became famous by photographing photographs by Jim 
Krantz; that of Doug Sanford, who photographed e-mails sent by his ex-girlfriend and 
displayed the photographs in a local gallery; and that of J.K Rowling, who has filed suit 
over an encyclopedic work, arguing that it infringes on her rights to the Harry Potter 
franchise. Having reached the end of our project, let us briefly return to these cases now. 
On the conditions provided in the foregoing chapters, two of the three above cases 
are cases of infringement: that of Prince, and that of Sanford. Each photographer’s work 
does, without permission, reproduce substantially elements of previously-copyrightable 
works—that is, in each case, the new work is atomically similar to the previously-
existing work, with the properties held in common between the works connected by 
strong historical links. Prince’s case closely mirrors a case discussed throughout the 
preceding chapters, that of Sherrie Levine and Walker Evans, and as with the 
Levine/Evans case, the Prince/Krantz case seems one of clear infringement. Notably, 
however, as Sanford’s photographs do not perfectly reproduce his ex-girlfriend’s e-mails 
(as they focus on some parts and blur others) and would seem to include properties not 
found in the e-mails themselves, the photographs would likely qualify as derivative 
works, and thus deserve copyright protection of their own.  
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 In our remaining case, there seems to be no clear issue of infringement. Although 
the encyclopedic work will undoubtedly depend heavily on the Harry Potter books and 
films, assuming the unauthorized encyclopedic work does not directly quote from the 
copyrighted source material, but rather discusses simply the facts of the work, there is 
unlikely to arise any issue of atomic similarity. As such, while there will almost certainly 
be strong historical links connecting the encyclopedia to the original Harry Potter works, 
without atomic similarity, only half the grounds of an infringement complaint will be 
satisfied.  
 Having distinguished the infringing cases from the non-infringing one, the further 
question to consider is whether, in addition to infringing, Prince and/or Sanford also 
violate the rights of those whose works they infringe. While I conjecture there may be a 
range of rights and interests that will outweigh the right of copyright, the most likely 
competing interest in these cases is the one discussed at length in Chapter Seven: the 
value of ideas themselves. As I have stated, given our general interest in the expansion of 
the marketplace of ideas, where an action will serve to directly expand the marketplace of 
ideas, to the extent that infringing a particular copyright is necessary to do so, such an act 
of infringement should be considered permissible and, as such, not a violation. 
 In neither of our infringing cases is it immediately apparent how the infringing act 
is necessary to expand the marketplace of ideas, although we might consider some 
possible defenses. It might be argued, for instance, that both Prince and Sanford are 
commenting on the works that they infringe, and that doing so requires infringing. 
However, especially in the case of Prince, it is not clear how producing a visually 
indiscernible duplicate of the original constitutes commenting on it. At best, I suspect, 
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one might argue that one of Prince’s duplicates operates in much the same manner as 
repeating back another’s statement in a sarcastic tone. Whether this qualifies as 
commentary would be a matter of some debate. In the case of Sanford, it might be 
argued, in order to truly express his feelings, it would not do to photograph an e-mail like 
those sent by his girlfriend, but rather that only photographing those very e-mails would 
do. I suspect the line of argument for Sanford will ultimately hold more water than that 
offered here for Prince. However, for either to be successful would likely require a 
subtler line of argument than I am able to undertake here.  
 As the law currently stands, however, it is even more difficult to say whether 
Prince or Sanford’s works infringe copyright, as the doctrine of fair use provides no 
reasonable heuristic for determining the matter. With this in mind, let us turn now to 
matters of policy. 
 
Matters of Policy 
In the United States, the Copyright Act has seen several official iterations, with each new 
version incorporating changes meant to reflect advances in technology and other real-
world changes, and ideally to alleviate problems arising from earlier versions and from 
case law enacted between versions.1 As such, practically speaking, the law allows at least 
in principle for a wide range of modifications to the central doctrines and concepts of 
copyright.  
                                               
1 Active iterations of the Copyright Act have also been altered, with the most recent additions to the 1974 
Act incorporating the details of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Such changes, however, have not 
generally served to fundamentally alter the principles and concepts embodied in the Act, but rather to add 
additional rules or to expand the domain of copyright. 
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 Certainly the most fundamental modification I argue for in the preceding chapters 
is the recognition of the nature of authored works, for it is on the basis of such a nature 
that the law of copyright must be built if it is to be stable and consistent. Many of the 
central concepts of copyright require only some further explanation and grounding, much 
of which arises directly from the ontological account I have provided. For example, on 
our understanding of the basic distinction between ideas and expressions, we can begin to 
sort out what qualifies under each, and so for protection or non-protection. However, 
accepting a multidimensional nature of authored works such as I have proposed would 
require an overhaul of some of the concepts and tests currently employed in the law. For 
example, where the law makes a principled distinction between “fixed” and “unfixed” 
works such that only the former may be offered copyright protection, on my view there is 
no grounding for such a distinction, and maintaining it leads to deeply counterintuitive 
results. Problems also arise for the concepts of “substantial similarity” and conceptual 
separability. Regarding substantial similarity, it seems no amount of similarity between 
works should ever alone be enough to substantiate a complaint of infringement, as 
evidenced in our running cases of the identical haikus and Grand Canyon photographs. 
Regarding conceptual separability, recall that the law only recognizes copyrightability in 
“useful articles” in cases where the item’s functional attributes are separable either 
physically or conceptually from its aesthetic ones. As I have shown, however, the 
problem with tests for conceptual separability is that absolutely every human artifact 
would seem to pass such a test: with any set of functional considerations, there seems to 
be an infinite number of ways in which those utilitarian needs might be embodied. As 
 286 
such, that an item is a “useful article” should not in any way seem to count against its 
copyrightability. 
Regarding my larger program, as tests for copyrightability and infringement have 
historically been indoctrinated into the law on the basis of particular judicial decisions 
without reflecting changes to the Copyright Act, it would seem that the law could without 
great difficulty take up conditions such as those I have provided in Chapter Six. And, as 
my conditions for copyrightability and infringement much more closely line up with than 
diverge from much of basic contemporary legal thinking, introducing such conditions 
would seem to be a relatively painless process. 
More difficult to address, however, would be the conclusions reached in Chapter 
Seven pertaining to the right of copyright. First, the U.S. Constitution is explicit that 
copyright should be of limited duration, a position I have explicitly argued against. 
Amendments to the Constitution can be enacted by a Congress-proposed bill passing in 
both houses of representatives by a two-thirds vote, and then ratified by state conventions 
or legislatures. However, such amendments do not serve to alter the extant wording of the 
document—only to add to it. Since recognizing copyright as a perpetual right would seem 
to require altering the current wording of the Constitution proper, such would 
theoretically require a Constitutional Convention—a much more arduous process, and, at 
least as of this writing, one not undertaken in the United States since the Constitution was 
originally written. 
 Perhaps equally difficult to address, because it relies on unofficial but deeply-
entrenched belief, would be my proposal that copyright is at base a natural right. As 
discussed in detail in Chapter Seven, although the wording of the Constitution does not 
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contradict the notion that copyright is at base a natural right, legislators since Jefferson 
have gone out of their way to ensure that it is not recognized as such. So, while 
recognition of copyright as a natural right would not require any official alteration to the 
law as written, it faces what is perhaps an even more difficult barrier: the history of 
popular legislative opinion. 
 For these reasons, enacting changes to the law based on the conclusions of my 
arguments would come in a sliding scale of difficulty, legal and otherwise. Granted, 
many of the conceptual problems I indicate—and solutions I propose—could be 
addressed on an individual basis. However, to do so would only serve to further buttress a 
system in danger of collapse. As I hope to have shown, what is ultimately required is a 
stable foundation based on an understanding of the objects of copyright—authored 
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